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The Security Council has sometimes failed to perform its main duty, which is the 
maintenance of international peace and security. The Council’s responsibilities in this regard 
have grown as new international challenges have emerged. These challenges include global 
environmental issues, refugee flows and mass migration across borders, the rapid spread of 
infectious diseases, civil war that threatens international peace and security, global terrorism, 
transnational crime and illegal stocks of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. The 
Security Council has thus become the subject of both severe criticism and calls for its 
structural reform. A variety of reform proposals have been offered by scholars and 
politicians, almost all of which have focused solely on state-based solutions. The current 
study considers that reforming the Council through such means would not alter its current 
state to any significant extent. International law no longer reflects the state-based system of 
the Westphalian World Order. The international legal order does not involve only nation-
states, and state-based systems are not able autonomously to deal with problems such as these 
in the post-Westphalian era. It is widely acknowledged that there are many non-state actors 
that could contribute to enhancing the Council’s representativeness, effectiveness and 
accountability. It is thus concluded that a reform proposal for the Security Council must 
consider these factors and produce a non-state based solution. It is proposed that the Council 
must consider granting formal access to Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) that have, 
as non-state actors, been active in the international legal order, and that have already made 
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Introduction and Summary of Main Arguments 
 
The reformation of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has become one of the main 
areas of concern for many academics and politicians, possibly because the Council plays a 
very significant role in ensuring the safety of the world community. It has thus always been at 
the centre of discussions in emergencies and conflicts. Critics have cited its veto powers as 
reasons for its failures. In fact, the history of the UNSC presents a mixed picture. The UNSC 
has had considerable success in maintaining international peace and security.
1
 On this point, 
the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty’s 2001 report states : 
there is no better or more appropriate body than the United Nations Security Council 
to authorize military intervention for human protection purposes…The task is not to 
find alternatives to the Security Council as a source of authority, but to make the 
Security Council work better than it has.
2
  
The UN’s actions are not always adequate. There is sometimes a failure to maintain 
international peace and security, mainly due to the obstacle presented by the use of the veto. 
For example, in the ongoing case of Syria, the UNSC has repeatedly been criticised for not 
taking action.   
                                               
1
 Examples are Cambodia, Mozambique, Haiti and Timor-Leste including long standing peacekeeping troops in 
Kashmir. Vijay Mehta. ‘Reforming and Strengthening the UN for the 21
st
 Century’ (2010), p.3. Others include 
the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda (ICTR) in 1994 and the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) in 1993 
2
 The report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to 
Protect (December, 2001), 49 
11 
 
The UNSC has failed several times to take action because of this use of the veto.
3
 Thus, many 
naturally believe that the Council would work better if they could remove the veto or change 
the Council’s size.
4
 The majority of previous reform proposals have mostly focused on 
removing or restricting the veto power, as well as on adding more permanent members or 
non-permanent members.
5
 It may be indeed important to remove Council members’ veto 
powers, but if the current realities of the world order make the achievement of such an end by 
direct amendment of the Charter impossible at present, an alternative would be to add more 
member states. The degree to which this would be efficacious is, however, debatable.  
 
There are in fact two reasons why these proposals are wrong. Firstly, an analysis of the 
UNSC’s structure makes it clear that the veto power is not the only problem. To illustrate this 
point, when the Council’s permanent members apply the veto to block it from taking action, 
it might be thought that there is no way to overcome this deadlock. Yet this is an assumption 
that cannot be taken for granted. The authority emanates from the Uniting for Peace 
Resolution
6
, which stipulates that the General Assembly to take an active role when the 
                                               
3
 In the case of Syria, the US, UK and France resolved to take action against the Bashar al-Assad regime to 
prevent violence against civilians, but this resolution was vetoed by Russia and China, which is why the UNSC 
could not take an active role on that occasion. For more details, see ’Russia, China veto U.N. resolution on 
Syria’ <http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/story/2012-02-03/un-syria-resolution/52951158/1> (accessed 
23/02/12) 
4
 See Ingo Winkelmann, ‘Bringing the Security Council Into New Era: Recent Developments in the Discussion 
on the Reform of the Security Council’ (1997) 1 Max Plank Yearbook of United Nations Law, 35-90; Brian Cox, 
‘United Nations Security Council Reform: Collected Proposals and Possible Consequences’ (2009) 6 South 
Carolina Journal of International Law and Business, 89-128; and Michael J. Kelly, ‘UN Security Council 
Membership: A New Proposal for a Twenty-First Century Council’ (2011) 31 Seton Hall Law Review, 319-407 
5
 Center for UN Reform Education, ‘Security Council Reform’ 
http://www.centerforunreform.org/?q=securitycouncil  
6
 L. H. Woolsey, ‘The Uniting for Peace Resolution of the United Nations’ (1951) 45 AJIL, 129-137. This 
resolution is discussed further in Chapter III 
12 
 
Security Council fails to solve an issue of international peace and security through 
inefficiency or the use of the veto. This implies two things: the permanent Council members 
do not bear all the responsibility for the Council’s failures, but also that those permanent 
members are not completely innocent in this regard – they have often played significant roles 
in gridlocking the Council. 
 
The second reason is that such a state-based approach is neither adequate nor sufficient to 
meet the demands of the current world order. There are now new actors and new threats. The 
UNSC was product of a time when states were the only actors on the international stage; the 
main threat was an attack by one nation state on another. The purpose for which the UNSC 
was originally designed is no longer relevant to the current world order. Any reform proposal 
cannot therefore ignore these new facts by simply restricting itself to 1945-era state-based 
solutions. 
 
The issue of UNSC reform should be treated according to the facts of current world 
conditions. There is no doubt that a more democratic UNSC is needed, but this entails 
proposals that go beyond state-based solutions. Neither can practical obstacles such as the 
veto wall
7
 and the consensus problem
8
 be ignored. In order to avoid a similar fiasco, any 
reform proposal should therefore certainly not be constricted in any way by these obstacles 
(or at least should not be totally dependent on them). 
  
                                               
7
 Article 27 of the UN Charter  
8
 The consensus problem is one of the main obstacles to the UN’s implementation of reform proposals, 
primarily because some states find such proposals at least partly inimical to their own interests. 
13 
 
1.1 Aim and Scope 
 
This study finds that one of the UNSC’s main problems is its state-based composition, a 
product of the 1945 Westphalian world order.
9
 This anti-democratic structure must be 
remoulded as a more egalitarian one, because as it stands it renders the UNSC unable to deal 
appropriately with international problems. Yet any attempt at reformation would be 
unsatisfactory without consideration of the current international legal order. A solution for 
the UNSC’s decision-making process should thus be both satisfactory and feasible. In this 
regard, the present study finds Cosmopolitan Democracy (CD) to be the most relevant type of 
democracy for its purposes.
10
 The author proposes brining the UNSC into the post-
Westphalian era
11
 in order to make it a more democratic body that would solve its problems 
regarding efficiency, accountability and representativeness. The author discusses new 
concerns such as those relating to NGOs that must be accommodated in the UNSC’s 
decision-making process. The main focus point of the present work is thus reforming the 
UNSC in order to make it more democratic.  
 
Secondly, as the UNSC is an international body, the question of how an international entity 
could be made more democratic is addressed. It is found that this notion became popular just 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. It is argued that developing more democratic 
                                               
9
 “The Westphalian world order” refers to a system in which states are considered to be the sole actors in 
international law. This era began in 1648 with the Peace of Westphalia that ended the Thirty Years’ War 
10
 This is evaluated in Chapter II 
11




international institutions is possible by the inclusion of non-state actors.
12
 It will also be 
argued in this thesis that an international institution like the UNSC would be democratically 
validated by including NGOs. These facts have led the author to investigate how the 
international legal order has been exercised in practice, particularly after 1991. It is found that 
this order has significantly changed since the establishment of the UNSC. The period that 
began after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the development of the Internet is known as 
the post-Westphalian order. This order is therefore scrutinised to find the realities of the 
current international legal order. 
 
On the other hand, this proposal might prove be too contentious to implement at present.  
This is a prospective agenda that might require some other stages before it can be effected. 
On this point, even though it does not require any Charter amendment, its implementation 
would also face challenges from political realities. This proposal could thus be seen as a 
potential project. Yet mechanisms by which NGOs can be allowed more influence on the 
UNSC must be found. 
 
This proposal is significant in that it presents alternative ways of reforming the Council. It 
constitutes more than just a consideration of the Council’s problems. It considers such issues 
as how permanent and non-permanent Council members can be made to act more 
responsibly, and how they can be obliged to commit to the responsibility given to them. The 
current study suggests that alternative ways must be developed to push the Council to work 
                                               
12
 David Held, Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance 
(Stanford University Press 1995), 233; Boutros Boutros-Ghali, ‘An Agenda For Democratization: 




more effectively, rather than constantly going over old and unfruitful ground. This would 
hopefully prompt the search for alternative ways to solve the UNSC’s problems. While it 
may not be a practical means of solving the gridlock resulting from the use of the veto, it 
would hopefully help to solve that gridlock insofar as it results from purely state-based 
solutions by opening the way for an alternative means of Council reform. 
 
In fact, there is already an example of alternative approach that has aimed to push the UNSC 
to be more responsible for maintain international peace and security: Responsibility to Protect 
(R2P). This was first announced in 2001, approved in 2005, and the intention was for it be 
finally implemented by the UNSC in 2011 in Libya. R2P also provides an alternative way to 
push states to take more responsibility for maintenance of international peace and security. 
Rather than asking for a Charter amendment, it develops strategies to limit areas in which 
self-interested states can use their veto power. There might be some similarities between the 
proposal made in the present thesis and R2P. The latter has three main pillars: responsibility 
to prevent, responsibility to react and responsibility to rebuild.
13
 This study also pays close 
attention to role of NGOs in preventing conflicts, in pushing states to take action when 
prevention fails, and their role in the reconstruction of war-torn societies. This study is, 
however, specifically about role of NGOs in making the UNSC more responsive to 
international peace and security in the context of the current international legal order. The 
R2P agenda has thus not been directly addressed in this thesis.  
                                               
13
 Gareth Evans, R2P: The Next Ten Years (2015) Oxford Handbook on the Responsibility to Protect 
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1.2 Developing Solutions and Making a Reform Proposal 
 
The problem with the UNSC is manifestly its anti-democratic state-based system, which 
makes it unable to perform its primary responsibility. The remedy is to make it more 
democratic. Which form of democracy and how it could be implemented are the questions to 
be decided. 
 
The answer to the former is CD. The theory should answer the purposes of this thesis, which 
include resolutions to such problems as the reformation of an international organization, the 
implementation of such democratic principles as accountability, representativeness and 
effectiveness, a decrease in the use of military force, the inclusion of new actors in the 
international legal order, the abrogation of purely state-based structures and the adoption of a 
progressive approach (i.e. one that works toward a solution rather than implementing it all at 
once). CD is the most suitable method of answering these purposes.
14
 The reasons why this 
form of democracy is proposed is explained in detail in Chapter II.  
 
There are several reasons why NGOs constitute the means by which the UNSC could be 
made more democratic. The solution they provide is more feasible. NGOs have already 
established informal relationships with the Council. It would thus be easier to formalise these 
relationships than to establish them from scratch with new non-state actors. Indeed, Article 
29 of the Charter and Rule 39 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council 
make it possible to establish formal relationships with NGOs. NGOs are also very important 
                                               
14
 See the table of criteria of Cosmopolitan Democracy: Daniele Archibugi, The Global Commonwealth of 
Citizens: Towards Cosmopolitan Democracy (Princeton University Press, 2008), 103-106 
17 
 
agents in the performance of the UNSC’s responsibilities. Lastly, in order to achieve 
democracy, it is necessary to consider the participation of new actors in the international legal 
order. In this regard, formal participation of NGOs, which are such actors, would naturally 
eliminate the UNSC’s democracy deficit. 
 
The current study also provides a definition for NGOs that could be granted formal access
15
 
to the UNSC. The definition of an NGO used in this study is that it is international in 
character, independent of any state and free of governmental influence, that its aims are non-
profit, non-violence, not obviously connected with criminality, not political or subversive, 
and conform to the sprit, purposes and principles of the UN Charter, that it has standing 
within its sphere of interest and is particularly active in the field of humanitarian aid such as 
security, peace, human rights, poverty, health and education, and that it has a democratically 




                                               
15
 Formal access refers to granting accredited NGOs Council access through a committee. Informal access 
means that NGOs could meet Council members as the latter deem necessary. Informal access is discussed in 
detail in Chapter 5 and formal access in Chapter 7. 
16
 This point is discussed in detail in Chapter 4. 
18 
 
1.3 Importance of Study 
 
The reformation of the Security Council has been evaluated in relation to state-based 
solutions such as enlarging the size of the Council by adding more members and removing or 
limiting the veto power. Little attention has been paid to developing relationships between 
NGOs and the Council. There is thus a paucity of literature regarding relations between the 
UNSC and NGOs. The current study such literature as exists on this topic. The people 
mentioned below are important for two main reasons. Firstly, to the best of the author’s 
knowledge they are only ones who have paid attention to the relations between NGOs and the 
Council. Secondly, the current study briefly compares its proposal to its predecessors in order 
to illustrate its originality and how it contributes to the literature.   
 
Firstly, Archibugi cursorily considers consultative status for NGOs on the Council
17
 as one 
suggestion in his discussion of CD, although he provides no background or detailed analysis 
for such a reform. In supplying these, the present research fills a gap in the current state of 
knowledge. 
 
Secondly, James Paul outlines the relations that have developed between the Council and 
NGOs.
18
 He evaluates to some extent the inequality of informal relations and provides 
reasons why this should be so, and he illustrates the outcomes of interactions between the 
Council and NGOs. He does not, however, offer any views as to the potential directions that 
                                               
17
 Archibugi (2008), p.282 
18
 James Paul, ‘Working with Nongovernmental Organizations’ in David Malone (ed.) The UN Security 
Council: From the Cold War to the 21
st
 Century (Lynne Rienner, 2004), 386 
19 
 
such development could take. This study has gone further: it investigates the development of 
informal relations and, makes theory-based predictions regarding the formal participation of 
NGOs. It uses the theory of CD
19
 to justify formal participation by NGOs on the Security 
Council. 
 
Third, Martin Binder examines whether and to what extent the Security Council grants access 
to civil society.
20
 He illustrates the shift that has taken place in the Security Council’s scope 
and authority, as well as its politicization, as non-permanent members have used NGOs to 
counterbalance the “Big Five”. However, he does not speculate on any future developments 
or resolutions regarding relations between the Council and NGOs. The current study has 
taken the issue well beyond a mere focus on the counterbalancing ability of NGOs. It has 
identified several salient points regarding NGOs’ contribution to the Council, such as 
enhancing its representativeness, accountability and effectiveness.  
 
Fourth, Jonathan Graubart examines the involvement of NGOs in the Council’s peace-
building operations. He takes a critical approach to this involvement, believing that relations 
between humanitarian NGOs and the Security Council in this regard are primarily intended to 
promote the political interests of the powerful sponsors rather than the subject populations.
21
 
                                               
19
 CD considers it essential that decision-making processes involve all individuals affected by those decisions. 
See n.1 above 
20
 Martin Binder, The Politicization of International Security Institutions: The UN Security Council and NGOs 
(2008) Social Science Research Center, Berlin 
21
 Jonathan Graubart, ‘NGOs and the Security Council: Authority All Around but for Whose Benefit?’ in Bruce 




The present study, on the contrary, finds positive outcomes of NGOs’ activities and suggests 
that informal relations be transformed into formal ones. 
 
Fifth, Pini Pavel Miretski evaluates the relations between the Security Council and non-state 
actors.
22
 He examines the legality of those Council Resolutions that deal with such agents. 
Yet he does not deal with NGOs separately, and does not so much as mention the Arria 
Formula. His concern is rather to examine the limits of the Council’s authority in its dealings 
with non-state entities. The present study, by contrast, pays particular attention to NGOs by 
analysing and evaluating their participation in detail. 
 
Lastly, Martin Daniel Niemetz’s study of Council reform is the most recent to be published.
23
 
He analyses NGOs’ participation in detail, but he concludes by disagreeing with the 
development of formal relations between NGOs and the Council, believing rather that they 
should be able to make the best use of current informal methods of increasing their influence 
on the Council rather than broadening these relations. He also offers a state-based solution, as 
he believes that the General Assembly should have more responsibility for security and peace 
issues. The current research disputes this, concluding that current informal relations are 
inadequate and subject to the arbitrary actions of Council members. The present research 
therefore finds that it is necessary for the Council to establish formal access for NGOs. 
 
                                               
22
 Pini Pavel Miretski, ‘Delegitimizing or Evolving?: The Legality of UN Security Council Resolutions 
Imposing Duties on Non-State Actors’ (2009) Social Science Research Network 
23
 Martin Daniel Niemetz, Reforming UN Decision-Making Procedures: Promoting a Deliberative System for 
Global Peace and Security (Routledge, 2015) 
21 
 
This thesis offers a new approach to the issue of reforming the Security Council. Firstly, its 
proposal does not require any Charter amendments,
24
 which makes it both more practicable 
and distinct from previous state-centred reform proposals. The present research takes the idea 
of establishing formal relations beyond a mere suggestion, providing reasons and possible 
outcomes in detail and using CD to justify its arguments. The author believes that this study 
would advance the granting of formal participation to non-state actors. It may also increase 
the opportunity for non-state-based discussions regarding the issue of Security Council 
reform. Lastly, it might contribute to the literature evaluating the importance of participation 




                                               
24
 All that would be required would be to apply Article 29, which states that “[t]he Security Council may 
establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions.” This point is 





Certain methodologies have been described in this work in order to identify the most 
appropriate ones for this inquiry. Those investigated are functionalism and institutionalism, 
CD and the Principle of Maximum Effectiveness. 
 
There is no single correct or perfect methodology or school of thought.
25
 Indeed, a study 
could incorporate one or more methodologies in accordance with the character and 
requirements of the research.
26
 It should initially be emphasized that the issue of Security 
Council reform concerns more than just law, but also involves international relations and 
politics.
27
 An exclusively legal method might thus be counterproductive in unnecessarily 
constraining the inquiry.
28
 The proposed research approach is therefore theoretical in nature 
and combines doctrinal international law with interdisciplinary material, particularly from 
international relations and politics. As an international relations theory, CD has made 
important theoretical contributions to the current study. It is also used to provide supporting 
arguments and reasons for and evaluations of the solution identified. The further relevance of 
those theories is explained later in this section. 
 
                                               
25
 Steven R. Ratner & Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘Appraising the Methods of International Law: A Prospectus for 
Readers’ (1999) 93 AJIL 2    
26
 Caroline Morris & Cian Murphy, Getting a PhD in Law (Oxford, 2011) 29  
27
 Sabine Hassler, Reform of the UN Security Council Membership: An Analysis of the Desirability, 
Effectiveness Achievability of a Representative Security Council Membership (PhD thesis, University of the 





Hassler believes that engaging with the issue of Security Council reform from a positivist 
perspective would provide neither “a future outlook nor a hypothetical exploration of 
reform”.
29
 Functionalism can be thought of as a political theory that “contributes to an 
understanding of the broad range of man’s political activities”.
30
 It assumes that all people are 
intrinsically “good, rational, and devoted to the common weal”.
31
 The ideals and values 
shared by humans around the world might not be amenable to expression at the lowest 
level.
32
 Resolutions could be achieved by experts beyond the nation state
33
 at the 
supranational level.
34
 In other words, it is possible for experts rather than nation-states to 
resolve international problems. As a theory of international relations, functionalism implies 
that states have become obsolescent.
35
 It emphasizes the significance of public goods and 
demands their equal distribution among states and non-state actors. This implies the increased 
importance of NGOs, experts and scientists in light of the erosion of states’ sovereignty.
36
 It 
also seeks to define the problems stemming from an anarchic system of international society 




Although functionalism has some merits, such as its emphasis on an incremental increase in 
peace, there are some drawbacks to this approach. Functionalism limits participation to 




 Paul Taylor ‘Introduction’ in David Mitrany, The Functional Theory of Politics (1975), ix 
31






 Hans J. Morgenthau, ‘Positivism, Functionalism, and International Law’ (1940) 34 American Society of 
International Law 261 
35
 Mitrany argues that state authority in the modern era had been called into question. Oliver Daddow, 
International Relations Theory: The  Essentials (SAGE, 2013)    
36
 Ben Rosamond, Theories of European Integration (New York 2000), 33 
37
 A. J. R. Groom & Paul Graham Taylor (eds.), Functionalism: Theory and Practice in International Relations 





 but it is not clear who those experts who could provide solutions to international 
problems are.
39
 This could therefore hinder the current study from clearly defining who as 
new actors can participate in the Security Council. Willets adds that experts could still be 
referred to certain groups who are not representative of individuals, thus making their use 
antidemocratic.
40
 This also assumes that cooperation between states would bring peace, 
despite the fact that functionalism regards nationalism as objectionable. Even though it seeks 
to eliminate nationalism, it is paradoxically quite approbatory of states. This approach could 
therefore prevent the current proposals from criticizing the Security Council’s state-based 
system. It also places too much emphasis on pragmatic cooperation, as it fails to provide for 




According to Hassler, institutionalism could help identify both the factors that inhibit Council 
reform and how these factors should be eliminated.
42
 Institutionalism could in this regard 
provide an analysis of the Council’s stability and efficiency in terms of political authority 
structures.
43
 However, it also considers states as principal actors in much the same way as the 
realists’ emphasis on the primacy of states.
44
 It might therefore be unsuitable for the present 
purposes, as it would prevent this research from offering a solely non-state-based solution, 
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and it would be inadequate to provide answers to questions regarding the contribution NGOs 
could make by participating in the Council. Likewise, institutionalism places too much 
emphasis on the positive role of institutions in creating the circumstances conducive to 
cooperation among state actors.
45
 The focal point of the current study is of course the 
insufficiency of the Security Council and the positive role of NGOs. 
 
The theory should sufficiently emphasize the role of NGOs’ participation in the international 
decision-making process. In addition, it should serve the purpose of the current study by 
making arguments supporting formal access to the Council for NGOs. This research therefore 




There are three main theories on the interpretation of treaties: the teleological theory, the 
subjective theory and the textual schools.
47
 According to Schweigman, the teleological 
approach indicates the significance of the object and purpose of a treaty. He states that the 
main assumption of this approach is to interpret a provision in a way that would best serve 
the object and purpose of the treaty even though such interpretation contradicts the original 
intentions of the parties. This theory allows “for gaps to be filled and texts to be interpreted 
liberally along the lines of the object and purpose of the treaty”.
48
 The teleological approach 
is generally incorporated with multilateral conventions of a general nature, such as the UN 
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Charter. The current study also evaluates that Charter according to its stated purpose in 
charging the Security Council to maintain international peace and security. The subjective 
and textual approaches would prevent the current study from interpreting the Charter’s 
current provisions as supporting the establishment of formal relationships between NGOs and 
the Security Council. The current study thus takes advantage of the teleological approach’s 
possibilities of establishing such formal access without any Charter amendments. The current 
study argues that Article 29 of the Charter should be interpreted in such a way as to allow the 
elected members of the Council to set up a Consultative Committee for the UN Security 
Council. Neither the subjective nor the textual schools can provide for this interpretation.  
 
In developing a practicable solution, the principle of maximum effectiveness encourages the 
author to apply the UN Charter’s current articles and rules in the best possible way so as to 
provide for the implementation of the solution arrived at in the present research.
49
 
Schweigman states that  
as regards international institutional law, in case of gaps or ambiguities in a 
constituent instrument, this school emphasizes the need for the effective 
functioning of an organization rather than the sovereignty of its members.
50
  
This implies the Principle of Maximum Effectiveness (la regie de I'effet utile).
51
 Schweigman 
details two assumptions underlying this principle. The first is that each provision is included 
for a reason, so no provision should be considered as redundant. This also considers that “it is 









better for a thing to have effect than to be void”.
52
 The second is that a provision should be 
interpreted in the light of the purpose of the instrument as a whole.  
 
Miretski applies the maximum effectiveness principle to Article 2(6) of the UN Charter in 
order to grant a legal personality to non-state actors.
53
 The current study posits that this article 
can be used to grant NGOs formal access to the UN Security Council, arguing that Article 29 
could be used to establish a permanent CCSC (Consultative Committee of the Security 
Council) that would have similar functions to those of Article 71, which provides for 
consultative status for NGOs. In fact, no such body has been established under that article 29, 
which could thus be interpreted by the maximum effectiveness approach as eliminating any 
possible negative reactions that could be based on legal provisions.  
 
Finally, as the current research concerns the development of a more democratic Security 
Council, CD provides significant insights with which to justify the desirability of democracy 
in the Council’s system. CD emphasises that all individuals affected by decisions should have 
the right to participate in that system’s decision-making process. It allows the definition of a 
demand for the development of a more democratic Council and describes grounds for a 
response to the question of why this demand for NGOs’ participation is so important. CD has 
played a significant role in identifying possible benefits of the proposed solution. In short, the 




 “…why should we not interpret Article 2(6), which may already be part of a binding customary international 
law, as allowing the UN to ensure that all non-members (and not just states), concur on the principles of the 





 have contributed significantly to the author’s arguments regarding the 
Council.  
The present research has also benefited from two other theories: Deliberative Democracy
55
 
and Liberal International Theory.
56
 Although they do not fully fit the purposes of the current 
research,
57
 they are to some extent relevant and supporting theories for the analysis and 
solution it proposes. Both of these theories are relevant because they also devote considerable 
attention to the participation of NGOs in the decision-making process. As they also 
encourage such participation, they broaden the present study’s potential reference base in 
order to make its arguments stronger and more convincing. On the other hand, despite their 
eagerness to highlight the significance of NGOs’ participation, neither Deliberative 
Democracy nor Liberal International Theory goes as far as criticizing the state-based system. 
They are also deficient in not adopting a progressive approach and in their suggestion that the 
use of military force be minimized. Those Council resolutions adopted pursuant to the 
activity of NGOs are used to support the current research’s possible outcomes and the 
feasibility of the solution it offers. 
 
The shape of this proposal’s methodology is flexible, which means that it could generate new 
strategies depending upon the exploration of new ideas and the nature of the research. In that 
regard, the thesis initially attempted to employ other methods such as interviews and 
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 It was hoped that the interviews would cover the staff of international 
organisations, the heads of NGOs, diplomats, foreign ministers, experts and political parties 
in order to understand the possibilities for granting formal access for NGOs. However, both 
the interview and questionnaire approaches were rejected
59
 because they were not necessary 
to the present study’s theoretical purpose and because of the significant time involved. The 
main research method has therefore been academic. The thesis’s approach has been to 
identify and use the relevant literature, ranging from books and journal articles through UN 
documents to Web material. The use of multiple sources and a wide variety of literature 
ensures that the subject is not dealt with from one view only. Identifying existing literature 
also means that the current study can build on and add to existing work rather than merely 
recapitulating extant knowledge. 
 
To sum up, the current study has adopted the theories that support its purposes, the main one 
being to grant formal access for NGOs to the Security Council in order to democratize it.  
The theories that have been found to be helpful in this regard are the Maximum Effectiveness 
Principle of the Teleological School and CD. The Maximum Effectiveness Principle allows a 
broad interpretation of the UN Charter in order to circumvent any objection to its 
amendment. CD’s provision of supporting arguments, reasons and evaluation has been 
significant, and Deliberative Democracy and Liberal International Theory are both used 
further to enrich that base.  
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1.5 Layout of the Study 
 
The thesis will be organized as follows. Chapter II offers some background material 
regarding the theoretical framework and democracy in the international legal order. It first 
highlights the realities of the post-Westphalian era by discussing its origins. It provides 
insights into the transformation of the international legal order from the Westphalian to the 
post-Westphalian order. As CD indicates, this section also explains the emergence of new 
problems and new actors that cannot be ignored, suggesting that they should be taken into 
account in the decision-making process. This chapter underlines changes that have taken 
place in the international realm after the establishment of the UNSC and provides reasons for 
the participation of NGOs in the Council. It outlines the circumstances in which states are no 
longer the only actors in the international legal order, and how they are not able to cope with 
the new problems of present world conditions. It suggests that the UNSC must begin to face 
the realities of the post-Westphalian order by granting formal participation rights to NGOs, 
citing changing facts as compelling reasons for such participation. It therefore supports the 
proposal that a reform project would be quite insufficient without considering the new actors 
in the international legal order. 
 
It also backgrounds the current situation regarding democracy in the international realm. The 
first section of Chapter II thus provides an opportunity to develop the argument and describes 
what is meant by a more democratic UNSC. This study seeks to find the way of making the 
UNSC, as an international entity, a more democratic body. The author must therefore 
delineate the general view of democracy in international law. The growth and decline of the 
democratic deficit in the international legal order is discussed. It is helpful to analyse the state 
31 
 
of democracy in the context of the UNSC in order to estimate more accurately the chance of 
developing a more democratic SC. Chapter II charts some of the main themes underlying the 
debate on whether international organisations could be democratized and what conditions 
must be met in order for an international organization to be democratic, before concluding 
that democracy cannot be limited to national boundaries. The chapter also determines where 
the UNSC itself stands in this debate. Finally, it argues that it is possible to democratize the 
UNSC and presents findings that demonstrate why and how the UNSC should be a more 
democratic entity. The second section of the chapter introduces the CD theory as it applies to 
the thesis. The choice of CD is justified on the grounds that it is the most suitable theory for 
the purposes of the present research. Critics and alternative theories are also discussed. 
 
Chapter III aims to diagnose the problem of the UNSC by discussing some specific articles of 
the UN Charter. It reaches a different conclusion from most other commentators: namely that 
the permanent members of the UNSC are not the only culprits. It is followed by a description 
of the UNSC’s main problem: its state-centric nature and structure, a critique of which is 
presented. It examines the Council’s state-centric system from a CD perspective, explains 
why the UNSC’s state-based system is no longer suitable for the current world order, 
criticizes the UNSC’s state-centric system by emphasising the problem of its hypocrisy and 
elucidates the reasons behind the proposal for the formal participation of NGOs. 
 
Chapter IV highlights the role of NGOs as important actors as it describes their contributions 
and roles in the international legal order. This section also portrays their de facto and de jure 
status in that environment. This chapter helps explain why it is that NGOs are singled out for 




Chapter V presents an overview of the informal relations that have been developed between 
NGOs and the UNSC to date, as well as revealing the circumstances that lead to such 
relationships being founded. Chapter VI evaluates these informal relations and concludes that 
such informality is not sufficient, outlining the practical difficulties attendant on this lack of 
formal identity. Chapter VII introduces a general framework for possible formal relations 
between NGOs and the Council and also outlines some concerns in this regard. Chapter VIII 
projects the possible outcomes of formal participation of NGOs by examining the informal 
relations that exist. Finally, Chapter IX predicts and evaluates objections and difficulties in 







The Transformation of the International Legal Order and Theoretical 
Framework 
2.1 Facing the Realities of the Post-Westphalia Era60 
 
In the rapidly changing world following the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet 
Union
61
, it has been argued that the state-centered system no longer represents the 
circumstances of the current world order. There may not be a treaty of similar importance to 
that of Westphalia to mark the birth of a new international legal order that involves non-state 
actors. Yet the new era has been marked by several significant developments such as an 
intensification of globalization, the Third Wave of global democratization and the rise of 
transnational social movements.
62
 Mattias Kumm maintains that “contemporary international 
law has expanded its scope, loosened its link to state consent and strengthened compulsory 
adjudication and enforcement mechanisms”.
63
 Ferguson and Mansbach maintain that the 
Westphalian era has passed and that the end of the Cold War has undermined states’ roles as 
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a consequence of this global trend.
64
 They aptly believe that “the current erosion of state 
authority and capacity signals that the interstate epoch is drawing to a close, and invites us to 
reexamine old ideas and construct new ones that will both provide a better fit with observable 
reality and a more accurate guide to changing political patterns and attendant norms”.
65
 It is 
thus clear that new international developments have been alerting the international legal 
system to necessity of adopting new realities of world order. 
 
Globalization has propelled many new issues onto the international agenda, such as a lack of 
deliberative democracy, international justice
66
, a universal constitution
67
, a world 
parliament
68
 and the principles of erga omnes, jus cogens and subsidiarity.
69
 The 
development of NGO activity in the international field accordingly demonstrates the 
emergence of international civil society.
70
 Holly and Karen state that “such activity has 
accelerated in several areas, notably environment and human rights, and the integration of 
NGOs into the implementation of international law, particularly of multilateral treaties, 
indicates a socialization of international law, and more importantly, the beginnings of 
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pluralism in international law, where states are not the only actors which can influence the 




Johan Galtung pertinently cautions: “states beware: as other key actors (NGOs, TNCs, and 
LAs)
72
 catch the linkage between globalization and democracy while states fail to do so, and 
the state system overdoes Westphalian sovereignty (350 years are enough!), these other 
systems may overtake and pass the state system as carries of the popular will”.
73
 The world 
has become a much more polycentric place than it was in 1945.
74
 In addition, the UNSC has 
also been facing significant new problems in the international arena that states cannot solve 
on their own.
75
 Those new developments can consequently be considered as exerting 





Jost Delbruck states that “the monopoly of the state as a political actor in the international 
system has been entirely broken”.
76
 In the post-Westphalian era the gradual diminution of 
nation-states’ powers has led to the emergence of supranational actors such as the EU, 
NAFTA and the WTO, sub-national actors including Puerto Rico, Greenland, Quebec and 
                                               
71
 The authority of the state in the international system has been broken. See Jost Delbruck, 'Prospects for a 
"World (Internal) Law"?: Legal Development in a Changing International System'  (2002) 9 Indiana Journal of 
Global Legal Studies, p.410 and ibid 
72
 NGOs: Non-Governmental Organizations, TNCs: Transnational Corporations, LAs: Local Authorities 
73
 Johan Galtung, ‘Alternative Models for Global Democracy’ in Holden (2000) p.159 
74
 Philip Alston, ‘The ‘Not-a-Cat’ Syndrome: Can the International Human Rights Regime Accommodate Non-
State Actors?’ in Philip Alston (ed.), Non-State Actors and Human Rights (Oxford, 2005), pp.3-36, p.4 
75
 Peter Wilenski, ‘The Structure of the UN in the Post-Cold War Period’ in Adam Roberts & Benedict 
Kingsbury (eds.) United Nations, Divided World: The UN's Roles in International Relations (OUP 2nd ed., 
1993), pp.437-467, p.439; n 71, p.408 
76
 Delbruck (2002) p.410 
36 
 
Hong Kong, non-state actors such as the Tibetan government in exile and private military 
companies, NGOs like Greenpeace and Amnesty International
77
 as well as transnational 
actors such as Interpol, Médecins Sans Frontières,
78
  the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), the 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the International Olympic 
Committee (IOC). The horizontal structure of international law is changing with the 
introduction of new actors at the vertical level.
79
  The emergence of non-, sub- and supra-
state actors has seen international relations develop vertically, which is to say in a 
multilayered and pluralist fashion, heedless of sovereignty and territorial factors. Various 
networks formed by sovereign-free actors for effective global governance should be brought 
together in the 21
st
 century as the monolithic model crumbles with the appearance of new 
actors. Thus, as Carol Gould rightly suggests that “no forward-looking democracy theory can 




Moreover, the concept of governance according to which states and non-state actors hand-in-
hand shape the process by which international law is formulated has replaced the state-centric 
conception of “government” which has hitherto formed the cornerstone of the old horizontal 
system. Another novelty of the post-Westphalian order is the introduction of the concept of 
democracy to the international level. The concept of “transnational democracy” is often 
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referred to by academics and politicians. The large number of innovations, both inside and 
outside the UN, concerning the democratization of the process by which international law is 
formulated emanates from the participation of non-state actors in international law and 
politics. 
 
The facts of globalization and global democracy have significantly increased their effects in 
the post-Westphalia era, so NGOs have been in the ascendancy in international law. Christine 
Drake argues that, even though “nationalistic feelings are becoming much stronger, and 
tensions among peoples, ethnic groups, tribes, and even clans are boiling over into open 
conflict”, yet, “national boundaries have become more permeable, and national sovereignty 
less sacrosanct”.
81
 She aptly adds that the concept of the nation-state has begun to be 
considered as an obstacle to the maintenance of international peace and security,
82
 so that, 
even though strives to restrain the development of new trends in the international legal order, 
it cannot escape debilitation.  
 
Charnovitz is arguing that “although the State-centric view continues to pervade international 
law, this dogma is losing coherence”.
83
 He attributes this to a significant rise in the number of 
states, their increasing heterogeneity
84
 and the decrease in incompatibility between natures of 
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 In a similar vein, Nicolas Politis postulates that “international law is in a 
transition period – no longer exclusively the law of States, but not yet completely the law of 
individuals”.
86
 While NGOs may not yet have gained formal recognition in international law, 
they have already brought about a practical change in the structure of traditional international 
law. 
 
The horizontal structure of international law has been degraded by the entrance of new actors 
in the international legal order. As mentioned, the WWO is single-layered, monolithic and 
territorial. A state’s ability to control a geographical area automatically entails its control of 
the political power within that territory’s boundaries.
87
 International law is seen as rules 
governing states in a world where each state has a border and equal rights.
88
 Yet the existence 
of NGOs has engendered the development of vertical relationships, as a result of which 
international law has significantly evolved a vertical dimension. Schreuer maintains that 
“there is mounting evidence that the process of redistributing authoritative functions will 
continue and that the vertical element in a preponderantly horizontal order will continue to 
grow”.
89
 International law, in other words, could develop both horizontally and vertically. 
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There has been a significant increase in transnational relationships that have led to the 
emergence of many actors.
90
 International law has thus shifted its emphasis to the vertical. 
 
To illustrate this point, entities such as non-state, supranational and sub-national ones can act 
independently of states in decision-making and in practice. Examples include Belgium’s 
Flemish and Walloon regions, the Canadian province of Quebec, Chechnya in Russia, 
Scotland and Wales in the UK and Spain’s Basque and Catalonian regions. Such sub-national 
geographical regions as Scotland, Wales, the Basque region and Catalonia could have direct 
and official relations with the central organs of the EU.
91
 Therefore, “the horizontal 
multiplicity of actors and their vertical interconnectedness has made classical concepts of the 
structure of the international system obsolete”; international relations as the exclusive domain 




Moreover, the advisory opinion of the ICJ in the case of Reparation for Injuries Suffered in 
the Service of the United Nations on 11 April 1949 provides that “…the Organization is an 
international person. It is a subject of international law and capable of possessing 
international rights and duties, and that it has capacity to maintain its rights by bringing 
international claims”.
93
 This decision amounts to an acknowledgement that an international 
organization can have a legal personality in international law. In that respect, it is a 
recognition of new actors alongside states in international law. 
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By contrast with current conditions, the monitoring and preservation of individual rights 
within a state’s borders was prohibited by the Treaty of Westphalia, which guaranteed not to 
interfere in the domestic affairs of sovereign states. This was main thrust of the Treaty, which 
made states free of responsibility for their internal behavior, thus allowing them to enjoy 
plenary authority within their boundaries.
94
 This is not valid for the current world order, 
however, since the majority of states do not have unlimited authority over their citizens. In 
addition, the notion that state governments are no longer their citizens’ sole representatives 
has become increasingly popular.
95
 Global civil societies therefore endeavor to establish 
independent non-state entities to maintain their interests, as they increasingly no longer 
believe that states are the proper agents working for their benefit.
96
 Steven Schneebaum 
argues that “none of this is conceivable in a world governed by the Treaty of Westphalia: all 
of it presupposes the demise of that regime”.
97
 These trends serve as alerts to the unfitness of 
the WWO to the current demands of the international legal order. 
 
The most significant feature of the post-Westphalian era is that states have been losing their 
control of international relations and of innovations and developments.
98
 Multinational 
enterprises and transnational corporations have begun to be influential in international legal 
decision-making processes.
99
 In fact, states’ determinations of their national economic 
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policies have been giving way to the preferences of multinational corporations.
100
 For this 
reason, states have considered the interests and wishes of profit-oriented corporations as far 
outweighing their own citizens’ demands,
101
 so that their dependence on multinational 
corporations forces them to shape their policies in accordance with those wishes and interests 
rather than those of their own people. The international system has eventually developed a 
new mechanism to fight the corporations’ dominance: non-profit NGOs and civil social 
actors have begun to play an important role in reducing the impact of multinational 




For example, protests that occurred after NGOs waged an intense global campaign against the 
Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) prevented its adoption.
103
 The same has 
occurred regarding the NGOs’ campaign against the planned EU agreements with Canada 
(the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA)) and the US (the Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)).
104
  NGOs are concerned that these agreements 
pose a threat to democracy, as they would involve a further transfer of power from nation-
states to corporations. They believe that such agreements would influence governments to 
take decisions that are not in the public interest. Such example demonstrates that nation-states 
are alone no longer the sole representatives of the public good in the post-Westphalian era, 
and that individuals have been motivated to collect under the umbrella of NGOs to make their 
wishes for their futures felt.  
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In short, there are four key aspects of the new world order: the introduction of innovations 
such as the Internet, the increased influence of new non-state actors, the rise of new problems 
and the loss of states’ traditional dominance. As the Security Council is the mainly state-
centric entity responsible for maintaining international peace and security, it is inconceivable 





2.2 Overview of Democracy in the Context of International Law 
 
“Suppose you were living in a village of thirteen people. You and your neighbours elected 
one person to be the mayor of your village, and made virtually all public decisions by 
referendums allowing your mayor to put your decisions into action. You would invariably 
manage few resources, and exert little power on the communities around you; however, you 
would have a substantial degree of control in your affairs. Now suppose you moved to a 
village of approximately 7 billion. You now have a village council, a mayor, a local 
representative, a governor, a national representative, a president or prime minister, and an 
international representative. There are thousands of issues decided each day, some of these 
are legislative issues bound to become laws, some judicial decisions that will have legal 
bearing - all will affect you and your life. Consequently, the degree of control you can exert 
over your own affairs has virtually evaporated. What happened to the spread of liberal 
democracy? In a world where the theory of a "global village" is increasingly and 
increasingly convincingly being advanced, international law theoretically also becomes 
increasingly necessary - this global village is interdependent, and thus there must be 




The Westphalian system of international law has never heeded the democratic legitimacy of 
states.
106
 That order has therefore never had a democratic purpose. States limited democracy 
within their borders, so democracy had been an unfamiliar concept in international law for a 
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 The most important subjects were states, and international law was regarded as 
concerning only affairs between states, not within them. The result was that a state was 
unlikely to be judged for any aspect of its behaviour under international law. Because 
international law was based on the classical concept of sovereignty, “states were given carte 
blanche to choose their own polity”.
108
 Of course, they used this opportunity to disregard 
democracy in order to forestall what they regarded as its pernicious effects on their behaviour 
for which they would not be held to account. Consequently, the ruling elites who regulated 
international law had enjoyed the benefits of neglecting democracy. 
 
In fact, traditional international law did not concern itself with the democratic character of 
sovereign states, as democratic governance was not a principle of statehood.
109
 In this regard, 
Roland Rich points out that “the word ’democracy’ does not appear in the Charter of the 
United Nations, nor was it mentioned in the Covenant of the League of Nations”.
110
 By 
requiring all states to approve its obligations, the UN Charter did not require its members to 
adopt a model of democratic governance.
111
 No standard textbooks on international law 
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include chapters on democracy.
112
 Neither has the International Court of Justice regarded the 
legal application of democratic principles in its decisions. There have, however, been some 
attempts to make democracy a norm of international law.
113
 US President Woodrow Wilson 
said that “the world must be made safe for democracy” when clarifying his aims upon the 




The defeat of fascism after World War II presented the international community with the 
opportunity to make democracy a norm of international law. With this in mind, some 
tentative steps were taken in describing “certain civil and political rights” and also in drafting 
the “consultative instruments of several international organizations”.
115
 It might well be 
concluded that “this formative period of modern international law did indeed plant the idea 
that democracy is an essential element of human rights, but the Cold War intruded far too 
quickly for the notion to take root in international law”.
116
 Democracy had thus arrived as an 
idea whose realisation should at least be attempted, even though the circumstances did not 
allow its full development. 
 
By contrast with the UN Charter, some post-war international treaties directly espouse 
democracy. UNESCO was established for the purpose of contributing to peace and security 
                                                                                                                                                  
which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able 






 ‘Making the World “Safe for Democracy”: Woodrow Wilson Asks for War’ 
<http://historymatters.gmu.edu/d/4943/> accessed on 25/2014 
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by promoting collaboration among nations in the spheres of education, science and culture.
117
 
The preamble to its constitution refers to democracy by stating that “the great and terrible war 
which has now ended was a war made possible by the denial of the democratic principles”.
118
 
Democracy also appeared in Article 29(2) of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. The Article refers to “…recognition and respect for meeting the just requirements of 
morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society”.
119
 At the same time 
the preamble to the constitution of the Organization of American States (OAS) also expresses 
itself “…convinced that representative democracy is an indispensable condition for the 
stability, peace and development of the region”.
120
 The preamble of the 1949 Statute of the 
Council of Europe sees its members as “reaffirming their devotion to the spiritual and moral 
values which are the common heritage of their peoples and the true source of individual 
freedom, political liberty and the rule of law, principles which form the basis of all genuine 
democracy”.
121
 Roland Rich believes that “the use of the qualifier genuine is an early 
indication of the contestation over ownership of the term democracy”.
122
 However, there does 
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The general character of traditional international law did not take the “will of the people” into 
account being instead based undemocratically on “sovereignty”.  James Crawford maintains 
that general classical international law’s features were deeply undemocratic,
124
 describing its 




Firstly, the executive has comprehensive power to agree and apply rules of international law 
which may affect the rights of individuals without their consent and even without their 
knowledge.
126
 For example, the heads of states and foreign secretaries or their equivalents 
generally have plenary powers to make international commitments on behalf of the state. 
Even if the government were to come to power with 75 per cent of the popular vote, one 
quarter of the population would be unrepresented by that government’s foreign policy. In 
fact, the 75 per cent might very well also disagree with foreign policy decisions.
127
 Once 
individuals express their concern that their consent is not taken into account, they might seek 
alternative ways of expressing their opinions. One reason for the existence of NGOs and their 
increasing role in international affairs is that they have been regarded as a significant 
alternative forum in which individuals can voice their views. 
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Secondly, it does not matter how democratically a national law is established. A state cannot 
make its national law an excuse for refusing or failing to comply with international 
obligations.
128
 In the current global order, a state’s national behaviour can have a significant 
impact on the rest of world. For example, the Ukraine crisis has negatively affected 
international politics, particularly in Europe. Broadly speaking, the Russian government has 
apparently put its national concerns before those of international law, causing an ongoing 
crisis that has adversely affected other regions. The impact of the crisis has been felt by 
people across the globe via Internet news and other networks. The ongoing Syrian crisis 
could not have been resolved because of conflicts between the states with interests in the 
crisis. If all interested states would first consider international rules rather than their 
perceived national interests, an effective resolution would be eminently possible. 
 
Thirdly, while the executive government has virtually exclusive control over the availability 
of international remedies, individuals have no legal standing and autonomous procedural 
rights in international law. This is an essential point, but it has weakness as well as strengths. 
First, it is necessary to provide some privileges to executive government regarding its 
security and official work. Otherwise, the execution of their policies might become 
impossible if they proved unwelcome to extremist or other antagonistic groups. Secondly, the 
absence of legal sanction for its work would make it very hard for it to fulfil that work 
efficiently. On the other hand, individuals should also be able to benefit from similar 
international remedies as far as possible. 
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Fourthly, the principle of non-intervention protects even non-democratic regimes. However, 
attempts to solve a mistake with another mistake are obviously flawed. Non-democratic 
regimes might pose a significant issue that must be dealt with. On the other hand, 
intervention is quite problematic: most such actions have failed to improve the situation; on 
the contrary, they have generally made it worse. In fact, there have been several examples of 
intervention in the affairs of non-democratic governments, implying that the principle of 
traditional international law was violated on those occasions. The well-known Iraqi invasion 
of 2003 concerned an anti-democratic government, but the international community has 
borne sad witness to how this intervention made the situation worse. Fifthly, the principle of 





Sixthly, a successor government is responsible for those responsibilities of its predecessor 
that emanate from its acts. For example, a military regime in Costa Rica seized power but 
was eventually overthrown and replaced by an elected government that refused to pay the 
debts incurred by its predecessor. After the case went to arbitration, it was held that the 
successor government was bound by all the acts of its predecessor, on the basis that the 
previous regime was firmly established, and that its legitimacy or constitutionality were 
irrelevant. 
Nevertheless, this trend has begun to change after the Cold War: the world has begun a 
remarkable shift towards democracy after the collapse of Soviet Union. Consequently, now 
that democracy has become a significant consideration, international organizations and 
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instruments have also been challenged on their democratic credentials.
130
 Gregory Fox and 
Brad Roth state that “prior to the events of 1989-1991, 'democracy' was a word rarely found 
in the writings of international lawyers” and that there were few international organisations 
that supported democratic governance.
131
 The traditional attitude was that international law 
said little about the way in which governments were selected. The post-Cold War democratic 
revolution has profoundly shaken old assumptions of international law,
132
 which has 
consequently been deployed to foster transitions to democracy and “to justify the armed 




Given this reality, it can be observed that international law has entered a new era of 
globalization, and that the path to a more democratic global world is an ongoing process, not 
a straightforward leap. Significant changes in the international realm have been followed by 
questioning the “democratic deficits” of international organizations and instruments. In this 
regard, some commentators raise questions regarding whether “global governance and the 
structure of international institutions [are] democratically legitimate, or [whether they] suffer 
from a democratic deficit”.
134
 This is emerging as perhaps one of the central questions in 
contemporary world politics.
135
 The legitimacy of international law has therefore become a 
central concern.
136
 Contemporary critiques of international law may have taken a variety 
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 Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Is there a ‘Democratic Deficit’ in World Politics?: A Framework for Analysis’ (2004) 









 but leading students of international law have begun to suggest that it is suffering 
from a crisis of legitimacy,
138
 the conclusion of international organizations being that ”they 




The issue of democracy has been of growing concern in international law. While Thomas 
Franck could say before the fall of the Berlin Wall: “yet, oddly, almost no one, nowadays, 
seems to ask this type of fundamental teleological question
140
 of the international system”,
141
 
this observation has been nullified by questions about the democratic deficit in international 
law. There was a clear victory for “liberal democracy” after the end of the Cold War in the 
early 1990s.
142
 This was considered as the triumph of democracy that implied the demise of 
communism, fascism and other ideological anti-democratic forces.
143
 After the victory of 
liberal democracy, international scholars began to believe in a right to democracy as a new 
human right to be considered among international human rights law and as an influential 
principle in most fields of public international law.
144
 Thomas Franck maintains that 
“democracy is beginning to be seen as the sine qua non for validating governance”.
145
 A 
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major debate has consequently arisen among international lawyers and political scientists 




Globalisation‘s impact on international relations has resulted in democracy beginning to 
become a principle of international law. In this regard the recognition of new states has also 
increasingly depended on their commitment to the construction of a democratic polity.
147
 The 
provision of democracy by globalization refers to the relationship between democracy and 
globalization.
148
 The main actors in this relationship are NGOs, which have come into being 
pursuant to the lack of representativeness of states or international organizations. Individuals 
consider that these political entities cannot accurately represent their interests, so NGOs have 
developed in order to represent and support those interests.
149
 Globalization has paved the 
way for NGOs to be more effective in the international realm by enabling them to recruit and 






 declare that “for the most part, it is only in the post-Cold War era that 
the historically estranged literatures of international relations theory and democratic theory 
have begun to exhibit a shared fascination with the idea of democracy beyond borders, that is 
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transnational (or global) democracy”.
152
 These two authors could be right in highlighting the 
significant impact of the end of the Cold War. However, claiming that international relations 
theory has become out of date would be an exaggeration. Of course, a “transnational turn” in 
the post-Westphalia era could be discerned, and thus a significant shift in the concept of 
democracy as it has crossed national boundaries.
153
 However, this process is still evolving; 
and international relations theory must thus be updated to some extent, while still 
acknowledging vestiges of the dominance of nation-states. 
 
Delbruck aptly declares that “the allocation of public authority to entities beyond the state” 
has been put firmly on the agenda for discussion, and that the legitimacy of public authority 
has thus begun to be questioned.
154
 This is in fact an essential point in the new international 
legal order. Prof Baslar has divided the last few centuries into the three eras of the 
aristocratic, oligarchic and democratic. By his account the aristocratic period, in which 




 centuries. The 
oligarchic period lasted until middle of the 20
th
 century and involved not more than 50 states, 
while international organizations were considered as legal persons in international law. 
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While it was not possible to question the legitimacy of the process by which law was 
adjudicated because of the predominance of a strongly positivist approach in the aristocratic 
period, a limited and non-functional opinion on legitimacy was dominant in the oligarchic 
period. However, a democratic period has emerged in the last 20 (now 30) years in which 
non-state, sub-state and supra-state actors have increasingly been participating in the 
formulation of international law, making democratic legitimacy of increasing importance.
156
 
It can be concluded that the participation of non-state entities has both instigated and 
accelerated the democratic process in the international legal order. NGOs as significant non-
state actors have made remarkable contribution to this process. 
 
Representative democracy has consequently been supplanted by participatory democracy, 
since NGOs have been considered as more representative of people’s interests.
157
 This is 
indeed an inevitable outcome when globalization coincides with the lack of accurate 
representation in the international sphere. The UN has also explicitly accepted with favour 
the fact that ‘citizens everywhere have found new channels of political expression and 
activity through NGOs and transnational movements’.
158
 Representative democracy is not 
adequate and it has been abused;
159
 people are therefore seeking alternative means of 
representation in the international legal order’s agenda. Globalization has tolerated 
innovations and the activities of NGOs.
160
 Worldwide, people have begun to coalesce under 
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the umbrellas of NGOs, and in so doing have increased their participation in the international 
organizational decision-making process. NGOs have thereby striven to insinuate themselves 









2.3 Why CD: Abandoning the State-Based System 
 
CD is not only one example of an approach to both cosmopolitanism and democracy. CD was 
first suggested by Daniele Archibugi and David Held at the end of the Cold War, as a new 
wave of democratization was building.
162
 A group of thinkers have developed the project for 
the purpose of providing intellectual arguments in favour of an expansion of democracy, both 
within states and at the global level, in the early 1990s.
163
 CD has endeavoured to provide a 
response to issues such as the conditions under which public opinion could become 
paramount, the extent to which the general public could control the actions undertaken by the 
various subjects, be they national governments, international organizations or multinational 
corporations, and the institutional instruments that are available to confer an effective 
political role on the planet’s inhabitants.
164
 A significant and growing body of literature on 
supporting the democratizing globalization
165
 has developed, whose authors include Falk, 





 Naturally, these scholars disagree on some matters, but their 
main point in common is the development of democracy beyond state borders. They offer a 
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variety of approaches to achieving this goal.  Therefore, even though some of them do find 
fault with CD, the points on which they agree with it allow their use as supporting arguments 
in the present work.  
 
Falk argues that a proper response to the emerging problems of the modern world demand a 
fundamental revision of the concepts of sovereignty, democracy and security in practice. 
These concepts are subject to reshaping in the context of a transformation from a state-centric 
world to global governance.
168
 He is clear that a fundamental change accompanied this 
transformation from state-centrism to globalism, and he thus considers the revision of basic 
tenets as a crucial necessity. 
 
McGrew also underlines the transformation of Westphalian state-based system, stating that “a 
post-Westphalian world order in the making as sovereign statehood is transformed by the 
dynamics of globalization”.
169
  He thus requires a conceptual shift, arguing that the 
perspective of thought should change from geopolitics to global politics. He also indicates 
that it is necessary to take non-state actors into account.
170
 He thus demands consideration of 
the changing from inter-state relations to global politics, where states and non-state actors act 
together within a shared global social space.
171
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Holden likewise states that “the international pre-eminence of intrastate democracy is now 
beginning to flow over into the international order”.
172
 He first considers the triumph of 
democratic nations as the fulcrum for the development of global society,
173
 which is why 
there has been an increasing interest in the idea of global democracy.
174
 He maintains that the 
growing significance of democracy within states has contributed to recognition of the 
practical importance of democracy between them, having generated an increasing demand for 
democratization internationally. In addition, the “growth of globalization, interdependence 





Habermas indicates that nation-states have been undermined by the processes of 
globalization, noting that they are therefore no longer able to claim the right of unlimited 
sovereignty and control over the traditional structures of international law. He also considers 
that the principle of non-interference in a nation-state’s internal affairs has been contravened 
many times during the twenty-first century. He believes that the international community 




Kaldor emphasises the impact of globalization on the character of war, believing that the 
need for a cosmopolitan political response emplaces individual rights and the rule of law as 
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cornerstones of any international action.
177
 She also considers changes in the international 
legal order and demands a suitable response to the consequent new facts this new order has 
created. She underlines the importance of individual rights as a fundamental issue and offers 
a cosmopolitan political response as a suitable approach to the points raised. Linklater 
likewise affirms that globalization has challenged the traditional practices of nation-states, 
making it possible to establish new forms of political community such as the cosmopolitan 




Dryzek also holds that international civil society has played a significant role in the 
democratization of international institutions.
179
 Thompson similarly emphasises the 
importance of individual participation. Although some perceived inadequacies of CD concern 
him, he agrees that if an international system allowing individual participation were to be 
adopted, it would present the opportunity to hold political decision makers to account, 




These ideas are linked to several arguments for cosmopolitanism: globalisation and its effects 
on the post-Westphalian world order, challenges to the control and sovereignty of traditional 
nation-states, and the expanding role of civil society and NGOs. In fact, these arguments are 
related to the present thesis, which also underlines the changed conditions in the international 
legal order. It criticizes the state-centric system as being an inappropriate means for the 
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UNSC to deal with the challenges of the current world order, arguing instead that the way of 
overcoming those challenges is to provide formal access for NGOs that have significantly 
increased their role in the international legal order. It thus concludes that the Council cannot 
remain aloof from this emergent reality.  
 
Despite previous attempts to enhance the transparency and accountability of, as well as 
participation in, world politics, and to increase respect for the rule of law, from Immanuel 
Kant to Richard Falk,
181
 the idea of applying democracy conceptually and practically beyond 
nation-states has hitherto been considered to be an innovative development.
182
 In this context, 
most international relations textbooks prior to 1989 do not even contain the word 
‘democracy’, and even those that do might still not refer to world politics.
183
 According to 
Archibugi and Held, most of these textbooks did not evaluate the concept of democracy 
beyond national borders, but rather addressed purely domestic issues. These authors believe 





Nevertheless, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, scholars and policymakers have begun to 
reconsider democracy in the face of global changes and, as a result, to discuss the application 
of democracy beyond borders.
185
 As mentioned earlier, McGrew contends that a 
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transformation has occurred from inter-state relations to global politics in the post-
Westphalian world order.
186
 Holden also points out that the collapse of communism has 
contributed to the development of international democracy.
187
 In this regard, most recent 
international relations textbooks devote at least one chapter to the question of democracy by 




Archibugi and Held find that not all commentators are convinced that CD is necessary or 
desirable. They define the concept as an attempt to avoid a single hierarchical form of 
authority and to generate democratic governance at a variety of levels including the global, 
providing for individuals to participate in world politics by involving them in decisions that 
affect them.
189
 Their fundamental point is that CD is a way of gradually improving 
democracy all levels of the world. In this regard, CD deems it possible to reform international 
organizations.
190
 They offer as an illustration the supposition that, if global politics were to 
become more representative and accountable, it would lead to the consolidation of domestic 
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politics. So CD has more goals that just its main one of democratizing global governance: it 
also addresses local, national and regional levels, aiming to sow the seeds of nonviolence, 




Archibugi holds that “cosmopolitan democracy is an ambitious project whose aim is to 
achieve a world order based on the rule of law and democracy”.
192
 At the same time, he 
indicates that “democracy is to be conceptualized as a process, rather than as a set of norms 
and procedures”.
193
 CD is sceptical about the positive outcomes of military interventions, 
which have ostensibly been motivated by humanitarian intentions, yet are not an effective 
way of achieving peace and security.
194
 CD rather prefers the active diplomacy of people and 
arms control. This point is an essential aspect of the current thesis, which criticises the 
UNSC’s military operations as interventions that could cause more crises in international 
affairs as well as in the regions subject to such intervention. In this regard it is suggested that 
participation of NGOs would increase the Council’s diplomatic power, making it possible for 
it to cope with international conflicts peacefully.  
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2.3.1 Contributions of CD to Study 
 
The UNSC is a product of a time in which the state-based system was paradigmatic. Its 
structure was thus shaped in accordance with the circumstances of the 1940s. The post-
Westphalian era has strongly challenged the assumptions underlying the Westphalian period. 
The international legal order has shifted significantly away from a state-based system, 
incorporating many new actors such as NGOs.
195
 Many new problems have also arisen with 
which states have found it difficult to deal without the cooperation of these new actors.
196
 The 
UN’s principal organs such as ECOSOC, the General Assembly, the Secretariat, the 
International Court of Justice and even the UNSC have consequently established relations 
with these new actors.
197
 On the other hand, organisations that have insisted on adhering to 
the state-based system have failed to achieve their objectives. The UNSC is one of these 
conservative organisations, as its interaction with those new actors has proved unsatisfactory 
having been only on an ad hoc or irregular basis such as informal meetings. It has been the 
target of constant criticism because of its failure to maintain international peace and security. 
In this regard, numerous reform proposals have been submitted with the purpose of 
enhancing the Council’s role. Yet these proposals have not received the full approbation of 
states, which have found them both unsatisfactory and infeasible.
198
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This thesis thus aims to find a way to revitalize the UNSC in order to bring it into the new 
era. It hopes not to share the same fate as previous reform proposals.
199
 To this end, the real 
problem of the UNSC is defined and the proposed remedies are intended to be as feasible as 
possible. The thesis suggests that the Council’s focus should shift from a stated-based system 
to become an entity capable of solving current international problems and being compatible 
with the current international legal order. Thus, in contrast to previous state-based 
recommendations,
200
 it advocates reform based on the current world order. This proposal 
avoids amendments to the UN Charter as being infeasible. It thus aims to present a 
progressive proposal that will pave the way for an ideal UNSC, rather than attempting to 
implement such a solution immediately. Formal participation by NGOs being obviously 
important, CD is found to be the theory that best answers the aim of this thesis. 
 
The proposed theory should meet the thesis’ aims. Firstly, the theory should aim to reform 
international organizations. Secondly, it should deal with the principles of democracy such as 
accountability, representativeness and effectiveness. Thirdly, it should consider the use of 
military force only as a last option; it should thus aim to decrease the use of military force. 
Fourthly, it should take account of new actors in the international legal order, and should 
therefore reject a solely state-based structure. Finally, in order to fulfil these aims, it must 
adopt a progressive approach: the implementation of its proposed actions must be long-term 
if it is to achieve its purposes. By contrast, the transnational democracy theory of radical 
democratic pluralism rejects the reformist approach and aims at direct democracy. This 
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radical theory believes that existing structures of global governance are inimical to the 
interests of humanity. The present work thus advocates a gradual or incremental change 
involving small steps rather than a rash leap to an ideal solution.  
 
CD is the most suitable answer for these purposes.
201
 It might be considered as a deficiency 
in this work that it does not refer directly to CD throughout. Yet this procedure is reasonable 
when it is considered that CD’s main pioneers are mostly referred to. On the other hand, it 
would be wise to explain why CD is favoured over other democracy theories. The question of 
CD’s relevance to reform of the UNSC must also be addressed. 
It is necessary for the UNSC to consider the developments of post-Westphalian order. A 
significant number of problems are seen to be emerging with which the state-based system 
alone cannot cope because it is hypocritical,
202
 and lacks both altruism
203
 and necessary 
sources.
204
 At this juncture, CD makes a significant contribution by its criticism of the state-
centric structure. In particular, Daniele Archibugi’s argument regarding the hypocrisy of 
states allows a clearer criticism of the UNSC’s structure, and consequently the development 
of a stronger line of reasoning as to how that state-centric system should be changed.  
 
Any suggestions of a more representative or democratic UNSC cannot ignore the 
participation of NGOs. States are no longer the sole actors in the international legal order in 
the post-Westphalian world. CD increases the opportunity to argue for the participation of 
NGOs in the UNSC. For example, it considers the participation of new actors in the decision-
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making process as an essential factor in raising the level of democratization, allowing that 
argument to be applied specifically to the UNSC.
205
 It also provides a way to highlight the 
indispensability of granting NGOs formal access to the Council. 
 
The democratic concept must also be approached more in terms of internationality, as the 
UNSC is an international entity. CD presents the opportunity of finding a way of making an 
international entity more democratic. For example, one of its tenets not only directly 
contradicts the traditional position that international organizations cannot be democratized, 
but shows how this is possible. It thus provides insights into how to develop arguments about 
democratizing the UNSC.  
 
To sum up, this thesis thus presents a reform proposal that would solve the UNSC’s general 
problems such as representativeness, accountability, transparency, minimizing the application 
of military force, and efficiency. NGOs are considered as potential actors in the achievement 
of these goals. As observed above, CD is one means of justifying this proposal.  The reason 
for choosing CD is that it sets out to be more inclusive: it takes democracy further and aims 
to increase nonviolence, political equality and popular control and to expand democracy 
beyond its traditionally state-centered domain. The decision-making process must involve 
individuals affected by those decisions. History is witness to the failure of democratic states 
to establish a democratic international system. It is therefore pertinent to challenge this state 
of affairs by establishing a democratic international structure and then also consolidating 
democracy within state’s borders.  
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2.3.2 Other Alternative Theories  
 
CD is only one example of an approach to transnational democracy. There are other 
alternative ways of making international institutions more democratic. As explained in the 
methodology section, there is no single correct or perfect method. In that respect, a work 
could incorporate more than one methodology in accordance with the character and 
requirements of the research.
206
 CD might be the most suitable for the purposes of this study, 
but reference is also made to other theories as necessary to support the present argument. 
Three other distinctly transnational democratic theories also contain some of these principles: 
deliberative democracy, liberal-internationalism and radical pluralism. These three also aim 
to take democracy beyond nation-states, but their solutions implicitly contradict some 
elements of CD,
207
 and all of these theories are therefore compared in order to justify the 
author’s preference for CD. 
 
Deliberative democracy holds that legitimacy is engendered by the participation of several 
actors and that the decision-making process has a democratic, transparent and accountable 
character in which participants can question each other’s interests and justify the public 
weal.
208
 It also considers the participation of other actors alongside states and it implies 
accountability.  
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Liberal-internationalism responds to the question of transnational democracy by developing 
more representative, accountable and transparent international organisations.
209
 The 
distinguishing idea of liberal-internationalism is “civil society”: it implies that states have 
been embedded in “domestic and international civil society”, which systemically hinders state 
actions.
210
 In this theory, civil society is considered as a political space where individuals and 
voluntary associations seek to shape the rules that “govern one or other aspect of social 
life”.
211
 What is more, citizens could non-coercively be brought together by civil social 





Radical democratic pluralism involves a substantive perspective on democracy.
213
 It is 
concerned with establishing “good communities” based on “normative principles of equality, 
active citizenship, the promotion of the public good, humane governance and harmony with 
the natural environment”.
214
 This philosophy seeks to adapt notions of direct democracy and 
self-governance to suit an era in which structures of transnational and global power regulate 
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The abovementioned alternative theories are also of significant value for developing a more 
democratic SC. Nevertheless, none of these three theories comprehend the purposes of this 
study. For example, none of them strongly recommends decreasing the use of military 
force.
216
 Nor, despite their eagerness to highlight the importance of the participation of non-
state actors, is any of them keen to criticize the state-based system.
217
 None of them adopts an 
even vaguely progressive approach.
218
 They do have some points, such as the participation of 
NGOs and increasing accountability in common. Yet it is CD that comprehensively answers 
the purposes of this thesis, and it is therefore more practicable to employ it than to aggregate 
the common points of different theories.  
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2.4 Critical Analysis of CD 
 
As stated above, CD is only one example of an approach to both cosmopolitanism and 
democracy. It might be the best theory for the purposes of the current study, yet it might not 
be the perfect one to make the world order more democratic. There are some objections to 
CD. Martell maintains that cosmopolitan goals cannot be achieved by cosmopolitan 
democracy.
219
 He has its doubts about cosmopolitan democracy while agreeing that it has 
value. For him, “…cosmopolitans are well-intended and concerned about the world’s 
problems and cultural harmony and are proposing routes for solving them”.
220
 He concedes 
the existence of common global problems, but questions whether global politics is the best 
way of tackling them. He believes that the world as it is is not ready for a cosmopolitan order 
because of the lack of sociological and empirical basis in society. A defence of CD would, 
therefore, obstruct the development of alternative analytical means of arriving at 
cosmopolitan ends. He suggests that such ends would more likely be achieved through the 
adoption of non-cosmopolitan means. This is in fact the strongest argument against CD, as 
the current international legal order may not be ready for such measures. That does not mean 
it will not be ready in the future. The current study acknowledges difficulty that the time may 
not yet be right for its proposal. 
 
Martell asserts that CD requires individuals and states to abdicate their own interests. He is 
concerned that this is not happening. He does accept that some cosmopolitan developments 
could be seen as a basis for cosmopolitan politics, but he does not see these as being widely 
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accepted. A global consciousness regarding ecological problems that would produce 
cosmopolitan sensibilities might, for example, be dawning, but he believes that “this is 
speculative there is no good evidence for it”.
221
 It might be easy, he says, for some groups to 
come together to combat factors that cause environmental pollution, as such action would be 
for their own benefit. Nevertheless, that same action could be inimical to the interests of 
some other groups such as factory owners or oil companies. Therefore, he concludes that 
circumstances are far from being cosmopolitan.  
In addition, realists also see the academic advocates of CD as dreamers.
222
 They believe that 
the world is very different than imagined by this theory, maintaining that international 
relations should be regulated according to principles of force and interest. They therefore 
think that any effort to tame the international legal order by institutions and public 
participation cannot be considered as anything more than purely utopian.
223
 On this view, 
some realists reject the feasibility and the desirability of the CD project.  
 
David Held points out, however, that CD acknowledges the importance of force and interest, 
without regarding them as the sole principles by which to shape the international legal 
order.
224
 The realist view that the mechanisms by which the world operates are different than 
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those advocated by CD ignore the mutability of international circumstances.
225
 Their 
assumption would have been prevailed before the 1990s, but the events of the last two 
decades offer very little to substantiate this viewpoint.
226
 Furthermore, Archibugi also affirms 
that, if the realists were right, democracy itself should not have existed as a political 
system.
227
 Yet it does so, even despite its imperfections. CD also refutes the realist argument 




In short, this objection could be referred to as the difficulty of CD’s practicality. The realist 
view rejects the philosophy’s feasibility, basing its argument on the fact that the international 
legal order is based on power and interests. They thus believe that there is conflict of interests 
that would not allow CD to be implemented.  In this respect Martell accepts the realist view. 
He goes further, however, to make alternative suggestions by which cosmopolitan goals can 
be achieved. His criticisms are thus more constructive than the simple realist dismissal of CD 
as a dream. At least he does not merely disparage CD as an unrealistic or infeasible vision.  
 
Nevertheless, CD does in fact take the realities of the international legal order into account, 
thus actually recognising facts ignored by realists. This does not mean the total rejection of 
force and interest as factors to be taken into account, but only of their monopoly as 
considerations. Barack Obama has recently stated that the traditional use of force is no longer 











an efficient way of dealing with problems in the international legal order.
229
 Many 
international treaties have been adopted by states who have relinquished their interests. If the 
realist perspective were valid, many international humanitarian treaties and mechanisms for 
cooperation would not have been considered by international actors. 
 
Martell’s assumptions might be correct as regards climate problems. Yet global terrorism is a 
very common threat to regions throughout the world. Action in common is thus required to 
deal with it. The issue of international security and peace is not one that can be postponed to 
appease economic interests. Besides, the global world order has made international peace and 
security an ever more pressing concern for the world community. It was formerly possible to 
confine the negative outcomes of a conflict to a single region, but no longer. None can claim 
that the impact of the Syrian crisis is limited to the Middle East. There could be a variety of 
interests regarding that conflict, but the significance of the threat could bring different interest 
groups together because if they were not to take action in common, it would disadvantage all 
of them. In fact, this is the reason supranational organizations are needed to discuss problems 
that arise from clash of interests. For example, the threat posed by the terrorist group ISIS has 
resulted in action common to the permanent five UNSC members. The problems of climate 
change may thus be very hard ones and take much longer to resolve, but an issue of security 
and peace is hard to ignore once it has become international. 
 
What is more, Eckersley points out that the majority of like-minded cosmopolitan nation 
states must agree in order to achieve a cosmopolitan global order. He thus believes that CD 
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should not attempt to weaken nationalism, but rather should seek ways that would rescue, 
reframe and harness nationalism in order to take on a more cosmopolitan character.
230
 Martell 
also sees a difficulty of reaching cosmopolitan ends by cosmopolitan means in the obstacle to 
CD presented by the material interests of states. While agreeing that it could occur in the 
public arena, he does not see cosmopolitan culture as prevailing over the behaviours of 
politicians. Because politicians as decision-makers are more motivated by the material 
interests of their own states, they are less influenced by the values of people.  
 
Organisations such as the UN, global economic organizations like the World Bank and the 
IMF, international human rights regimes, international NGOs and global social movements 
could be basis for cosmopolitan institutions. Martell affirms that even though states have 
engaged in global negations over trade, debt, aid, climate change and nuclear proliferation, 
those attempts have often failed due to the fact that national interests have overridden 
cosmopolitanism.
231
 It is hard to develop cosmopolitan democracy if political institutions’ 
interests clash. In order to develop CD, there must be common material interests in addition 
to public awareness, but such common material interests in global issues is hard to find.
232
 
Likewise, Brown also indicates that globalization may make it possible to develop universal 
closer relations, but that this does not lead to common beliefs and interests.
233
 In short, even 
if the public is culturally motivated by cosmopolitan values, it would hardly impact on 
decision makers, because those values would be undermined by material interests. 
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There is indeed a difficulty in overcoming politicians’ material interests, but there are some 
counter-examples that might illustrate that public concerns could prevail over the concerns of 
decision makers. For example, the Syrian refugee crisis has been a significant issue since the 
conflict there began in early 2011. When a picture of the dead body of a small child was 
broadcast through the media and on the Internet, it caused many people to take action such as 
petitioning parliaments around the world. Ultimately, many governments had to take the 
refugee issue into more serious consideration and take steps to deal with it.
234
 That the public 
could influence decision-maker despite material interests therefore cannot be denied with any 
certainty, but the difficulty of such an outcome must likewise be recognized.  
 
Kuyper indicates that globalization makes CD a necessary project while relegating its 
fulfilment to the distant future.
235
 He concedes that there might well be increased 
interdependence and cooperation of actors at the global level that renders the CD proposal 
necessary. On the other hand, he points out that globalization also amplifies power 
imbalances and skews the interests of various actors.
236
 He also puts forward the argument 
that CD has failed to provide empirical evidence that could support its vision. He thus 
suggests that CD should focus on questions emanating from Historical Institutionalism (HI) 
and International Relations (IR) rather than only grounding itself in the democratic equality 
of individuals while advocating the abolition or establishment of international organizations. 
He states that “how agreement can be reached under uncertainty, how nation-states could 
credibly commit to such a scheme, what types of institutional design should be sought, and 
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other questions must be analyzed in depth”.
237
 In fact, CD also tries to respond to these 
questions, noting for example the requirement for states to approve the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the ICJ.
238
 CD also considers the progressive approach that would be necessary 
when it proves hard for actors to reach a consensus.
239
 The present study likewise considers 
how the UNSC’s efficiency could be improved rather than directly proposing a replacement 
cosmopolitan structure. 
 
Another reservation about CD is that it could be misused by powerful states for their own 
interests. The philosophy represents a world in which all individuals have obligations to one 
another and have a say as though there were no inequality and no powerful actors.
240
 At this 
juncture, powerful states could use cosmopolitanism as a tool for their own interests by 
paying lip service to it while advancing their own ends. Likewise, Patomaki and Hutchings 
argue that the CD project could be used to legitimate a new form of imperialism even as it 
presumes the universal validity of Western democratic values.
241
 In fact, this criticism applies 
to any system, not just to CD. Any system runs the risk of being misused by the wielders of 
power. CD is more about providing a mechanism that could hold powers accountable. It 
requires states to approve the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ.
242
 It is true that this may not 
be adequate, but no system can be guaranteed to be free of the potential for abuse by powers.   
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Archibugi argues that even though there are real-world obstacles to the implementation of 
CD, it should still be defended because of its visionary nature.
243
 Martell finds that quite 
risky, however:  
this can leave you arguing for something which does not work, for which there are not 
adequate bases, that can then be misused by the most powerful for their own ends, 
justifying such misuse in the name of cosmopolitanism, while serious problems go 
untackled because this approach does not have an effect.
244
  
He suggests an alternative route: rather than being utopian, he advocates a focus on finding 
supportive material. It might be possible to find shared material interests for cosmopolitanism 
while clashing material interests undermine it. Material interests may make it difficult to use 
cosmopolitan means in order to achieve cosmopolitan ends under current conditions, yet 
alternative ways could be developed to pave the way for cosmopolitan goals. For example, 
the non-aligned movement, the G77 group of developing nations in the UN and South–South 
alliances between developing countries have cosmopolitan orientations but have used non-
cosmopolitan means, “not via all-inclusive top-down politics but through alliances with those 
with whom they have connections, and in conflict with opposed interests”.
245
 Nevertheless, 
one of CD’s important assumptions is that it adopts a progressive approach: it does not regard 
the acknowledged obstacles to its implementation posed by current conflicts of interests as 
insuperable, but as difficulties; CD can be defended and implemented in gradual steps. 
Held and Archibugi argue that it is possible to implement CD via consensus and agreement 
between actors.
246
 However, Martell suggests a perspective that “involves a conflict model of 
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society more than an approach that is optimistic about difference as a basis for consensus”.
247
 
Held and Archibugi believe that it is possible to construct an institution by involving all 
actors through CD,
248
 which is to say that they adopt an inclusive global-level approach. Yet 
they base their argument on denying “the possibility of having a political enemy and hence 
also rhetorically deny their political nature”.
249
 In fact, CD does not deny the possibility of 
having enemies. It suggests forming an international institution where different interest 
groups could come together and reach a consensus that would be benefit all the actors.  
 
Held and Archibugi have adopted a ‘top-down’ inclusive approach for achieving CD
250
 by 
considering all individuals as possible members of a single world institution. Some argue that 
there is always the possibility of non-members, and that CD cannot therefore include all 
individuals within a universal legal order. As there is always the chance that opposing parties 
are present, it is suggested that CD needs to contend with at least one other political identity.  
Cochran argues that “the need for further democracy cannot be simply instituted from above, 
but should be allowed to arise from below”.
251
 Martell also maintains that such attempts will 
not be successful, as there would be a wide variety of interests that lead to conflict and make 
it difficult to achieve cosmopolitan ends.
252
 He also suggests a “bottom up” approach that  
involves alliances only with those who are likeminded lower down rather than with 
everyone at a global level; it is not inclusive – one only allies with those with whom 
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Indeed, the attempt to include all actors at the global level would make the implementation of 
CD difficult but not impossible. CD aims to include all levels, which renders it quite hard to 
find a common solution among numerous opposed interests. The number of actors should be 
very limited in order to make it easier to reach a solution. This attempt to adopt an inclusive 
global level by trying to involve every individual might thus constitute a weakness of CD that 
consigns a solution to the distant future. Yet “difficult” does not mean “impossible”. 
 
CD goes beyond national borders and suggests a global institution that would make it 
possible for actors to negotiate solutions for their problems. Martell, however, holds that it is 
easier to make resolutions between actors at the national rather than the global level. There 
are too many opportunities for clashes of interest and the use of power by the most powerful 
states that would lead to failure. National laws, on the other hand, have provided greater 
opportunities for negotiation and enforcement than global ones. Martell advocates “national 
laws which can be made and enforced more easily, and bilateral agreements where there are 
less parties involved, so more chance of being achieved”.
254
 In short, Martell concludes that 
we should apply local and national agreements in order to achieve cosmopolitan goals at the 
global level. Otherwise, it is difficult obtain results via global-level agreements, as there 
would be many conflicts of interest. Put simply, it is easier to reach an agreement between 
two states than 195. It is therefore more logical to pursue means that have the chance to be 







implemented rather than ones whose feasibility is very problematic. In short, he suggests 





Such measures may be important, but they would not provide international solution for global 
problems such international peace and security. Two actors might be happy with a mutually 
agreed resolution that the rest of the world may totally disagree with. For example, some 
states believe that the Assad regime in Syria must remain and that all anti-government 
movements should cease their opposition, while other states maintain that a solution to the 
Syrian conflict would be possible only when the Assad regime goes. This was an intractable 
divergence until the ISIS threat become a significant global problem. Now these diverse 
actors have managed to make an agreement to fight ISIS. A mechanism that could persuade 
different actors to seek a common solution is therefore needed. Bilateral agreements would 
hardly have a global impact unless all actors agree with them. 
 
In addition, Some argue that the main problem with CD is its inclusiveness. CD’s failure to 
acknowledge that “the practice of politics is necessarily contradictory to political all-
inclusiveness”
256
 is regarded as a flaw that renders it unable to provide citizens with a 
political identity through its “aspiration towards the universal political membership”.
257
 Carl 
Schmitt also finds the establishment of  a cosmopolitan world institution impossible: 
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[T]he political entity presupposes the real existence of an enemy and therefore 
coexistence with another political entity. As long as a state exists there will thus 
always be in the world more than just one state. A world state which embraces the 
entire globe and all of humanity cannot exist.
258
  
There would indeed be significant problems, even though cosmopolitans could legitimately 
found a universal legal order. First, as mentioned above, they are not able to involve everyone 
in it.
259
 Secondly, on Thompson’s view it is very doubtful that such a universal entity could 
be held to account: “[The] general problem with cosmopolitan democracy is its multiplication 
of decision-making authorities, which is likely to result in a decline of accountability”.
260
 It 
might be difficult to build a global identity, but it is not impossible. Besides, the difficulties 
inherent in accountability are arguable, and a satisfactory solution could be arrived at. In any 
case, such an end can surely not be foregone for such reasons, as if extant systems were 
perfectly accountable.  
 
CD has been criticized by Marxists
261
 for ignoring what they take to be the fundamental basis 
of power – namely, economics – focusing instead on the institutional aspects of the 
international legal order to develop a superstructure.
262
 Marxists believe that “international 
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democracy as an exclusively institutional project would therefore be impossible, while only a 




Links between economics and politics have, however, become blurred as dominant 
transnational corporations operate in many countries and their relations with governments are 
quite complex. It is thus not an easy task to clearly define relations of cause and effect 
between politics and economics.
264
 In addition, many economic organisations have been quite 
satisfied with the present mechanisms of control and they do not see their interests being 





It is right to point out that some economic interests benefit from crises. In addition, the 
impossibility of building a strong economic regime without democracy is at least arguable. 
Democracy entails an assurance of peace and security. If there is no safe environment, 
economic dynamics are not secure. For example, no investor would invest in a conflict 
region. In a politically chaotic environment, the ownership of banks and big companies does 
not constitute an issue that would command any attention. Investors would simply abandon 
such regions in favour of safer ones where their investments would be secure. In short, the 
absence of democracy also poses significant risks for economic regimes.  It follows that the 
economy cannot play a dominant role. 
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Other Marxists criticize the very concept of CD,
266
 considering that the term 
“internationalism” would be more suitable than that of “cosmopolitanism”. Timothy Brennan 
considers that the use of the term “cosmopolitanism” is inaccurate in this context. Archibugi 
contradicts this firstly by claiming that the essential point is the concepts and not the words, 
then insisting that it is more meaningful to conceive of democracy as cosmopolitan rather 
than international. He sees internationalism as referring to a specific class, such as the 
internationalism of workers’ movements and their various international associations in the 
19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries.  
 
On the Marxist perspective there is a permanent conflict of interests between rival social 
classes that are in conflict not only within but between states. Yet Archibugi maintains that 
interests are now quite different from what they were. He consequently proposes a global 
institution that would be able to provide effective channels to resolve conflicts. In this regard 
CD rejects the idea of limiting institutions to specific social classes, suggesting instead 
institutions in which all individuals would be directly represented at the global level 
regardless of their social status. Decision-making on global issues would thus be based on a 




Internationalism was based on the notion that  
after [the] proletariat had abolished social classes, conflicts between nations 
also would disappear and no community would want to subjugate any other. 
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Thus, it would no longer be necessary to envisage a form of international 
political organization to arbitrate and resolve disputes, simply because there 
would no longer be any need. Sovereignty itself would be dissolved together 
with its bearing structure, the bourgeois state.
268
 
Yet this concept is no longer suitable for the contemporary era. As mentioned above, CD  
rejects the delegation of authority to a single class because it does not rely on any one group 
to interpret the interests of all individuals. In fact, CD has drawn from proletarian 
internationalism the idea that “common sentiments and interests exist among citizens that are 
not reflected in the policies of their respective governments”.
269
 For example, Ulrich Beck 
points out that the slogan “citizens of the world, unite!” indicates that “the common interests 





Yet the Marxist perspective limits these common interests to those of a single social class. 
Moreover, the idea of world citizenship does not have the objective of abolishing conflict 
among social classes; its aim is simply to provide some institutional forums where conflicts 
can be addressed. As mentioned, CD suggests institutional channels that would not be passive 
when faced with conflicts. Archibugi cites some examples of transnational campaigns that 
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Another argument against CD is that international institutions cannot be democratic. Those 
critics of the EU who do not believe that the institution is a democratic one support this view. 
Groucho Marx’s famous quip, ‘I refuse to join any club that would have me as a member’,
272
 
has formed the basis for the most frequent criticism of the EU: “If the EU were to apply for 
membership in the EU, it would not qualify because of the inadequate democratic content of 
its constitution”.
273
 Many observers have used this line of reasoning to argue that the EU is 




As the EU is supposedly among the most democratic of international organizations,
275
 this 
criticism supports the contention that extending democracy beyond the nation-state is 
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difficult if not impossible.
276
 Robert Dahl has formed a list of minimum criteria for assessing 
intrastate democracy,
277
 concluding that the possibility of applying these criteria to 
international organizations is unrealistic. He therefore argues that global democracy is not 
possible,
278
 and asserts that international organizations cannot ever be as democratic as many 




It could be acknowledged that Dahl’s scepticism is understandable when his criteria are 
applied to the global sphere. It might be difficult to implement these standards and expect 
them to become integral to international organizations in the short term. However, Dahl’s 
criteria do not comprise the core of democracy, but only constitute some of the means of 
achieving non-violence, popular control and political equality.
280
 Besides, although 
international organisations are less democratic than many of their member states, they should 
not be evaluated according to the same criteria.
281
 In fact, such evaluation is more about 
determining the capacity of various systems to increase the level of democratic participation 




It is understandable that Dahl is not opposed to the idea of international organizations or of 
increasing accountability and transparency. Archibugi disagrees with Dahl’s use of the word 
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 When Dahl’s criteria are compared with democratic values, their incompleteness becomes obvious. See 
democratic values: Archibugi (2008), 29-30 
281





democracy, but it is more plausible to consider courses of action rather than semantics. The 
oft-cited apparent obstacles to the implementation of democracy at the international level 
may prevent the development of mechanisms for such implementation even when it is 
possible. At this juncture, Archibugi aptly emphasises that  
the situation should be avoided in which, in view of the difficulty of attaining 
democracy at the international level, we neglect to act to increase the legitimacy of 




What is more, the notion that the EU is not a democratic entity arises from high expectations. 
While the institution’s level of democracy is very high compared to those countries with a 
large democratic deficit, that same level might not satisfy other states with higher standards 
of democracy. Of course, it cannot be argued that the EU represents the perfect democratic 
model, but neither can the positive influence of its activities on the developing democracy 
and accountability of states be ignored. 
 
Communitarian and multiculturalist thinkers have also criticised CD for its possible threat to 
the identity of political communities. This fear leads them to argue that there cannot be a link 
between democracy and cosmopolitanism, as they regard anypolitical system as able to 
represent only one or the other of these conditions.
284
 At the same time, they do not deny the 
challenges that have recently emerged in the international sphere. Kymlicka urges democratic 
states to consider such new problems as migration, financial flows, multi-ethnic communities 
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and minority rights. He also encourages these states to contribute positively to the global 
community’s increasing humaneness by enhancing international human rights and boosting 
development aid. He believes that states should not be exempted from these responsibilities 
under the pretext of a new and undefined world order, holding that this would be hazardous 
as it would create a void between an existing state system that is presently insufficient but has 
the potential for improvement and a system that does not yet exist. 
 
Kymlicka agrees with such demands for global responsibility. But while he does believe that 
institutional systems to tackle global problems should be developed, he thinks it would be 
more satisfactory to base such systems on existing states rather than establishing new entities 
on nascent mechanisms for involving individuals internationally.
285
 The state is presently an 
important component of the CD project. CD does not absolve states or individuals from 
global responsibilities. Kymlicka points to another objection to CD: the difficulty posed by 
the lack of a common language to global participation. He argues that “democratic politics is 
politics in the vernacular”;
286
 he is concerned that individuals are more comfortable 
discussing issues their native tongues. However, it is mostly the elite classes who are able to 
speak more than one language fluently. It would therefore be difficult for all individuals to 
participate equally in a global institution. As there would be more one language in such an 
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However, Kymlicka seems to be oblivious of the fact that “far too many aspects of our daily 
lives escape the vernacular dimension, at the state level as much as at the global level”.
288
 He 
cites the very pertinent examples of the vernacular political dimensions of China, India and 
Switzerland, and asks rhetorically what part of the population is excluded from vernacular 
politics in countries such as the United States or Canada. The greater importance of global 
problems over those posed by language barriers could also be argued. This might be an issue 
that requires resolution, but it is not necessarily an obstacle that would prevent a global 
institution being founded.  
 
As a summary of the responses to these criticisms, CD is now about 25 years old. One of its 
goals is to expand democracy both within states and in the global system. The successes that 
have been attained with regard to the former are indeed greater than those in the latter.
289
 Be 
that as it may, “one goal has been achieved: it is no longer sacrilegious to consider that 
democracy can be applied even outside the state”.
290
 There is no doubt that the development 
of democracy still has a long way to go, but CD is beginning to achieve its goals as time has 
made the circumstances more congenial for the implementation of the philosophy throughout 
the world. 
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Diagnosing the Problem: Examining the State-centric UNSC from the 
CD Perspective 
3.1 What is wrong with the UNSC?  
 
The current study presents criticisms of the UN Security Council. This does not mean that the 
Council is completely disfunctional. The present study tries to find an alternative way to help 
the Council respond better to international peace and security issues. The aforementioned 
report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty in 2001 aptly 
states that  
there is no better or more appropriate body than the United Nations Security Council 
to authorize military intervention for human protection purposes…The task is not to 
find alternatives to the Security Council as a source of authority, but to make the 
Security Council work better than it has.
291
  
Critics are therefore enjoined to investigate ways of making the Security Council function 
better than it does.  
 
The issue of Council reform provides a reminder of the demands to change the UN Charter in 
order to develop a more democratic, effective and accountable Council. These demands, 
which may be feigned to hide a deeper purpose, are ostensibly a call to the Council to be 
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more accountable for its actions, but often express regret that the UN Charter is the only 
obstacle to this desirable outcome, as it purportedly does not permit other members either to 
stop the Council from taking decisions or to take action when the Council’s power of 
decision has been blocked by a member exercising its power of veto. These critics have 
mostly blamed those two factors: the Charter and the power of veto. They have therefore 
generally continued to demand reform of the Council’s structure to make it more democratic, 
effective and accountable.  
 
However, it is by no means certain that this question should be taken at face value. The facts 
might differ to some degree from the way in which the critics present them. The contention 
that the member states cannot control the Council is certainly questionable, so it becomes 
futile to scapegoat the UN Charter or veto powers the Council’s failures. The veto power is 
undoubtedly a problem, but not the only one.
292
 As will be shown, there are alternatives by 
which UN members can overcome this obstacle. Yet it will also be demonstrated that a lack 
of consensus or of the ability to act independently has prevented the UN’s members from 
employing these alternatives. It is concluded that state-based solutions such as removing the 
veto power or adding more states to the Council are pointless. It is necessary rather to focus 
on non-state based solutions that are more likely to enhance the Council’s role. 
 
Firstly, it is reasonable to assess the sources of the power invested in the UNSC to enable it to 
perform its functions. In accordance with Article 23 of the UN Charter, there are five 
permanent members, each with the veto power, and 10 non-permanent members with no veto 
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power. In fact, it is evident that this veto stipulated by the UN Charter gives any one 
permanent member the power to prevent the Council from taking a decision.
293
 Nonetheless, 
it is not something that cannot be overcome under the provisions of the current UN Charter. 
Article 27 states explicitly that all decisions, procedural or otherwise, should be taken by a 
majority of no less than nine Council members.  It is thus clear that the five permanent 
members alone cannot take any decisions, and that the seven non-permanent members are 
able to block the Council from taking any decision. It is, however, not surprising that there 
has not been a single case in which the non-permanent members have exercised this power.
294
 
The second concern often voiced is that the non-permanent members are not able to urge the 
Council to take action regarding any international issue. But this need not present a problem 
that cannot be overcome by the Uniting for Peace Resolution.  
 
The authority emanating from the Uniting for Peace Resolution
295
 provides for General 
Assembly members to take an active role when the UNSC fails to resolve any particular 
international peace and security issue because of inefficiency or the exercise of the veto 
power. It means that the Council is not the UN’s sole decision-making organ with regard to 
such issues. The General Assembly can in fact urge its member states to take action when the 
Council’s permanent members cause deadlock. This resolution was adopted in 1950; its 
significance is that the UN had to some extent solved the veto problem just five years after its 
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establishment. Nevertheless, there are only a few weak instances in which the provisions of 
that Resolution were implemented: Korea (1950), the Suez Crisis (1956), the Congo Crisis 
(1960), the conflict between India and Pakistan (1971) and the Afghanistan conflict (1980).
296
 
It was, however, forgotten in the case of the Rwandan genocide, and has not been applied to 




It can thus be seen that non-permanent members of the Council can prevent its permanent 
members from taking any undesirable action
298
 and that the Assembly can assume final 
responsibility for taking action in any international dispute in which the Council has been 
rendered ineffective. It is also evident, however, that both of these capabilities have not 
properly been fulfilled by the UN’s members. Even though the Uniting for Peace Resolution 
was practiced on a few occasions, even these depended on the consent of the big powers. It 
therefore does not follow to attribute blame solely to the UN Charter or the Council’s 
permanent members; it must also be remembered that member states have their own power 
but cannot or do not choose to exercise it on their own authority.
299
 This is why the UNSC is 
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 For example, “in the cases of East Timor, Sierra Leone, and Haiti, the Security Council took enforcement 
actions after reaching the conclusion that the situations under review were threats to peace and security—a 
conclusion that is required to justify such action under the Charter. It seems quite clear, however, that there was 
very little danger to international peace and security in these isolated conflicts, where primitive armaments 
dominated and no major powers were involved. Yet the Security Council confirmed the necessity of action.” 
Rich (n111), p.31 
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in deadlock in significant international issues such as the current Syrian conflict and Ukraine 
crisis.  
 
Be that as it may, the structure of the UNSC itself is hardly without its problems in this 
regard, at least to some degree. There might indeed be some possibility of enhancing the 
UNSC by restructuring the UN Charter. The veto power could be removed or limited. More 
members can be added, which could cause more problems or could alleviate them. These 
solutions are however subject to Articles 108 and 109 of the UN Charter that require the 
approval of the permanent members for any amendments to the UN Charter. Thus, such 
expectations would quite be hard to put into effect. 
 
The primary question seems to concern the actors in the UNSC. Rather than focusing on state 
based solutions, a non-state approach should be adopted. It is more a question of the 
unwillingness or inability of member states to enhance the role of the UNSC: when one or 
more permanent Council members block the system, surprisingly the other 192 members 
simply feel obliged to respect this international institution.
300
 The main problem is therefore 
mostly the result of the members’ inability rather than rules of the Charter. To illustrate this, 
member states have been warned by the superpowers that the UN might fall into a state of 
irrelevance similar to that which preceded the demise of the League of Nations during the 
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course of the Second World War.
301
 This ominous warning was issued by the US in 
connection with its attempts to have UNSC resolutions passed authorizing the use of force in 




The member states of the UN can be pressured by the big powers into restricting their actions 
to those of which the big powers approve. For example, on 19 November 2003 at Whitehall 
Palace in London, then-US President George W. Bush said that the UN was aware that its 
credibility “depends on a willingness to keep its word and to act when action is required. 
America and Great Britain have done and will do all in their power to prevent the United 
Nations from solemnly choosing its own irrelevance and inviting the fate of the League of 
Nations.”
303
 President Bush can be seen as having acted according to the dictates of his 
predecessor Theodore Rooselvelt: speaking softly and carrying a big stick as he warned or 
threatened other UN member states. President Bush has thus made it explicit that UN 
member states may not take action independently without big power consent. If they do not 
wish to jeopardize their own interests, they might also prefer to remain silent. In this context, 
the USA, Russia and the other big powers may not be solely responsible for refusing to 
adhere to the common rules of international law.
304
 There are significant ideological or 
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economic disagreements among UN members,
305
 so the organization has many times been 
wracked with dissention rather than being united in consensus.  
 
In such an environment, the weakness of the UNSC is inevitable.
306
 Neither maintaining the 
current state-centric structure nor reforming it would make any sense without considering the 
inclusion of new agents. Hans Köchler pithily observes that “this leaves the United Nations 
trapped between a rock and a hard place when it comes to crucial matters of international 
peace and security”
307
 such as the ongoing crises in Palestine, Syria and the Ukraine. Member 
states are regrettably unable to enforce the rules of the UN Charter against the will of its most 
powerful members – nor, indeed, do they want to if they are to preserve their interests. In that 
respect, rather than attempting to reform the UNSC, it is essential to seek out new actors that 
would be able to act freely. 
 
The balance of power may prevent the Council from fulfilling its duty properly, but at least it 
can play a deterrent role in international or domestic conflicts through the participation of 
new actors. Changing the UN Charter might be impossible in practice, and may not be a 
proper solution in any case, in light of the many democracy promises made by various UN 
pronouncements. Members have some right to challenge the Council and make the General 
Assembly the final decision-making organ. These rights are, however, dependent on the 
consent of the big powers, whose statements must be heeded by the other member states. 
They indeed have rights, but can only use them at the discretion of the big powers.  






 Köchler (2006), p.335.  
97 
 
This implies that the main problem concerns the willingness of states to dare to take risks 
against their interests. In this context, it does not seem that it would make any sense if other 
member states were to have further places on the Council. The Charter might have some 
impact on states’ behaviour, but it is the positions of states that have the greater effect on 
their actions. The Security Council’s failure is not purely a consequence of the UN Charter; it 
is more about the choices of decision-makers.  Given this situation, while state actors are 
already on the scene, it is quite useless to pursue state-centric reforms. These independent 
actors would not be concerned about the pressure that powerful states could exert; they would 
be able to act autonomously. 
 
The Council also has significant duties such as maintaining international peace and security, 
but states do not seem adequately to be able to perform these obligations due to their self-
interested politics. This certainly implies that leaving such important responsibilities to a 
state-based system would be the equivalent of setting a wolf to guard the sheep.
308
 The 
former Secretary-General of the UN, Boutros-Ghali, has provided a clear, coherent 
theoretical framework for the future enrichment of global democracy, highlighting the fact 
that making the Council a more democratic and effective international actor would be 
possible by granting it considerable autonomy from the traditional fetters that the most 
powerful states have imposed on it.
309
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3.1.1 The State-centric System’s Problem: Greed for Power, not Peace 
 
It is frequently argued not only that states are the source of the world’s problems,
310
 but 
further that the “nation state” has begun to be considered as an obstacle in maintaining 
international peace and security in the post-Westphalian era.
311
 Criticisms about “the state-
centric nature of the set of UN Charter principles because of its fundamental dissatisfaction 
with the Charter scheme as a foundation for global order” have been voiced.
312
 The UNSC 
system is in fact a club of nation-states; it is mostly handicapped when it comes to resolving 
disputes in the international realm. This might indicate that the Council’s state-centric system 
is inadequate to face problems in international relations.
313
 Such an inability should serve as a 
clear signal that Council has reached its systemic limits, and must consider changing its state-
centric system in order to achieve both effectiveness and democracy. 
 
Daniele Archibugi has proposed two hypocrisies by way of pointing out how difficult it is for 
a state-based system to be both democratic and compatible with the current international legal 
order.
314
 The first of these hypocrisies, he maintains, has arisen through the Western 
democracies. The US, the UK and France in fact consider the UN as a tool for propagating 
their own “constitutional forms” into the international arena. They have had no compunction 
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about appropriating “the right to block any decision regarding security”.
315
 They have 
arrogated to themselves the “imperial privilege”
316
 of being the permanent members of the 
UNSC with the veto power.
317
 The Soviet Union seemed to be the more consistent actor by 
explicitly preventing the word “democracy” from appearing in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights.
318
 That absence makes it cruel but not paradoxical that the major UN powers 







The second hypocrisy has arisen from the governments of developing countries. Even though 
they have continually demanded more democracy in the UN’s structure, accusing the 
organisation of not being responsive to the claims of weaker states, most of these 
governments have been reluctant to apply democratic principles within the boundaries of 
their own states. Harassment – and in some cases massacre – of their own peoples have 
therefore often accompanied their “anticolonial and anti-imperialist rhetoric”.
321
 Their 
representatives do not have any credibility on this ground to demand democracy while 
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As Archibugi states these two hypocrisies, they are not likely to allow headway to be made 
for a more democratic UNSC.  They seek to advance their own interests rather than 
developing a more democratic organization that can promote international peace and security 
more effectively. And it is not necessarily reasonable to expect member governments to 
comply with or practice untried and untested democratic values that do not reflect the existing 
dynamics of power, irrespective of whether or not they have approved them.
323
 It is thus not 
to be expected that such actors will promote a more democratic UNSC. Even though they 
could manage to establish one, it would only be natural to expect them to continue their 
hypocritical positions by attempting to avoid applying these democratic values. 
 
To further illustrate the hypocrisy of the members, there has been a debate about involving 
regional organisations such as the EU, the African Union (AU), Mercosur and the Arab 
League to the UNSC. However, even though the EU has been moving toward a common 
foreign policy, it is not surprising to see that some Western members of the UNSC have 
voted against the EU having a seat on the Council.
324
 When it is considered that this issue 
concerns the EU, not the UN
325
, it is not difficult to see how states would not be inclined to 
act on behalf of common interests or of a group. A self-interested state-based system is thus 
not a fit instrument for benefitting the UN’s people or for complying with its purposes and 
principles. This question particularly concerns the UNSC, which bears the primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. 
 









This issue of the permanent members’ hypocrisy raises another significant issue. The 
powerful states have used the “democracy” argument many times to legitimate their military 
interventions through UNSC resolutions. Their goal has always been to increase their geo-
political pressure in order to serve their interests.
326
 This is why they promote democracy 
across the globe in word but not in deed. The UK and France, two of its permanent members, 
also belong to the EU, which consistently underlines the importance of democracy in its 
member states. Another permanent member, the US, claims to desire and promote democracy 
- indeed, to the extent that it can even declare a war against any entity for democracy’s sake. 
France’s reaction to the Rwandan genocide in 1994 was frankly irresponsible. President 
Francois Mitterand said, “In such countries, genocide is not too important…”
327
 There are 
cases such as Palestine, Syria and the Ukraine in which the Council has failed to take 
effective responsibility. 
 
The Palestinian case in particular raises many issues, but one outstanding example shows 
how the US, supposedly the world’s leading promoter of democracy, could challenge a 
democratic step under the auspices of the UN. It has withdrawn funds from UNESCO after 
Palestine was upgraded to non-member observer status in the General Assembly.
328
 It is 
politically understandable that the US voted against this, yet it is hardly to be comprehended 
that the country took such a drastic step as to cut funds from a democratically elected entity. 
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The Syrian case involves two types of hypocrisy as outlined by Archibugi. First, the UNSC 
undertook military operations against Gaddafi in Libya in 2011 after expressing its concern 
about “protecting civilians, the escalation of violence, and the heavy civilian casualties” in 
that country.
329
 When violence escalated in Syria, with resultant heavy civilian casualties, it 
was widely expected that the Council would respond likewise to that situation.
330
 Yet a single 
effective action has yet to be taken in that case. The second hypocrisy is that many Middle 
Eastern countries who have called on the Syrian government to establish democratic 
principles and negotiate with anti-government movements are hardly in a moral position to 
do so, responding violently as they do to any demands for democracy from their own citizens. 
 
However, whilst the major powers maintain their desire for democracy throughout the world, 
their actions betray their detestation of the concept in the context of the UNSC. Murithi 
asserts that “this is one situation in which the UN Charter came under direct threat from the 




Of course, other permanent members are hardly blameless. The case of the Ukraine could be 
cited as the clearest demonstration of how Russia has used military intervention in order 
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pretend to preserve the Crimea’s rights. And Russia and China has now been preventing the 




This problem of hypocrisy renders nation-states incapable of acting to maintain international 
peace and security. While a particular state can be highly sensitive to the security of its own 
people, the same does not even vaguely pay attention to that of other countries’ peoples. 
States can sometimes even apply a double standard, favouring its native-born citizens against 
its immigrant ones in terms of human rights. The UNSC should not be a place in which 
governments hypocritically proclaim one set of values while practising another.
333
 It should 
also not be a vehicle to disguise the pursuit of power politics. It is thus entirely plausible to 
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3.2 Democracy in the Context of the UNSC 
 








The international legal order is a system that provides a framework that encourages 
international agents to maintain their affairs as stably as possible.
336
 The rules of the 
international legal order regulate international agents’ interactions, moderate their conflicts 
and provide a mechanism for resolving their disagreements.
337
 These rules also form a 
common basis for international peace and security.
338
 They may vary from time to time. For 
example, the previous formative principles were that states were the only significant actors
339
, 
recognition of a new actor depended on “territorial integrity” and “political independence”, 
the maintenance of international order was based on “collective security”, it was possible for 
states to control all other actors, both individuals and groups
340
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However, the international legal environment has evolved remarkably in several respects 
such as the introduction of new actors, new problems and new inventions. For example, the 
major organization, the United Nations, has increased its membership from 51 states to nearly 
200, while the world’s population has risen from about 2.5 billion to approximately 7 billion. 
It is necessary for the international legal order to adjust to this new environment. For Fred 
Morrison, this order is not an immutable body of rules; it is a living system and it should 




The question of whether the UNSC must be more democratic must be answered in the 
affirmative when the realities of the current world order are considered. The Council was 
established and its permanent members were empowered by veto power to control their 
aggressive actions for the sake of preventing a third world war.
343
 Yet there are significant 
differences between 1945 and the modern world. If the main reason for the Council’s 
structure was to prevent international conflicts, new threats such as global environmental 
degradation, refugee flows and mass cross-border migration, the spread of infectious 
diseases, global terrorism and transnational crime have manifested themselves in the 
meantime.
344
 These threats could be as serious as any possible conflict among the permanent 
five. As new global threats have emerged, the UN has also become essential for the national 
security of big powers.
345
 The UNSC must therefore restructure its system in response to 
these threats. The way to effect this is to make the institution more democratic. 
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 The U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Susan Rice, told a House subcommittee: "As we all know, America's 
resources and influence are not limitless. That's why the United Nations is so important to our national 
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Democracy in the UN, particularly in the UNSC, could be seen as a contentious issue. Barry 
Holden sees that ‘what global democracy is, and to what extend its existence is likely or 
desirable, are matters about which there is considerable controversy’.
346
 Such dissention 
might be due to the fact that, on the insistence of the USSR, the UN Charter does not use the 
word “democracy”; instead it refers to some of its principles.
347
 Democracy was apparently 
sacrificed on the altar of the Soviet Union’s ideological purposes. If democracy had been 
directly mentioned in the Charter, it would perhaps have paved the way for the quicker 
development of a more democratic UNSC by possibly making it easier for arguments to be 
based on it and for other authorities to demand more democracy in the Council. Of course, it 
would also thereby make the idea less controversial.  
 
Secondly, while the enrichment of democratic culture is seen as a first step towards 
democratization
348
, there are significant contradictions between the Charter and the Council’s 
practices, preventing the development of a democratic base and making it difficult to picture 
a practicable democratic structure. Principles of democracy are outlined in the UN Charter, 
yet these have been arbitrarily interpreted by the permanent members of the UNSC.
349
 The 
lack of a clear, widely acknowledged theoretical frame of reference also makes democratic 
reforms more difficult. Lastly, when member states call for a more democratic Council, the 
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aim of such demands is more often than not to gain advantage under the guise of democracy 
rather than to actually democratize the UNSC. It can therefore be said that “the commitment 
to democratization is, however, stated in terms of pragmatism rather than of a comprehensive 
and long-term political project”.
350
 Under these circumstances it is hard to define a concept of 
democracy for the UNSC. 
 
The World Commission on Culture and Development’s report Our Creative Diversity states 
that “as we enter the twenty-first century, it is time to restore the supremacy of the people in 
international organizations on the same lines as it is at present being restored within nations 
all over the world”.
351
 A principle of democracy also enshrined in the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights adopted by the General Assembly in 1948. The concept of democracy is 
eloquently expressed in Article 21(3) of the Declaration
352
 in the phrase “the will of the 




While the UN Charter and its statements such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
have embraced some principles of democracy in theory, they have been applied ambiguously 
rather than by adhering to the purposes for which they were made.
354
 In this context, as Our 
Creative Diversity observes, “fifty years ago, the United Nations was created in the name of 
“We, the Peoples”, yet, people did not have too direct a say in the operations of the United 
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Nations as governmental representatives took over all its organs, including the General 




In fact, four significant factors have motivated the UN to include global democracy on its 
agenda: the end of the Cold War, the third wave of democratization, globalization and the 
influx of new international actors.
356
 The UN has thus changed its attitude to the notion of 
democracy. However, it has only been partially successful of idea and making up a historical 
backdrop
357
 since no significant development regarding the practice of democracy is evident. 
Jacobs and Poirier aptly point out that “despite the cooperative goals espoused in the Charter, 
the United Nations is a political institution in which members are pursuing their national 
interests as they see them”.
358
 Bertrand likewise indicates that attempts by states to 





The UNSC has accordingly also struggled between stated principles and their practical 
application. Firstly, the Council was set up to maintain international peace and security, but 
the history of international conflicts shows that the Council’s permanent members in 
particular have been involved in many conflicts, either by inciting the parties concerned 
                                               
355
 World Commission on Culture and Development, ‘Our Creative Diversity’ (1995) 
<http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0010/001055/105586e.pdf> pp.61-62. 
356




 Jacobs & Poirier (1976) p.606 
359
 Maurice Bertrand, ‘The Historical Development of Efforts to Reform the UN’ in Adam Roberts & Benedict 
Kingsbury (eds.) United Nations, Divided World: The UN's Roles in International Relations (OUP 2nd ed., 
1993), pp.420-436, p.436; Adam Roberts & Benedict Kingsbury, ‘The UN’s Roles in International Society since 
1945’ in Roberts & Kingsbury (1993), p.14 
109 
 
(generally indirectly) or by directly intervention. Archibugi states regarding the UN’s general 
condition that the practices of influential members are sufficient to demonstrate that “this is a 
formal principle that is not upheld in practice”.
360
 It is thus essential to reconsider who 
implements the UN’s rules. 
 
Article 2(1) of the UN Charter speaks eloquently of the need to act in accordance with 
democratic principles: “the Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of 
all its Members”. The veto power is thus a legal abuse that has no possible democratic 
justification.
361
 In this regard, Hans Köchler also maintains that “the co-ordination of policies 
at the global level should be organized in a democratic way, something that is also required 




In addition to this, the United Nations might principally be an organization of sovereign 
States. However, the Charter has also provided an indispensable system that offers 
cooperation with governmental or non-governmental actors.
363
 Chapter VIII of the UN 
Charter consists entirely of regional arrangements; Article 54 in particular is devoted to the 
UNSC’s cooperation with regional arrangements and agencies in maintaining international 
peace and security. Article 57 is generally devoted to the UN’s international economic and 
social cooperation with special agencies, while Article 71 also authorizes the ECOSOC to 
make directly arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in 
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order to increase its capabilities. Examination of the UN’s principle organs reveals more 
promise in the General Assembly’s, ECOSOC’s and the Secretariat’s embracing of popular 
entities.
364
 The UNSC and the International Court of Justice (ICJ), by contrast, have remained 




From the UN’s inception its provisions have allowed for the establishment of interaction and 
cooperation with new actors. The UNSC has, however, failed to make any formal contact 
with new actors, as fundamentally required if the Council is to be democratized. Boutros-
Ghali maintains that international democratization is possible by including all actors in 
international decision-making systems such as those in the developed and developing worlds, 
rich and poor, North and South, as well as giving voice to new actors.
366
 The Council has 
practical problems, while the Charter is quite suitable for establishing and maintaining 
relations with recently arrived entities. 
 
The preamble of the Charter also begins with “we the peoples of the United Nations…”, 
stating that “when decisions will be reached by means of a truly participatory process”
367
 and 
referring to peoples rather than states. Thus, as a reflection of the fundamental principle of 
democracy, the UN should not be limited to a states-only entity; rather, it should represent all 
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people’s associations such as regional organizations
368
, developing nations, unrepresented 
peoples
369
 and NGOs. Yet, the UN has traditionally seen itself as forum for sovereign states 
alone.
370
 This might be because power rather than democratic principle seems to be the 
dominant dynamic in such interstate relationships, as the principles were interpreted by and 
on behalf of states. 
 
Nevertheless, in the context of the UN, the term “democracy” has at times been used to refer 
to an inter-state project whose aim is to grant all states, large or small, the greatest chance to 
participate in global decision-making based on the principles of the UN Charter.
371
 Yet, this 
discourse has been affected by recent international developments, resulting in the notion of 
democracy beginning to take on a broader resonance that also addresses the demand to 
provide formal participation to non-state actors such as NGOs, the private sector, local 
authorities and parliamentarians.
372
 The UN’s policies have fostered more participation by 
non-state actors in the organization’s deliberations and operations,
373
 so there is a strong case 
that the UN’s policies have developed the idea of a “democracy without borders” by 
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In that respect, UN leaders have often proclaimed that “the globalization of democracy is a 
trend consistent with recent structural changes in the world order”.
375
 The UN considers 
“democracy as a universal right and a source of legitimacy”.
376
 Additionally, the UN also 
indicates the demand for “a stronger engagement of civil society, business, and other global 
constituencies in world affairs”.
377
 The organization has therefore increasingly allowed non-
state actors to take part in UN deliberations.
378
 The UN has, however, failed to develop a 
similar case for democratic UNSC reform, since the majority of Council reform proposals 
have focused on simple growth.
379





However, it seems that these problems regarding the Council’s effectiveness and 
accountability have to do with the balance of power within the institution. In other words, 
reform proposals are focused mostly on balancing the veto power rather than enhancing the 
Council’s functions. For Archibugi, democracy is the most efficient way to enhance the 
Council. Yet he also points out that it should not be used only to balance and manage power, 
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3.2.1 Parameters of the Democracy Concept for the Security Council 
 
As there is no agreed definition of democracy in international law, a variety of interpretations 
could exist according to circumstances, such as who is defining the term and the context in 
which they are doing so.
382
 This might be because of the paucity of theoretical work in 
defining and discussing democracy in the context of relations among rather than within 
states.
383
 Neither the theoretical literature nor the historical experience of democracy between 
states has been developed and consolidated.
384
 There is thus not a sufficiency of successful 
democratic international organisations,
385
 and those that do exist consequently have no 




It must first be determined what it means to “make the Security Council more democratic”. 
The Council is expressly not a democratic body when the UN Charter
387
 and its actions are 
considered.
388
 The phrase cannot therefore mean to develop the Council’s democratic profile 
as though it was already democratic entity. Nor does it mean directly developing a fully 
democratic Council. “Making the Council more democratic” refers to introducing some 
democratic instruments into the Council at least to increase its level of democracy in order to 
pave the way for the development of a pure democratic Security Council. 
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 For example, see Article 23(1), 27(3), 108 
388
 “The SC represents the most extreme form of intergovernmental oligarschism. The UN is an antidemocratic 
entity.” Archibugi (2008), p.161 and p.183 
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James Paul and Céline Nahory state that “critics of the Council made seven demands – that 
the Council be: (1) more representative, (2) more accountable, (3) more legitimate, (4) more 
democratic, (5) more transparent, (6) more effective and (7) more fair and even-handed (no 
double standards)”.
389
 A more “democratic” body might refer to one that is more 
representative and fair and even-handed, while more “accountable” could mean more 
legitimate and transparent. These demands can thus be reduced to a Council that is more 
democratic, effective and accountable.  
 
In fact there is a strong relationship between demands for democracy and those for 
effectiveness and accountability. Delbruck notes that some concepts are related to the concept 
of democracy, or indeed depend on its definition. He thus stresses that transparency and 
accountability are essential to democracy.
390
 In this context, Archibugi and Held also 





David Held also maintains that “systematizing the provision of global public goods requires 
not just building on existing forms of multilateral institutions, but also on extending and 
developing them in order to address questions of transparency, accountability and 
democracy”.
392
 It is clear that democracy and accountability are complementary concepts, as 
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they are usually treated together. It is therefore obvious that a more democratic Security 
Council ought also to be a more accountable one. 
 
The question of democracy for the Council can be regarded as being raised when it is 
ineffective and not accountable. The more the Council fails to take action regarding 
international crises, the more insistently do the UN’s member states raise the issue of reform, 
goaded by the Council’s inability to act because of the veto.
393
 In this regard, the Council has 
often been accused of inefficiency in cases of genocide, war and conflict.
394
 These failures to 
fulfil its significant responsibilities have made the Council the target of severe criticisms 




The Council’s failure in Syria was due to Russia’s and China’s application of the veto to 
block a resolution that would have allowed meaningful action against the Syrian regime. 
Such reactions by states to these Security Council failures signifies that the veto has made the 
Council’s current system undemocratic, and it therefore needs to be reformed in order to 
increase its capacity to maintain international peace and security. Calls for a more democratic 
or more representative Council have thus stemmed from the Council’s inefficiency. The 
underlying reason for a more democratic Council is its systemic inability to take action. Put 
another way, its inefficiency can be redefined as the non-democratic nature of its system. 
                                               
393
 Hans Köchler, ‘Security Council Reform: A Requirement of International Democracy’ (2007) International 
Progress Organization, p.2 
394
 “The UN has failed to stand up to dictators and perpetrators of genocide.” Its failure to halt the Rwandan 
genocide in 1994, its failure to stop the humanitarian crisis in Sri Lanka and failure maintain peace and security 
in Syria crisis ‘are a few examples of its impotency on the major issues of the day’. Mehta (2010) p.3 
395
 Köchler (N 311)   
116 
 
Another issue is that demands for reform have been based on making the Council more 
democratic by adding new members to increase its representativeness, effectiveness and 
accountability. Thus, these demands for a more democratic Council inevitably entail a more 
representative, effective and accountable one. So making the Council more democratic caters 
for these desires for its increased effectiveness and accountability. 
 
The absence of a democratic structure has nevertheless meant that the Council’s dealings 
with international problems have mostly been failures because of this ineffectiveness and lack 
of accountability. There is most likely no way other than democratization that would enhance 
the Council’s function. For Boutros-Ghali “democratization at the international level has 
become an indispensable mechanism for global problem-solving in a way that is accountable 
and acceptable to all and with the participation of all concerned”.
396
 The immediate 
implementation of such a democratic mechanism in the Security Council is perhaps not to be 
expected; yet the foundations of a democratic Council could – and should – at least be laid in 
order for it to efficiently fulfil its obligations. 
 
The Council’s main problem is its lack of proper responses to international peace and security 
issues. In other words, it does not efficiently fulfil its main duty: to maintain international 
peace and security. Issues such as inefficiency, lack of accountability and a lack of 
representativeness have been raised in that respect. These three concepts draw attention to the 
need for the Council to be more democratic so as to overcome these problems.  
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Moreover, it is not necessary for this to be considered as a reform proposal because it does 
not require any Charter amendments.
397
 This can be understood primarily with reference to 
the invention of UN peacekeeping forces in the field of security in 1956.
398
 This has been a 




The word “reform” in that context is different from its use in the demands for Council 
reform: “the word reform has never been used in this connection”.
400
 Bertrand gives another 
example, stating that comprehensively implementing the provisions of the UN Charter has 
also never been regarded as reform. For example, Article 43 delegates authority for special 
agreements on the assignment of military forces to the Security Council and Article 47 
allocates major responsibilities to the Military Staff Committee. Whenever any of these 
articles is implemented, significant UN reform as proposed by Secretary-General Boutros-
Ghali would result.
401
 Yet such proposals have been described as revitalization rather than 
reform.
402
 Implementing present structure effectively, in other words, does not refer to 
reform.  
 
In fact, both reform and revitalization aim to enhance the Council’s role. However, 
revitalization concerns the more efficient use of current Charter instruments. The present 
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proposal likewise does not require any Charter amendments,
403
 as it can be put into practice 
under that Charter’s Article 29
404
, Rule 39 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure of the 
Security Council
405




The proposal is thus deliberately circumscribed as it opens the way for democracy. It does not 
aim instantly to produce a purely democratic Council, but rather to fulfil certain conditions 
preparatory to the development of an ideal Security Council. The effect of these limitations 
on the study’s purpose is to minimize the possibility of failure in its implementation by its 
embodiment of a progressive approach. Limiting the parameters of the concept of “making 
the Security Council more democratic” in this way makes it more possible to develop a more 
democratic Council. 
 
According to the tenets of CD, it is essential for an international entity to open its doors to 
new non-state actors in order to be more democratic at the international level. The application 
of such tenets provides assurance that democracy is representative, accountable and effective. 
It is the argument of this study that the only possibility of attaining democracy is by taking 
into account the new actors in international legal order. The Security Council will eventually 
become more accountable, effective and representative. It is therefore also argued that would 
be a more democratic entity by granting formal access to NGOs. By doing so, it demonstrates 
that it would erode the Council’s conservatism and would make enable it to coexist with the 
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 However, if the Council were to insist on compliance with the 
specific terms of its existed structural instrument, it would become irrelevant and eventually 
become defunct. In short, a system mired in the circumstances of its creation in 1945 would 
doom the Council to failure. The Council must therefore accommodate itself to changing 
circumstances. The author believes that a progressive approach would make this possible.  
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CHAPTER FOUR  
Introducing NGOs: Their Legal Status, Significance and Definition 
4.1 Identifying NGOs408 as Significant Partners in the Post-Westphalian Era 
 
The argument of this work is that formal participation of NGOs on the Security Council is 
essential to increase the Council’s capabilities. To this end, the importance of NGOs as actors 
in the international realm must be demonstrated, which can help understand why these 
entities deserve a place in the mechanism of the Security Council. In this regard, Charnovitz’s 
theory of the “empowerment” period of NGOs, classifying seven historical periods of NGO 
development, is explained.
409
 In particular, this “empowerment” period since 1992 supports 
the growing impact of NGOs on the international legal order. Also explained is the problem 
of defining NGOs; such a definition is arrived at for the purpose of the study in order to 
eliminate uncertainties about which NGOs should be granted formal access to the Council.  
 
In terms of the “New World Order” that began after the Cold War, international participatory 
democracy appears to be an irreversible process. NGOs have continued to markedly increase 
their role in global politics primarily through globalization processes.
410
 Some radical 
suggestions have been made about NGOs taking a more active part preparatory to positive 
law being applied to them in a world order in which civil social actors have increasingly 
                                               
408
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participated in the formation and control of international law.
411
 Examples of the major 
influence of NGOs includes their participation in the preparation of the conventions on the 
Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on 
Their Destruction, the Rights of the Child, the Convention to Combat Desertification, on 





Boutros-Ghali states that “international relations” should not be considered solely as relations 
between sovereign states, pointing out that international relations have been shaped not only 
by nations but also by an increasing array of non-states actors, “ranging all the way from 
individual persons to civic associations, non-governmental organizations, local authorities, 





The presence of NGOs in the international sphere may date back to the 6
th
 century, but their 
increased influence has become especially obvious since the Cold War.
414
 Steve Charnovitz 
classifies the development of NGOs into seven historical periods. NGOs began to emerge 




 Karsten Nowrot, Global Governance and International Law (2004), p.11. For more examples of the 
participation of NGOs in the international lawmaking and law enforcement process, see Kal Raustiala, ‘The 
Participatory Revolution in International Environmental Law’ (1997) 21 Harvard Environmental Law Review, 
pp.537-586 
413
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414
 “As the earliest examples of international NGOs, one can probably point to the Christian churches and their 
spiritual and secular orders that formed in the 6th century A.D. and represented the only private transnational 
networks at that time.” Karsten Nowrot 'Legal Consequences of Globalization: The Status of Non-Governmental 




between 1775 and 1918 and were able to make engagements from 1919 to 1934. A period of 
disengagement followed, from 1935 to 1944, but Charnovitz describes the following five 
years as a time of “formalization”.
415
 Next came two periods, of “underachievement” (1950-





Charnovitz’s current empowerment period has seen an increasingly strong impact on the 
international realm. Alvarez also maintains that “although the impact of NGOs on legal 
development ebbs and flows, no one questions today the fact that international law – both its 
content and its impact – has been forever changed by the empowerment of NGOs”.
417
 NGOs 
have thus started to take more active roles in the decision-making organs of international 
organizations.  
 
First and foremost, even though NGOs do not have rights equal to those of states or 
international organisations, they have occupied significant positions in international law and 
international relations,
418
 a development that an absence of formal rights has not been able to 
prevent.
419
 NGOs have also been regarded as “non-negligible partners” of governments and 
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inter-governmental organisations once they have attained both informal and formal access in 
the decision-making processes of international organisations, in particular when issues are 




The report of the Secretary-General of the UN on development and international cooperation 
says that NGOs have undertaken numerous projects valued at more than $7 billion 
annually.
421
 This report summarised the importance of NGOs to the global community. It 
characterized NGOs in these terms:  
- able to stay active for a long time in the search for peace 
- have always been at scene of conflicts at an early stage 
- have made crucial contributions to the immediate relief of stricken populations 
- have laid the foundations for the reconstruction of war-torn societies 
- have led the new global networks 
- have flexible structures 
- are able to mobilize private funds 
                                                                                                                                                  
amicus curiae briefs before some international courts such as the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
and the IACtHR. (Alina Kaczorowska, Public International Law (Routledge, 4
th




 This number may now have significantly increased when it is considered that only eight NGOs (World 
Vision International, Oxfam International, Save the Children International, Plan International, Médecins Sans 
Frontières, CARE International, CARITAS International and Action Aid International) had combined revenues 
of more than $11.7 billion in 2011. Bill Morton, ‘An Overview of International NGOs in Development 
Cooperation’ (2013) <http://www.cn.undp.org/content/dam/china/docs/Publications/UNDP-
CH11%20An%20Overview%20of%20International%20NGOs%20in%20Development%20Cooperation.pdf>  
accessed on 21/06/15 
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- have highly motivated staff 
- possess vast potential for the cause of development 




The report, after highlighting significant features of NGOs, concluded that the increase of 
NGOs in number and influence has been prodigious, and that it is therefore time to “bring 
NGOs and United Nations activities into an increasingly productive relationship of 
consultation and cooperation”.
423
 The confirmation of this report can be seen in the 
development of the international scene: the number of NGOs has increased at an astonishing 
rate, that of international non-governmental organizations alone having grown from 
approximately 1,300 in 1960 to nearly 40,000 today.
424
 The report thus supports Charnovitz’s 
argument that NGOs have seen an empowerment period after 1992.   
 
The rise of NGOs
425
, along with supranational organisations, could perhaps be seen as the 
most significant political development in the post-war period.
426
 It has arguably become 
impractical to ignore their existence by pretending that they cannot be actors under the 
                                               
422
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 <http://www.ngo.in/>  accessed on 21/06/2015 
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 in such a time of volatile change in which global civil society 




Moreover, many NGOs are more effective than many states in terms of resources and 
international activities. Major NGOs are considerably larger than many states.
429
 The 
populations of approximately 40 member states of the UN are under one million,
430
 while the 
membership of the major international NGOs, transnational networks and actions groups is 
numbered in the millions.
431
 Their power and efficiency is greater than the economic and 
demographic capacity of marginal, micro and miniature states such as Gabon, Eritrea, Laos, 
Suriname and San Marino. Some major international NGOs have more foreign 
representatives than many states.
432
 For instance, the General Secretariat of Amnesty 
International in London has more staff than the all personnel that work at the headquarters of 
the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in 
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 World Vision International (nearly 100), Caritas (160+), Transparency International (100+), the International 
Political Science Association (80+), the International Association of Legal Science (42+), the International Law 
Association (52), the Institute of International Law (108), the International Bar Association (200+), the 
International Association of Democratic Lawyers (83+), the International Commission of Jurists (60) and the 
Inter-Parliamentary Union (176). See: K. G. Saur Verlag, Legal Status of International NGOs: Overview and 





 NGOs have in effect already found a place in the international legal order by 
virtue of their possession of an astonishing number of resources.  
 
Furthermore, some major NGOs have more economic power than states with GNPs of several 
hundred million dollars,
434
 having witnessed a tremendous increase in their resource bases 
over the years.
435
 To illustrate this, the nearly 500 NGOs in the Interaction network group 
have a combined annual revenue of over $2.3 billion
436
, and Cooperative for American Relief 
Everywhere (CARE) has an annual budget of over $446 million to provide assistance to 97 
million people in the fields of “hunger, gender, social justice, education, emergencies 
(conflicts areas such as Syria) and health”.
437
 Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) has a budget 
of over $423 million, the United States provided about $1.3 billion to the West Bank and 
Gaza through USAID (United States Agency for International Development),
438
 The Ford 
Foundation had assets valued at $13 billion and about $500 million per year as of the date of 
January 2000,
439
 and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has 12,000 
personnel in more than 80 countries and about 100 million members and volunteers; it spends 
about €650 million on humanitarian assistance.
440
 From another perspective, the institutions 
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 and the World Wildlife Fund (WWF)
442
 are larger than the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) and the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO).443 The WWF 
has a budget that is approximately two hundred times larger than that of the Commission on 
Sustainable Development (CSD).
444
 It is clear that NGOs have significant resources that are 
larger than those of many states.  
 
What is more, Wiessner points out that the value of the activity generated by today’s NGOs 
has grown by more that $1 trillion dollar a year. In this respect, the sector of civil society has 
become the world’s eighth largest economic power.
445
 It is estimated that the combined 
resources of all NGOs could total between $9 and $10 billion, which is the amount they 
spend annually on humanitarian assistance.
446
 These funds benefit nearly 250 million 




pE&sig=AHIEtbTLVBQU-LjgJ_ixb9GftANmCLduvw> accessed on 26/02/2013 
441
 As of January, 2009, Greenpeace has about 2.9 million financial supporters and a presence in 41 countries. 
See: <http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/about/faq/#General> accessed on 26/02/2013 
442
 WWF has been active in over 100 countries on five continents and while there was 570,000 supporters in 
1985, it has currently about 5 million supporters. 
<http://wwf.panda.org/who_we_are/history/50_years_of_achievements/> accessed on 26/02/2013 
443
 Alexander Titus, ‘In the Name of the People: Strengthening Global Accountability’ A One World Trust 
Discussion Paper, p.6 
444
 Gillian Martin Sorensen, ‘The Roles a Civil Society Can Play in International Dispute Resolution’ (2002) 18 
Negotiation Journal, pp.355-358, p.357 and Baslar (2006), p.22 
445
 Siegfried Wiessner, ‘Legitimacy and Accountability of NGOs: A Policy-Oriented Perspective’ in Wybo P. 
Heere (ed.) From Government to Governance: The Growing Impact of Non-State Actors on the International 
and European Legal System (T.M.C. Asser Press, 2003), p.95-101, p.95 
446
 Alex P. Schmid, 'Non-State Actors: Organized Crime, Human Rights NGOs and the United Nations' in Theo 
C. van Boven, Cees Flinterman, Fred Grünfeld and Rita Hut (eds.), The Legitimacy of the United Nations: 





  Taylor states that “international relief and development NGOs are now responsible 
for delivering more aid than is the UN system”.
448
 NGOs are not only better at acquiring 
significant resources, they are also good at delivering them to places where they are required. 
They have thus made the best of distributing sources on the ground. 
 
NGOs have also developed great economic weight within national borders.
449
 For example, 
they provided more than 12 per cent of the Netherlands’ employment, 8 per cent of that in the 
United States and 6 per cent in the UK in 1995.
450
 They employed 19 million people in 
1998.
451
 There are some 154 NGOs whose role is the protection of national resources in the 
US and who have income or assets in excess of $5 million.
452
 There is no doubt that NGOs 




The Secretary-General of the UN, speaking at the annual UN/NGO Conference in New York 
in 1994, highlighted the emergence of many new NGOs on every continent: 
In France, for example, 54,000 new associations had been established since 1987. In 
Italy, 40% of the associations had been set up within the previous 15 years. This 
phenomenon was also occurring in developing countries. Within a short space of time, 
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449
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 See more: ‘Wealthy NGOs’ <http://www.sovereignty.net/p/ngo/wealthy.htm> accessed on 27/02/2013, 
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10,000 NGOs had been established in Bangladesh, 21,000 in the Philippines, and 
27,000 in Chile. In Eastern Europe since the fall of communism, NGOs had been 
playing an increasingly important role in people’s lives.454  
 
There are about one million in India, upwards of half a million in the UK
455
 and more than 
200,000 in Brazil. 40 per cent of NGOs in Italy were set up in last two decades, and the 
10,000 in Bangladesh, 21,000 in the Philippines and 27,000 in Chile were all established 
within a short time.
456
 US NGOs employ more people than the federal government and have a 
larger combined budget than all world’s countries with the exception of the top eight.
457
 
NGOs “do things that governments will not, or cannot, do”.
458
 Their rapid growth could be 




Lastly, while NGOs’ voices have been increasing significantly, the United Nations 
Development Agenda
460
 cannot help but reveal the striking growth in their global impact.
461
 




 N. Crowson, Matthew Hilton & James McKay, NGOs in Contemporary Britain: Non-state Actors in Society 
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The report highlights how NGOs participation helped increase the legitimacy of the Fourth 
World Conference on Women held in Beijing in September 1995. In accordance with the 
Development Agenda, “it was the largest: an estimated 35,000 NGO representatives 
participated in the Conference, making it the most highly-attended United Nations 
Conference on record to date”.
462
 More importantly, the report stated that such participation 
highlights how the UN is the seat not of governments only, nor does it solely sustain states. In 
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contexts; these include the UN Convention against torture, the Framework Convention on Climate Change, the 






4.2 NGOs in International Law 
 
NGOs have been playing a growing political role in the international realm, and their status 
with regard to international law has usually seen as important yet informal.
463
 This approach 
is to some extent true. NGOs have been regarded as significant partners. States have thus 
benefited by establishing relations with NGOs, relations that have mostly been based on 
informal procedures; the establishment of formal relationships have deliberately been 
avoided. Significant gaps between the de facto and de jure status of NGOs are thus evident. 
 
Kaczorowska states that the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has opened the door to non-
state actors in LaGrand (Germany v United States).
464
 The court’s judgement states that 
either NGOs or Multinational Corporations (MNCs) can be recognized as subjects of 
international law.
465
 Gaja states in his report that  
…the Court stated in the LaGrand case that individuals are also subjects of 
international law. This approach may lead the Court to assert the legal 
personality even of NGOs.
466
  
This does not necessarily mean that all NGOs have legally become subjects of 
international law. It means that the possibility is open, and that it depends on NGOs to 
                                               
463
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Moreover, there are also some examples of NGOs having been granted formal places, such as 
the conferral of consultative status on ECOSOC.
468
 NGOs have sometimes also acquired 
equal rights with states on particular occasions.
469
 The legal status of NGOs in international 
law is thus vague, and maintaining that they either do or do not have legal standing is not 
adequate. This might be because there are no accepted rules on the position of NGOs in 




4.2.1 Uncertainty in the Definition of NGOs 
 
As the nature of NGOs does not conform to a set template, which results in a lack of clarity in 
this respect. There is no generally approved definition of the term “Non-governmental 
Organization” in international law.
470
 While some definitions exclude political parties, others 
do not; yet other narrower ones exclude trade unions and churches.  
                                               
467
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468
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According to Lindblom, the reason for this variety of definitions is “a reflection of ad hoc 
approach to NGOs of IGOs and the international legal system in general”.
471
 This is true 
because every international organization exhibits a different approach to NGOs. Inter-
governmental organisations (IGOs) have limited the definition of NGOs in terms of what 
they expect from them. While participation by NGOs is the norm for some organisations, it 
can be quite radical for others.  
 
The term “NGO” may say little about what one actually is or provide a general understanding 
of the concept.
472
 The granting of legal status may need further elaboration: a terrorist group 
could also be an NGO. It might to some extent increase uncertainty about the legal status of 
NGOs in international law. In fact, each field of law that links to NGOs determines its own 
definition, as a reflection of the fact that the status and legal framework for NGOs could vary 
from one area of international law to another.
473
 Understanding of NGOs is therefore mostly 
determined by the deliberations of states.  
 
Article 71 of the UN Charter also provides no definition.
474
 A subsequent revision in 1950 
does include the following:  
Any international organization which is not established by intergovernmental 
agreement shall be considered as a non-governmental organization for the 
                                               
471




 ibid p.36 
474
 “The Economic and Social Council may make suitable arrangements for consultation with non-governmental 
organizations which are concerned with matters within its competence. Such arrangements may be made with 
international organizations and, where appropriate, with national organizations after consultation with the 
Member of the United Nations concerned.” Article 71 of UN Charter 
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purpose of these arrangements, including organizations which accept members 
designated by governmental authorities, provided that such membership does 
not interfere with the free expression of views of the organization.
475
  





Current provisions on the ECOSOC consultative agreements comprise a broader description:  
Any such organization that is not established by a governmental entity or 
intergovernmental agreement shall be considered a non-governmental 
organization for the purpose of these arrangements, including organizations 
that accept members designated by governmental authorities, provided that such 





In this provision, the word “such” refers to the criteria for launching consultative interactions 
with an NGO that are mentioned in this and previous paragraphs of the Resolution.
478
 
According to the provision, these criteria are as follows: 
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1. the aims and purposes of the organization shall be in conformity with the spirit, 
purposes and principles of the UN Charter,
479
  
2. the organization shall be of recognized standing within the particular field of its 
competence or of a representative character,
480
 (i.e. accountability) 
3. the organization shall have established headquarters with an executive officer,
481
  
4. the organization shall have a democratically adopted constitution, and that
482
 
5. the organization shall have a representative structure with appropriate mechanisms 




The criteria emanating from this resolution are valuable in that they delineate the scope of 
NGOs. While stipulating that an NGO should be representative and accountable, it also 
excludes some actors considered as NGOs according to some definitions. These conditions 
are required for an NGO to acquire consultative status on ECOSOC. It does not, however, 
follow that an organization not conforming to these standards is not an NGO. In other words, 
these are not universal rules for what constitutes an NGO. These principles are requirements 
for NGOs to gain consultative status on ECOSOC. Indeed, this also demonstrates how the 
definition of an NGO can vary according to circumstances. 
 
                                               
479
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 Ibid para.12 
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There are also measures that can be activated when an NGO breaches these criteria. This 
provision allows for suspending or withdrawing an NGO’s consultative status in order to 
prevent abuse. In this regard, the provision explicitly warns NGOs of suspension and 
withdrawal in the following cases:  
(a) If an organization, either directly or through its affiliates or representatives acting on its behalf, clearly 
abuses its status by engaging in a pattern of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the 
United Nations including unsubstantiated or politically motivated acts against Member States of the United 
Nations incompatible with those purposes and principles; 
(b) If there exists substantiated evidence of influence from proceeds resulting from internationally recognized 
criminal activities such as the illicit drugs trade, money-laundering or the illegal arms trade; 
(c) If, within the preceding three years, an organization did not make any positive or effective contribution to the 




According to subparagraph (a), political parties and liberation movements are not to be 
granted consultative status.
485
 Excluding such entities may not explicitly be stated in the 
NGO definition of Paragraph 12. However, the provisions on suspension and withdrawal in 
conjunction with the definition and the first principle for consultative status (i.e. that the 
“aims and purposes of the organisation shall be in conformity with the spirit, purposes and 
principles of the UN Charter”, make it clear that political parties and liberation movements 
are in fact outside the scope of the definition (“at least that is how the resolution is 
interpreted).
486
 By the same token, violent and criminal groups can also be excluded
487
 as the 
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provision explicitly states that “the aims and purposes of the organization shall be in 




Nevertheless, as is observed above, the definition of NGOs can be extended according to 
circumstances. Just as with political parties, international organizations of national political 
parties or groupings such as the Liberal International and the Socialist International are also 
able to obtain consultative status.
489
 Both Socialist International and Liberal International 
were in fact granted general consultative status with ECOSOC in 1995.
490
 A few liberation 
movements have achieved observer status with the UN,
491
 among them the Palestine 
Liberation Organization (PLO) in the General Assembly on 22 November 1974
492
 and the 
South-West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO) on 20 December 1976.
493
 Another 
concrete example of the conferral of observer status on national liberation movements is the 
resolution that deals directly with this issue in principle.
494
 These examples demonstrate how 
general rules can be interpreted according to circumstances. 
 




 Resolution 1996/31 para.2 
489
 Lindblom (2005) p.39 
490








  A/RES/31/152, http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/43/a43r160.htm  
494




In addition, there are no explicit criteria for non-profitmaking organisations,
495
 while there 
are clear and explicit principles for the exclusion of political parties. It is surprising that the 
UN does not refer directly to this significant point. This might be because member states of 
the UN are more concerned by political organisations than profit-making ones. On the other 
hand, it could implicitly be concluded from Paragraph 2 that there is a principle involved in 
non-profit status,
496
 as that paragraph seeks conformity with the purposes and principles of 
the UN Charter.
497
 Paragraph 13 also considers the articulation of non-profit aims as a 
principle
498





Consequently, while there is no limitation in the Resolution’s definition of NGO as provided 
in Paragraph 12, the succeeding or preceding provisions could impose limits. Therefore, 
ECOSOC’s definition can properly be understood by interpreting different provisions in the 
light of the Resolution.
500
 In this regard, each international organization may construct its 
own definition of an NGO, while different circumstances may require distinct approaches. 
Lindblom also emphasizes that “it is apparent that definitions of the term ‘non-governmental 
organisations’ vary according to the circumstances. Each institution has its own definition 
elaborated for its own purposes”.
501
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4.2.2 Constructing a Definition of “NGO” for the Security Council 
 
Providing a universal definition of an NGO may be hard because it is vague. It is relatively 
easy for an entity to determine a definition of NGO for its own purposes. This definition may 
not work for another body whose purposes are different. And if such a definition under 
present conditions is nearly impossible, the task is rendered all the more difficult by future 
NGOs that will come into existence to meet new demands. In any case, a particular definition 
may not have a significant impact on relations between NGOs and IGOs, meaning that status 
would be granted to NGOs according to demand. It is not therefore necessary to attach too 
much importance to the problem of definition. It is their legal status that is the more pressing 
concern for NGOs. As far as legal personality is concerned, a comprehensive definition of an 
NGO is possible. By analogy, reference to a “state” does not necessarily mean a democratic 
one.  
 
There are nevertheless four main sources that can be used to construct a definition of an 
NGO. These are the General Assembly’s Resolution 1996/31, the European Convention on 
the Recognition of the Legal Personality of International Non-Governmental Organizations 
(24 April 1986), the Fundamental Principles on the Status of Non-governmental 
Organisations in Europe (2003) and the criteria of the Union of International Associations 
(UIA). Many such institutions have been inspired by these four documents to construct 
definitions according to their own needs.
502
 The present study will likewise define NGOs 
with regard to the Security Council. The General Assembly is one of the principal organs of 
the UN, as is the Security Council, and the two have identical concerns about international 
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peace and security issues. It is thus more suitable for this purpose to take the General 
Assembly’s definition as a basis, while not ignoring the other approaches. 
 
NGOs that have already established informal relations with the Council are also considered. 
These fall into two groups: those that have established such relationships under the umbrella 
of the NGO Working Group on the Security Council
503
 and those that have developed 
interactions individually.
504
 The NGO Working Group on the Security Council comprises 
approximately 35 NGOs
505




 and the 
NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security have done remarkable work by 
individually influencing the Council.
508
 The reason these NGOs are considered is that it 
enables a determination as to which type of NGO is more suitable for the Council’s purposes. 
A definition of an NGO that meet the criteria of working with Council can thus be 
constructed. 
                                               
503
 Since 1997, the NGO Working Group has provided this unique platform for NGOs to access the UN Security 
Council.” http://www.ngowgsc.org/ accessed on 09/01/2015 
504
 Informal relations between NGOs and SC are evaluated in Chapters V and VI 
505
 http://www.ngowgsc.org/content/members-ngo-working-group-security-council accessed 09/01/2015 
506
 Of these, the ICRC has been the most active in interacting with the Security Council and other principle 
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The common features of these organizations are that they are non-profit
509
, non-violence, 
have no obvious connections with criminality, are independent of any state, have no political 
or subversive aims, have democratically adopted statutes and representative structures. These 
requirements are shared by most definitions contained in international legal instruments, 
including the aforementioned four major instruments. ECOSOC has also added the 
requirement of conformity with the principles of the UN Charter.  
 
In short, the definition of an NGO used in this study is that: 




- its aims are non-profit, non-violence, not obviously connected with criminality, not political 
or subversive, and conform to the sprit, purposes and principles of the UN Charter 
- it has standing within its sphere of interest, and that it is particularly active in the field of 
humanitarian aid such as security, peace, human rights, poverty, health and education
511
  
- it has a democratically adopted statute, representative structure that is transparent and 
accountable in its actions 
 
                                               
509
 This does not mean that an NGO cannot make profit, but rather that it may use any profit solely for the aims 
of the NGO, not to distribute to its members. In other words, its main aim should not be to make a profit. 
510
 It is very essential point for NGOs to comply with this requirement in order to be able to take active roles on 
the Council, as one of its main problems is the lack of resolute and independent actors.  
511
 As the Council’s primary responsibility is to maintain international peace and security, it would be wise to 
first consider NGOs that have related field works to maintain major contributions.  
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These criteria in the definition must be met by NGOs applying for formal participation in the 
Security Council. Various entities that are international in character such as associations, 
charities, foundations, churches and religious congregations, non-profit corporations and 
trade unions can be encompassed by this definition. For example Global Witness would suit 
it perfectly as it does not contravene any requirements of the definition when its aims and 
activities are considered. International Progress Organization (IPO) likewise has members 
from over 70 countries, enjoys consultative status with ECOSOC and is associated with the 
United Nations Department of Public Information. It is strictly non-partisan and is not aligned 
with any government. It notably aims to promote peaceful co-existence between nations and 
dialogue between civilizations. It has been calling on the UN, particularly the Security 
Council, for reform in order to make it more democratic. We can see from its articles that it 
has expertise in the fields of conflict resolution, civilizational dialogue, international law and 
United Nations reform. All of these features are well suited to the current definition. Al-
Qaida, however, would not be, as its aims are violent, as are those of Colombia’s National 
Liberation Army, and the Yakuza. Of course, further criteria could be applied when 
considering NGOs for formal status on the Council. Some of these, together with a 
prospective framework for formal access, are mentioned in Chapter VII.  
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4.2.3 The Question of Legal Status  
 
The reason the legal status of NGOs in international law has been examined is neither to 
make a proposal on this topic nor to scrutinize it in detail. In fact, the present thesis advocates 
formal access for NGOs to the Security Council, since this also means granting legal status. 
Therefore, understanding the general situation regarding the legal status of NGOs in 
international law would give an idea as to what extent it is possible and feasible to establish 
formal relations between the two parties. The main reason for states to approve formal 
relations with NGOs has been explored. International law provides NGOs with no 
internationally approved universal legal status. Eventually, this exercise helps to determine 
the possibility of granting formal access to the Council to NGOs more accurately. 
 
4.2.3.1 The Theoretical Position of the Legal Status of NGOs  
 
As mentioned, there is no clear definition of NGOs; instead, there is a diverse array of 
definitions. There is likewise a variety of approaches to the legal status of NGOs. In this 
regard, Lindblom argues that “the theories on international law look very differently on the 
legal role and position of non-state actors”.
512
 Ian Brownlie sees a legal personality in the 
following terms: “a subject of international law is an entity possessing international rights 
and obligations and having the capacity (a) to maintain its rights by bringing international 
claims; and (b) to be responsible for its breaches of obligation by being subjected to such 
claims”.
513
 In Brownlie’s view, in order to be regarded as a full legal personality, these 
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513
 James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (8
th
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principles must be achieved simultaneously or the legal personality will be constricted.
514
 In 





The gap between the de facto and de jure status of NGOs may lead to arbitrary agreement on 
their legal personality. The substantial involvement by NGOs in international activities 
demands their acquisition of such a personality, an issue that their significant number of 
activities would otherwise complicate. As long as the legal status of NGOs has no defined 
basis, their legal personality is likely to remain restricted.  
 
Two conditions have determined the assessment of NGOs’ legal personality:
516
the demands 
of states might play a leading role in recognising that legal status, and NGOs’ performance is 
important in granting it. It is therefore essential for NGOs to be very diligent in order to 
achieve legal status. It is within their capacity to influence states to grant them legal rights.  
 
Anne-Marie Slaughter’s normative approach
517
 to this question entails the observation that if 
states are not considered as primary actors in the international legal system then the system of 






 “A theory of NGO involvement can be based on two factors. First, one can look at the needs of governments, 
or more descriptively, of particular government agencies or officials. Second, one can look at the capability of 
NGOs.” Charnovitz (1997), p.269 
517
 Lindblom (2005), p.104 
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international law founded on that very condition would be irrelevant.
518
 She does not clarify 
exactly who the current actors in the international legal order are,
519
 but she does assert that 
“the challenge of non-state actors is both an empirical and a conceptual one, and that we need 
to redraw our conceptual maps in ways that help us to solve a number of practical 
problems”.
520
 The liberalist strand of international law and international relations theory 
therefore considers non-state actors to be relevant to law, and suggests a new transnational 





However, this liberalist strand does not seem to claim legal status for NGOs under the current 
international legal order. They focus only on NGOs’ influence while still regarding states as 
the priory actors.
522
 Other scholars in the liberal strand of international law such as Richard 
Falk and Thomas Franck point to the significance role of NGOs and the waning of state 
dominance.  Yet they also fail to make clear proposals as to the status of NGOs under the 
present international legal system.
523
 This might be because their primary aim is to underline 
the importance of NGOs in the international legal order, as this could constitute a basis upon 
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 “Even as IR has moved to acknowledge the role of non-state actors in international affairs, the discipline still 
sees states in an elevated position above other actors, as the repository of ultimate power...” Peter J. Spiro, 
‘Globalization, International Law, and the Academy’ (2000) 32 New York University Journal of International 
Law and Politics, pp.582-584, ibid 
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which their legal status can be established. There is a tendency to deal with NGOs in a 
normative way, and not to make room for them in the present international legal system.  
 
On the other hand, some international lawyers have developed interdisciplinary theories that 
could also deal with the current status of non-state actors and the fact of personality.
524
 
Michael Byers, for example, considers international legal personality as a qualification that 
permits an individual or entity to participate directly in customary processes. He argues for 
the possibility of various levels of legal personality,
525
 distinguishing the full from the partial 
level. 
 
For Wessel, however, 
[l]egal personality is nothing more (or less) than independent existence within 
the international legal order. There would not be any use of speaking of an 
international legal entity when it would not exist under international law. One 
consequence of this line of reasoning is that there is not much sense in speaking 
of a ‘partial legal personality’ of international organizations; neither can we 








 “When used in a legal sense, the term personality usually refers to the capacity of an individual or entity to 
hold rights and be subject to obligations within a particular legal system.” Michael Byers, Custom, Power and 
the Power of Rules: International Law and Customary International Relations (CUP, 1999), p.75 
526
 Ramses A. Wessel, ‘Revisiting the International Legal Status of the EU’ (2000) 5 European Foreign Affairs 
Review, pp.507–537, p.510 
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Yet the difference between full and partial legal personalities has been endorsed by the 
ICJ in its Advisory Opinion on Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the 
United Nations, in which its states that “subjects of law in any legal system are not 
necessarily identical in their nature or in the extent of their rights”.
527
 According to this 
distinction, states can only have a full legal personality insofar as, in principle, they can 
possess all international legal rights and are subject to all international legal duties.
528
 
Other subjects of international law are considered as partial subjects with limited rights 
and duties.
529
 This category of partial legal personality directly covers international 
organizations by their constitutional treaties and individuals by the relevant treaties and 
customary international law.
530
 Thus, it does not apply directly to NGOs. 
 
Byers asserts that the only actors possessed of full legal personality in the international legal 
system are states:  
[n]on-governmental organisations do not have international legal personality and are 
therefore incapable of participating directly in the customary process… States [have] 
allowed non-governmental organisations to participate, to a limited degree, in certain 
bodies of some international organisations...
531
 
It might be true that NGOs do not have legal personality, or that they might to whatever 
extent have limited legal personality, in the international system. 
 
                                               
527








 Byers (1996) p.86 
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However, it would be inadequate to limit the reasons for NGOs not having international legal 
personality. A comprehensive assessment cannot be made from a narrow perspective on this 
question. The case for indirect or limited influence on the customary process does not apply 
only to NGOs. Some states are politically weak, so more powerful ones render them unable 
to participate in the customary process. The Security Council itself provides an illustration: 
only five permanent members are able to rule it, because they allow other member states to 
participate equally in the General Assembly’s decision-making process but not the Council’s 
own. As for unrecognized or largely unrecognized states, Byers also argues that influence can 
vary between states depending on their levels of power. Yet he rejects the legal personality of 
NGOs while acknowledging their influence. He believes that NGOs can exert pressure on 
states to grant them indirect access to the customary process, but he thinks this does not mean 
that those NGOs have a direct role as if they had international legal personality.  
 
Byers considers that participation of NGOs is possible only when States allow them. In fact, 
some NGOs possess more rights and obligations than most states, and in cases they have been 
granted access in spite of states’ resistance because circumstances have compelled the latter 
to accept their participation. For example, “when the UN Charter was drafted in 1945, 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) attended the San Francisco conference and lobbied 
successfully to obtain Article 71, providing for ‘consultative arrangements’ with the 
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)”.
532
  The participation of NGOs therefore rather 
depends on their ability to affect circumstances.   
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 applies international relations theory in a manner similar to Byers,
534
 but 
proposes a more acceptable approach to this question of the legal personality of NGOs. He 
accepts the dominance of states in the current world order and believes that NGOs are able to 
participate in decision-making processes at states’ discretions, maintaining that  
under the present condition of the international system, I believe that non-state 
actors generally do not participate directly in the law-creating process. Non-
state actors, with some exceptions…, do not interact with states in an 
unmediated manner. Non-state actors may be the origins of a proposed legal 




He thus agrees that it is possible for non-state actors to propose legal rules, but also that this 
is subject to the acquiesence of states. However, he also argues that for some exceptions by 
which NGOs could directly participate. Rather than disregarding NGOs’ role, he opines that  
with the growing prominence of non-state actors, it is possible that the 
international system may be moving toward one in which states would interact 
with non-state actors directly in the law-creating process.
536
  
He therefore does not deny the roles of non-state actors, believing that their increasingly 
important role will lead them to participate directly in the legislative process. He foresees that 
the international system will eventually consist of both states and non-state actors. 
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In addition, even though treaties, case-law and resolutions regarding inter-governmental 
organizations have dealt with the international legal status of NGOs,
537
 different international 
procedures for NGOs have been implemented: some international organisations have 
explicitly recognised NGOs, some partially so according to need, and others have even closed 
their doors to them. 
 
To summarize, just as there are various levels of agreement on the legal personality of NGOs, 
scholars also adopt a variety of approaches to this question. Of course, the NGOs themselves 
have been affected by such inconsistent stances. It is difficult for them to manage their 
activities under conditions of restricted legal personality. Malcolm Shaw considers this issue 
of legal personality to be a crucial factor, underlining its significance: “without it, institutions 




4.2.3.2 Efforts and Background of Legal Personality of NGOs 
 
This question of the legal personality of NGOs has been debated for decades. Frits Hondius 
explains that “the quest of NGOs for recognition of their status under international law is 
almost a century old”.
539
 The first attempts were made mostly by NGOs themselves rather 
than by states or international organizations.
540
 The matter can be traced back as far as 1910, 
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when the Institut de Droit International (Institute of International Law) drew up a draft 
convention on NGOs and, at the suggestion of Nicolas Politis, offered a study on “the 





adopted by the Danish Government and put forward in discussion during the Diplomatic 
Conference on Assistance to Foreigners in 1912 in Paris, which voted unanimously in favour 
of a draft convention in order to determine the establishment of an international legal status 
for associations.
543
 As a final vote on the draft was planned for the next conference, the text 







These deliberations were suspended for the duration of the First World War, but the text 
encouraged the Belgian government to approve a law on international associations on 25
th
 
                                                                                                                                                  
Studies, pp.19-20. The 1st World Congress of International Associations convened in 1910 and founded the 
Union of International Associations. The Congress also proposed that “...[a] supernational status be established 
through diplomatic convention, for the use of International Associations without lucrative object, which, by 
reason of their nature or aim cannot or do not wish to be subject to a fixed society legislation”. (1, p. 489). See 
http://www.uia.org/archive/legal-status-4-1 accessed on 23/12/14 
541
 “The discussion continued at the Madrid session in 1911 (4). These early suggestions were then taken up by 
L von Bar, a member of the Institute, and developed into a short draft convention which was presented to the 
Institute's session in Christiania in 1912.” http://www.uia.org/archive/legal-status-4-1 
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 The governments represented were those of Argentina, Belgium, Bolivia, Chile, China, Colombia, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, France, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Mexico, 
Norway, Persia, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, UK. <http://www.uia.org/archive/legal-status-4-4> accessed 
on 23/12/14.  It is indeed encouraging to see the UK, France and China among the signatories, even if they were 







 This Belgian law was enacted to provide legal status to international non-
governmental organizations with scientific objectives such as “philanthropic, religious, 
scientific, artistic or educational” ones.
547
 According to Article 9,  
the Belgian government shall be authorized to conclude treaties with foreign 
States for the establishment of an international Statute for international 
scientific associations on the basis of the present law.
548
  





Nicolas Politis, a member of the Institute of International Law, improved von Bar’s earlier 
proposals of 1912
550
 and presented them in a report to the Institute. His resulting draft 
Convention on the Legal Position of International Associations was unanimously approved 
during the course of the 50
th
 anniversary session of the Institute in Brussels in 1923.
551
 The 
draft laid down the conditions for non-profit international associations, according to which 
they should have international purposes and memberships and not be motivated by profit.
552
 
The treaty also offered an international registrations office
553
 and, most importantly, the right 
                                               
546
 http://www.uia.org/archive/legal-status-4-4  
547
 http://www.uia.org/archive/legal-status-6-1  
548
 http://www.uia.org/archive/legal-status-4-4  
549
 Martens, (2003), p.22 
550
 http://www.uia.org/legal/app41.php  
551
 http://www.uia.org/archive/legal-status-4-5 accessed on 24/12/14 
552
 Article 1 states: “…on the basis of its laws to those non profit-making international associations which meet 
the following conditions”; Article 2: “Are deemed to be international within the context of the present 
Convention those associations of a private character which are accessible under the conditions laid down by 
their Articles of Association to subjects and joint bodies of several countries and which pursue, without any 
profit motive, an objective of international interest”. http://www.uia.org/archive/legal-status-4-5  
553
 This later became the Union of International Associations 
153 
 
to appear before the Permanent Court of International Justice:
554
 Article 7 of the Treaty states 
that an “…association…may contest the same on the grounds of action ultra vires before the 
permanent International Court of Justice”.
555
 Even though the Treaty could not be brought 
into force because no government took advantage of the opportunity to adhere to this 
convention, it was the first serious and comprehensive attempt to recognise the possession by 




Several attempts also failed during the planning period, mostly for the same reason.
557
 After 
the end of World War II, some NGOs were granted consultative status in the UN and have 
attempted to examine the legal status of NGOs. In 1949 they constructed a draft that cut 
through the red tape involved.
558
 This report made noteworthy points about the legal 
personality of NGOs, highlighting that the lack of a suitable legal status was affected their 
work negatively. The additional draft consequently suggested that the legal personality of 
NGOs should be granted by an international entity independently of national systems.
559
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Another convention was also proposed by Suzan Bastid in the 44
th
 meeting of the Institute of 
International Law in 1950 in Bath. However, this proposal attracted no advocates. Another 
convention on the law of NGOs at the Hague was advanced in 1956, one that applied to 
foreign companies, associations and foundations. In fact, this convention was approved by 
the founder members of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1968. Yet, it never 





As Charnovitz concludes, when the general status of NGOs’ legal personality is considered 
apart from other examples, “leaving aside the Red Cross,
562
 NGOs do not have international 
legal personality”.
563
 They have therefore been governed by the laws of the state in which 
they are incorporated.
564
 This, of course, causes contradictions and creates many difficulties: 
when an NGO conducts affairs in a different country, it must consider that country’s laws. 
Significant problems might also emerge. An NGO’s mobility might be reduced because of 




Some progress has, however, been made on a regional level based on reciprocal recognition 
between countries
566
 within the context of international law.
567
 The European Convention on 
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 “Under present public international law only states are able to occupy and administer the inhabitable parts of 
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the Recognition of the Legal Personality of International Non-Governmental Organizations is 
the only concrete international agreement on NGOs. It was adopted in 1986 and entered into 
force in 1990. The convention enables the general recognition of the legal personality of an 




However, the convention has widely been considered a disappointment. The Treaty has only 
been ratified by 11 countries, and as with the Belgian law, it also recognizes the national law 
of the states in which respective NGOs have their headquarters. In this respect, the 
convention does not provide NGOs with an international personality. The essential 
difference, however, is that “like the snail that carries its shell, every International Non-
Governmental Organization (INGO) carries with it its identity and its status
569
 without having 
to request new recognition from the various countries where it carries on its activities”.
570
 
Nevertheless, it does not deal with all problems:
571
 it sets “the geographical limits of the 
Council of Europe and, within them, to the countries who have ratified”.
572
 It simply “takes 
up the conditions and the constraints of Belgian national law on NGOs”.
573
 The Convention 
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In addition, states could also make international commitments concerning NGOs.
575
 For 
example, the United States has obligation regarding headquarters of the United Nations. The 
US cannot impede the transit of NGOs’ representatives, as the agreement between it and the 
UN states that  
the federal, state or local authorities of the United States shall not impose any 
impediments to transit to or from the headquarters district of representatives of 
nongovernmental organizations recognized by the United Nations for the 
purpose of consultation under Article 71 of the Charter.
576
  
Another possible scenario is that states sometimes intercede with other states on behalf 
of NGOs.
577
 A state could, for example, establish diplomatic attempts to another 
government on behalf of an NGO.  
 
Lastly, because INGOs have not been granted an international legal personality, they have in 
practice been faced with eight choices when they have been established.
578
 These are:  
informal (i.e. unwritten) rules, unregistered contracts, registration in accordance with national 
laws, operation via national members, separation of legal registrations and operational bases, 
negotiated ad hoc agreements with governments, establishment as trusts or foundations and 
legal status within canon law.
579
 These different types of establishment can result from the 
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absence of a legal personality. INGOs have thus striven to overcome this gap by establishing 
different solutions according to their circumstances. 
 
Nonetheless, even though NGOs are regarded as international “outlaws” (referring to their 
lack of recognition in international law), it is to some extend ironic that a remarkable number 
of INGOs have an “international tribunal and a legislative function”.
580
 Many also have 
regulatory function in sports such as football, rugby and the Olympic Games themselves, or 
other games of significance to national reputations such as chess.
581
 Some members might be 
government-sponsored national representatives, yet clashes of interests are settled in the 
appropriate organs of the INGO concerned. Likewise, the Court of Arbitration of the 
International Chamber of Commerce is used as a tool to settle international commercial 
disputes.
582
 It can therefore be concluded that NGOs’ de facto status has significantly 
exceeded the limits of their de jure status. As mentioned earlier, the absence of rights is not 
an insuperable obstacle to NGOs’ participation in and influence on the decision-making 
processes of international organisations. 
 
In conclusion, firstly, there is no doubt that NGOs are very important actors in the 
international legal order in terms of their activities and their sources. Their significant 
capabilities in this respect can be seen as evidence of their significance and their entitlement 
to formal access to the Security Council: they are truly potent actors on the international 
scene. NGOs are still in what Charnovitz calls their “empowerment” period that began in 
1992. The present period is thus one in which NGOs are able to take responsibility in the 









international legal order for affecting any international decision-making body, including the 
Security Council itself.  
 
Secondly, NGOs are able to obtain legal personalities according to circumstances. The level 
of relationships, whether formal or informal, is determined by the demands of states and the 
performance of NGOs. Since the latter can play a significant role in granting formal access, it 
cannot be asserted with any confidence that the Council’s member states would definitely 
reject formal participation of NGOs in the Council. Likewise, as Higgins maintains, social 




Thirdly, it is difficult for NGOs to operate properly without legal personality. This also shows 
how important it is to formalize relations between the Security Council and NGOs. Lastly, 
constructing an appropriate definition of NGOs for the purpose of this study would at least 
apprise the reader that terrorist groups are excluded. 
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Background of Interactions between the Security Council and NGOs 
 
Most major, effective international organisations have been in dialogue with NGOs,
584
 
signing memoranda of agreement or entering into official partnerships relating to the 
implementation of development projects, relief works, environmental protection or the 
maintenance of peace.
585
 It might also be a common practice for international organisations to 
provide counselling or observer status in order to allow them to participate in decision-
making processes without the right to vote.
586
 The UN has also developed interactions with 
NGOs. 
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5.1 The Size of the Relationships with the Security Council 
 
Although Article 71 is the only official provision to authorize or encourage relationships 
between NGOs and the Security Council,
587
 the Security Council has joined the other 
principle UN organs in establishing and maintaining such relationships.
588
 The Council might 
have interacted with non-state actors since 1982 via an ad hoc procedure,
589
 but in contrast to 
other UN organs has mostly refused NGO’s demands for access. This might stem from the 
Council’s state-centred focus. NGOs have consequently been prevented from speaking at 
Council meetings, and from making “consultations to official delegations, government 
officials of Council members and UN officials” by long-standing practice.
590
 Nevertheless, 
NGOs have noted that the Security Council has expanded the scope of its functions to deal 
increasingly with cases beyond traditional inter-state security threats.
591
 As mentioned, the 
protection of human rights and humanitarian assistance can be seen as essential issues for 
NGOs. Therefore, as Paul states, “as the Council took unprecedented action in the area of 
sanctions, peacekeeping, election monitoring, policing and post-conflict peace building, 
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Some conditions have nevertheless paved the way for the establishment of relations between 
the Security Council and NGOs. Firstly, the Council serves as an implementing body that 
attempts to execute specific political and social goals.
593
 The new challenges posed by the 
changes in international relations have compelled the Council to exercise this function 
through NGOs. Hume has observed that these changes have influenced the Security 
Council’s functioning.
594
 Council members, particularly the elected members (E-10), have 
therefore striven to develop relationships with NGOs so as to receive consultative advice 
when dealing with new difficulties.
595
 The Security Council’s decisions have also affected 
many aspects of life, in which regard it has embarked upon an active and unprecedented 
program of activities in the fields of “sanctions, peacekeeping, election-monitoring, policing, 
and post-conflict peace-building” in the 1990s.
596
 NGOs thus pay close attention to Council’s 
work.  
 
The Council aims to take an active role in preventing internal conflicts and global disputes, 
an aim that could be seen as a basis for relationships between it and NGOs. Such 
relationships with civil communities increased significantly in the Cold War era in which 
these types of issues existed.
597
 In this period, 90 per cent of those who suffered from internal 
conflicts were civilians, so the Council took action to maintain peace and security. The 
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Council has also tackled other global threats while dealing with armed conflict. When the 
members of the Security Council form opinions or make decisions about national disputes or 




The Security Council has found a way of developing relations with NGOs to deal with such 
issues. Even though “there has been an ad hoc procedure since 1982 that permits experts to 
be convened to provide information to member-states’
599
, a remarkable negotiation process 
referred to as “the Arria Formula”
600
 was initiated in the second half of the 1990s.
601
 An 
NGO Working Group on the Security Council was established in 1997 after two years of 
attempts.
602
 It was expected at first that the veto powers would block the process, but it did 
not function as intended.
603
 The Council first met with an NGO in accordance with this 
formula in 1997.
604
 NGOs subsequently began to provide information pursuant to Article 
39
605
 about their fields of expertise such as the use of children in armed conflict. 
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Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and OXFAM are also active lobbyists.
606
 A 
grouping of approximately 100 major NGOs
607
 with different fields of interest meets 
regularly with delegates. There were about 50 meetings with the UN officials, mostly 
ambassadors, in 2002.
608
 The NGO Global Policy Forum has held about 40 meetings 
annually that provide a forum in which NGOs convene with UN ambassadors and senior 
officials.
609
 These weekly meetings, unrecorded by ambassadors to the Security Council, 




No member of the United Nations Secretariat attends these meetings, which are not minuted; 
NGOs can only explain their outcomes. The NGOs aiming to join the group must 
demonstrate their seriousness of purpose and their interest in the Council. The Working 
Group arranges meeting once a year with full delegations. Some 20 NGOs participate in the 




The Security Council has also used the services of NGOs that operate in related fields in 
order to obtain information for use in internal conflict meetings to resolve domestic conflicts 
in individual countries. The Council needs accurate and timely information, and hence prizes 
                                               
606
 Caroline E. Schwitter Marsiaj, The Role of International NGOs in the Global Governance of Human Rights: 
Challenging the Democratic Deficit (Schulthess Zurich , 2004) p.283 
607
 For a complete list of NGOs that are members of the Working Group, see ‘NGO Working Group on the 
Security Council, List of Associated Organizations’ 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/185-general/40398.html accessed on 05/06/2013 
608
 The increasing level of cooperation is clear from the fact that that there were 28 meetings in 1998 and 36 in 
2002. Sorensen (n444).  
609
 ‘NGO Working Group on the Security Council’ http://www.globalpolicy.org/ngo-working-group-on-the-
security-council.html 
610
 Sorensen (n444) 
611
 Paul, ‘The Arria Formula’ 
164 
 
such input from NGOs. The Department of Public Information collects information from 
NGOs and prepares reports for the Council. NGOs are seen as partners, service contractors 
and policy developers, and play a significant role in facilitating dialogue with the public.
612
   
 
As mentioned earlier, a significant increase in Security Council activities and the extent of its 
authority following the Cold War is evident. The Council has begun to use “supranational 
coercion” to deal with issues occurring within borders, such as civil conflicts, humanitarian 
crises and terrorism.
613
 It is also clear that this development has arisen from a transformation 
in security threats and from alterations in international norms and in the opportunities 
presented by the global political system after the Cold War. It is therefore plausible to 
observe that the members of the Security Council have progressively increased the level of 
their relationships with NGOs as “partners and service contractors, in emergency and post-
emergency” circumstances under the authority of the Council since the Cold War ended.
614
 
The Council’s intention has always been to increase its capacity to tackle international 
challenges in the light of new conditions. 
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5.1.1 The extent to which the Security Council grants access to NGOs 
 
There are two ways of establishing interactions with NGOs: on a legal basis
615
 or ad hoc, as 
circumstances arise. The relations that have developed between the Security Council and 
NGOs can be said to derive from the latter. By way of illustration, the Council’s meetings 
and consultations increased fourfold just between 1988 and 1993.
616
 As the Council has 
assumed unprecedented responsibilities in the field of sanctions, peacekeeping, election 
monitoring, policing, and post-conflict building, so have NGOs decided to focus increasingly 
on the Council’s activities.
617
 A change in the scope of the Security Council’s activities has 
thus drawn NGOs to seek a way to establish relations with it. 
 
There are reasons other than this expanded scope of activity for enhancing interactions 
between the Council and NGOs. Firstly, the Council’s delegates, particularly the Elected 
States (E-10), have found it difficult to fulfil these increased responsibilities. This inability 
has impelled them to seek information, expertise and policy ideas, purposes for which NGOs 
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What is more, NGOs play a significant role in moulding public opinion regarding 
international political behaviours. Their public advocacy and media campaigns have always 
shaped public understanding of crises. This has furthermore enabled NGOs to use public 
opinion to leverage governments to take action. The Council has therefore begun to regard 




The Council’s activities have largely moved from international
620
 to internal conflicts, 
dealing more with civil wars, the collapse of government authority and internal strife.
621
 This 
work renders NGOs’ expertise and actions essential. For example, when the Council strives 
to establish peace that is dependent on such factors as economic and social development, 
respect for human rights and disarmament, these are all fields of NGO expertise.
622
 That is to 
say, it has not only been NGOs who have aspired to establish relations with the Council. The 
Council has also tried to do the same after it has become aware of the demands resulting from 
its actions.  
 
Apart from the expansion of the Council’s functions, criticism of its democratic deficit has 
also prompted the establishment of relations between the two. These criticisms are stimulated 
by the Council’s anti-democratic structure and its ineffectiveness, both of which result from 
its permanent members and their veto power. In fact, the Security Council has become more 
secretive and unaccountable than ever as its meetings have taken place behind closed doors 
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“in private consultations of the whole” after 1990.
623
 Critics and some prominent states have 
argued that there is a lack of legitimacy in the Council’s work because its practices are not 
sufficiently transparent or publicly accountable.
624
 At the same time, some considered the 
increased relationships between the Council and NGOs as a significant stage for more 
legitimacy and effectiveness in the international political and legal order.
625
 It was believed 
that NGOs could leverage the Security Council and balance it to increase its legitimacy and 
make it more fit for a legal environment.
626
 Eventually, this constitutes another circumstance 
that paves the way for participation of NGOs in the Council. 
 
In short, the increase in the Council’s activities has made the incapacity of the state-based 
system more obvious. The Council thus feels it necessary to cooperate with NGOs in order to 
increase its capabilities. Besides, the need to balance the illegitimate behaviour of the 
permanent members has led the elected members to cooperate with NGOs. In addition to 
these internal reasons, the Council’s inefficiency combined with the relevance of its activities 
has led NGOs to aspire to interact with it. There are thus significant reasons driving the 
development of interactions between the Security Council and NGOs. These reasons could 
also be instrumental in establishing formal relations between the two. 
 
Nevertheless, even though these circumstances have drawn attention to the importance of 
NGOs’ involvement, the Council has mostly forestalled the granting of formal access to 








 See: ‘Reforming the Security Council’ was a conference and organised on May 1994. Some of these views 
can be found in the speeches.  See at: http://www.globalpolicy.org/security-council/security-council-
reform/32789-reforming-the-security-council.html accessed on 15 May 2013, ibid 
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NGOs. This reaction may at first have come from the permanent Council members, who have 
strongly resisted NGOs scrutiny of their “special terrain”.
627
 Some Council members have 
also been unfavourable to the work of NGOs because of the negative feedback they have 
received from human rights organisations and other NGOs.
628
 These factors may therefore 
have resulted in the restriction of interactions between the two to informal consultations. 
Especially recently, the results of such meetings have also lost their relevance,
629
 perhaps 
because the Council aims to apply to NGOs only when only circumstances render it 
necessary. The reactions of the Security Council’s members have thus made it impossible to 
date to take the process beyond informal relations.  
  




 For instance, there were tensions between governments and human rights NGOs in the Vienna World 
Conference in 1993. Some states had apprehensions regarding the influence of NGOs in terms of reporting 
“damaging information” to the world’s media. See Thomas G. Weiss & others, The United Nations and 
Changing World Politics (5
th
 ed., Westview Press 2007) p.227 
629
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5.2 Precursors of Access 
 
Various types of interactions have developed between NGOs and the Security Council. In this 





Firstly, the Quaker United Nations Office (QUNO) represents the worldwide religious 
organisation of the Society of Friends. This organization might have had the longest relations 
with the Security Council as an NGO.
631
 The QUNO has arranged informal meetings with 
delegates and experts to develop peaceful means for conflict and dispute resolution in an 
informal atmosphere at nearby Quaker House.
632
 The highly essential work in developing 
peaceful means that this NGO does for the Council could provide an alternative to military 
operations. This constitutes proof that formal participation by NGOs could help minimize the 
use of military intervention, as this is one of the goals of the study.  
 
Another major actor is the ICRC, which aims to promote international humanitarian law and 
to encourage its implementation in internal law; this venerable organization also provides 
protection and assistance for the victims of war.
633
 The ICRC launched an office in New 
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York at the beginning of the 1980s. Importantly, meetings with Security Council delegates 




The ICRC has also met regularly with the Presidents of the Security Council, whose members 
have tended to be favourable towards the ICRC because of its significant reputation, 
neutrality, quiet diplomacy and valid sources of information regarding crises.
635
 However, as 
Paul states, “though not an NGO, the ICRC was also not a state, so it bridged the two worlds 
and helped to erode ‘states only’ thinking of Council members”.
636
 In this regard, the ICRC 
may be considered as neither an NGO nor a state. 
 
Yet the ICRC has impressed Council delegates thanks to its noteworthy reputation.
637
 It also 
has access to the Council through regular meetings that can be quite essential for the granting 
of access as a major actor from outside the Council. More importantly, the ICRC is not a state 
and not a member of the Council, yet it is still able to access and influence the Council’s 
policies. It is also the only NGO that enjoy partial legal personality in international law.
638
 
This is a hopeful sign of the possibly of breaking the veto power’s obstacle to granting NGOs 
formal access to the Security Council. 
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 Kaczorowska (2010), p.170 
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Other models have been proposed by the Stanley Foundation and the International Peace 
Institute (IPI),
639
 both of whom have been involved in policy research, and both of whom 
have arranged conferences on the facts concerning major policies.
640
 The Stanley Foundation 
has complementary relations with the UN: for example, several times a year it has arranged 
effective private conferences on peace and security in which Security Council ambassadors 
and high-level UN delegates have participated.
641
 The IPI’s has gained a solid reputation 
following its significant experience on peacekeeping activities, and has initiated a number of 
roundtable meetings on various issues of concern to the Security Council, having assembled 




It is evident that these NGOs have been active in the fields of peace and security. The QUNO 
tries to develop peaceful means for the Security Council through informal gatherings of 
delegates and experts at nearby Quaker House; the ICRC has been active in the 
implementation of humanitarian laws, and holds regular meetings with the Council; the 
Stanley Foundation tries to put peace and security issues onto the Council’s agenda in 
conferences; and the IPI has been holding roundtable meetings to influence the Council. In 
short, informal meetings, private conferences, regular meetings and roundtable meetings are 
used as a tool to access and influence the Council. These interactions are in fact proof that 
NGOs can manage to access the Council, on a variety of levels. This is not easy for them, but 
nor is it impossible. 
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Consequently, the relationships that have been established between the Security Council and 
these actors can be seen as a significant – and unprecedented – development. These relations 
have also influenced the development of interactions between other NGOs and the 
Council,
643
 paving their way to access. Some NGOs such as Amnesty International, OXFAM 
International and MSF initiated relations with the Security Council at the beginning of the 
1990s.
644
 They faced the resistance of Council members at first, but still provided a 
significant number of information networks, a field presence and penetration in conflict 
regions, and broad public support.
645
 These interactions have potentially planted the seeds of 
formal relations between the Council and NGOs. At least they have forced reconsideration of 
any scepticism regarding the possibly of such a development.  




 Ramesh Thakur ‘Human Rights: Amnesty International and the United Nations’ (1994) 31 Journal of Peace 





5.3 Types of Access 
 
As noted above, the limited interactions between the Security Council and NGOs can be 
described as “informal consultations”. They fall into three categories: the Regular Meeting 
Process, the Arria Formula and Somavia Meetings, and informal channels (referred to as 
Bilateral Meetings). In addition to these relations, there are indirect types of interaction: 




5.3.1 The Regular Meeting Process 
 
The meetings of the Working Group on the Security Council have taken place regularly 
outside the Council’s chambers. They consist of informal briefings of individual members of 
the Council and NGOs. The initial aim of the Funci meeting was to involve all the Security 





 The five permanent members of the Council deprecated formal 
contact with NGOs through these informal consultations, yet they agreed to join this informal 
process.  
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The permanent members also asked to present their national perspectives during meetings.
649
 
The more important point is that they were expected to obtain support from NGOs for the 
admissibility and applicability of their own national policies and initiatives. This might 
indicate that NGOs have increased their reputations and earned sufficient respect of Council 
members to gain access to the Council. Furthermore, Council delegates have considered these 
meetings largely as a change of pace from the Council’s endless diplomatic discussions.
650
 
More importantly, it proves that the permanent five does not pose an insuperable obstacle to 
granting access to NGOs. 
 
On the other hand, the elected Council members are more natural partners for NGOs. This 
might be because they do not hold positions of major power or have veto authority, so they 
strive to achieve most of their aims by working with NGOs.
651
 Meetings of the Working 
Group have eventually occurred almost four times a month. Paul notes that they provide a 
central and ongoing aspect of the interaction between the main NGOs and the Security 
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5.3.2 The Arria Formula and Somavia Meetings 
 
The Arria formula can be regarded as the most essential step in establishing more interactions 
between the Security Council and NGOs. There are several reasons for this important status. 
Firstly, after its momentous inception it has been used as the basis for relations between civil 
society and the Council.
653
 Secondly, it is an informal arrangement which provides the 
Security Council with a broad flexibility to be briefed on issues of international peace and 
security. The Arria Formula also allows any Council member to invite other members to 
informal meetings held outside the Council chambers and chaired by the inviting state. The 
meeting’s purpose is for one or more people who are considered as experts on the issue of 





The permanent members of the Security Council have their own sources of information 
regarding significant global issues, while its elected members remain insufficiently informed. 
This encouraged the Council President, Venezuelan ambassador Diego Arria, to contact a 
Croat priest who had just been in the Balkan area of conflict.
655
 It was not possible to arrange 
a formal Council meeting, so Arria just invited his fellow ambassadors to meet the priest in 
the delegates’ lounge. Some 11 ambassadors attended the meeting, and they were surprised 
about what they heard from the priest about the conflict. When this meeting raised awareness 
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There have been further instances of meetings held for the same purpose at that time. Arria 
understood that the Secretariat was not informing them properly about the case of Somalia. 
He therefore invited the head of Africa Watch to inform him in the office of the Presidency. 
Some Security Council members also attempted independently to obtain human rights 
information as the Rwandan genocide began. Czech ambassador Karel Kovanda sought an 
expert on Rwanda from Human Rights Watch because he suspected that the Council was not 
receiving the necessary information about the conflict. He arranged an informal meeting with 
the NGO expert in his residence in which all the non-permanent members of the Security 
Council participated in April 1994.
657
 Even though meetings with NGOs are an essential 
means of obtaining concrete information, Arria pointed out that it is not possible to meet in 
the Security Council’s rooms. This obstacle was removed by meetings being held informally 
outside the Council chambers. 
 
After these earliest contacts with the Security Council, representatives of NGOs aspired to 
meet with the whole Council rather than speaking individually with Council members. Some 
elected members were of the same mind. One of them, Chilean Ambassador Juan Somavia, 
assumed that humanitarian NGOs could have a significant influence on the Council’s agenda. 
To that end he offered to provide a process by which leading NGOs could make presentations 
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in the “Arria Formula Briefing”.
658
 The Council was opposed to the expansion of any 
involvement by NGOs with its permanent members, but they approved of meetings limited to 
heads of state and other top officials.  
 
Somavia thus slightly modified the “Arria Formula” by adding delegates who were not from 
the Council.
659
 Eventually, the “Somavia Meeting” took place on 12 February 1997 to discuss 
the conflicts in the Great Lakes Region of Africa. Representatives from the ICRC and three 
humanitarian NGOs (Oxfam, MSF and CARE) attended. During and after that meeting, 
NGOs heavily criticized the Council’s failure to take action or to find a solution for the crisis. 
The Council’s permanent members were, needless to say, not pleased with this statement, so 
they blocked any further Somavia meetings.
660
 Consequently, such meetings might best be 
seen as a source of inspiration for potential future ones, even though it could not have been 




This example demonstrates that heavy criticism provokes negative responses, and that it 
should not be aimed directly at the Permanent Five or indeed at any Council power; instead, 
it should be general and constructive. It thereby avoids becoming a target and risking the 
NGOs’ position. This does not necessarily entail deceit or hypocrisy, but it does demand the 
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exercise of care when dealing with issues, and of patience when anticipating developments. 
This might take some time, so diplomatic language is necessary. The Security Council’s mind 
cannot be changed in a single meeting. NGOs should be careful to use these meetings wisely. 
 
The collapse of the Somavia meeting saw some efforts to return to the Arria formula. Firstly, 
Antonio V. M. Monteiro of Portugal, President of the Security Council in April 1997, 
indicated that human rights voices should also be considered. This step was supported by 
Chile and Sweden among others. Council members eventually surmounted the obstacle posed 
by the Permanent Five and approved a meeting with Pierre Sane, the Secretary General of 
Amnesty International. Monterio made more attempts, striving to take the Arria model further 
with NGOs, but the permanent members again blocked the process until 2000. The Arria 
Formula nevertheless re-emerged after interactions with NGOs began to be considered as 




These developments prove that the permanent members do not pose an insuperable obstacle 
to granting NGOs access to the Council. Their intransigence may make progress difficult for 
a while, but even though they explicitly oppose access for NGOs, their resistance cannot last 
indefinitely. 
 
Finally, the Arria meetings can boast a success: the protection of civilians during a time of 
war. In that respect, Ambassador Peter van Walsum
663
 of the Netherlands arranged an Arria 
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briefing, “Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict” through the participation of CARE, 
Oxfam and MSF. Canadian ambassador Peter Fowler, Council President, aided developments 
by engineering the meeting and obtaining support from the permanent Council members. 
Resolution 1296 was consequently adopted after debate in the Council. The outcome of this 
success showed that the policy interests of like-minded governments are essential to progress 
NGOs,
664
 who would otherwise struggle to progress relation without Council support. 
 
The Arria Briefings have prompted positive and negative responses from both states and 
NGOs. Firstly, while no further significant opposition has been expressed to NGOs briefings 
in principle, several ones proposed by NGOs, such as the cases of Kashmir and the Sudan, 
were aborted by political opposition.
665
 Secondly, NGOs often regard these meetings as 
highly important.
666
 For example, Amnesty International attaches particular significance to its 
work with the Security Council.
667
 They thus expend much effort in time and expense to 
provide the best representation to the Security Council, including presentations by their top 
level leaders, chief policy experts and the grassroots voices from conflict regions. The same 
cannot be said for states. In fact, the briefings’ durations have become shorter, and are 
attended by few ambassadors and top diplomats. It can be said the Arria process has lost 
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5.3.3 Informal Channels (Bilateral Meetings) 
 
Bilateral meetings take place between individual NGOs and single delegates from the 
Security Council. The bilateral meetings have significantly developed informal contacts with 
Security Council representatives, in contrast to the adverse results of the Arria meetings. 
These can therefore be seen as the foremost aspect of the interactions between NGOs and the 
Security Council. As mentioned earlier, the Council’s delegates need information from 
alternative channels as the Council has expanded the scope of its activities.
669
 Its non-
permanent members in particular have demanded adequate information from outside the 
Council, as they were not kept sufficiently informed by the Permanent Five, with their 
advantageous sources of necessary information. They could not rely on the permanent 
members and they considered media sources to be mostly superficial and unreliable. They 
found NGOs, on the other hand, very useful and reliable as they came to realize the 




The most important instance of these meetings is the Rwandan genocide in April 1994. The 
Council’s delegates were taken aback by the secrecy of the permanent members and the 
Secretariat’s silence.
671
 The callousness of the permanent members could be seen from their 
speeches. For instance, French President Francois Mitterrand stated that “in such countries, 
genocide is not too important”.
672
 Such responses encouraged the elected members in 
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particular to find different means of obtaining information, calling some major NGOs to brief 
them on the Rwandan situation. For example, New Zealand ambassador Colin Keating
673
 
called MSF and the ICRC to inform him. 
 
The bilateral meetings reflect the impediments posed by the permanent members. It shows 
that elected Council members in particular are constantly investigating alternative ways to 
interact with civil society. Their insistence on establishing relations with NGOs reflects their 
view of NGOs as important actors that can help them overcome the Council’s inefficiency. 
On the other hand, the resistance of the permanent five shows that they regard NGOs as a 
threat to their authority. One way or another, the reflections of the Council’s members, when 
taken together, prove the significance of NGOs. 
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5.3.4 Other Means of Interaction 
 
5.3.4.1 Lobbying  
 
The Security Council has been the target of lobbying activities since its establishment. The 
Quakers and the ICRC, for example, have located their offices near the UN’s headquarters 
and have initiated relationships with the Council from the outset in the field of conflict 
resolution.
674
 Other organisations have also realised that this is the most influential way to 
establish relationships with the Council. Paul states that “as NGOs gained experience in 
Council advocacy, many concluded that the most effective strategy combined diplomacy in 
New York with world-wide public advocacy campaigns”.
675
 Some other organisations such 
as Amnesty International, Oxfam, Save the Children, Global Witness and Human Rights 
Watch have used this same method of developing relations with the Council about 45 years 
after the UN’s establishment. NGOs also establish parallel ad hoc coalitions with other NGOs 




5.3.4.2 International Campaigns 
 
International campaigns can be considered as one of the most practicable ways of attracting 
popular attention and support for particular causes. Civil society can leverage states and 
international organisations to encourage them to implement various policies. Social actors 
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“name and shame” to exert pressure.
677
 The cases of blood diamonds and UN resolutions land 
mines, for example, demonstrate how successful NGOs are in exerting influence on the 
Council’s policymaking. London-based Global Witness produced “A Rough Trade”, a report 
on diamonds in Angola
678
  which provided evidence showing how rebel group UNITA
679
 
sold diamonds to giant company DeBeers and other Western diamond interest groups. After 
this report appeared, Global Witness representatives were invited to meet with the Angola 
Sanctions Committee of the Security Council. As a result of this report, the Committee used 
innovative methods to tighten its sanctions. UNITA finally collapsed some three years later 




5.3.4.3 Implementing Agencies  
 
Another way for NGOs to leverage the Security Council is through implementing agencies.
681
 
These are also likely to be an essential means for the Security Council to use NGOs to enact 
its policies, particularly in the field of humanitarian assistance. The significant expansion of 
the Council’s activities in areas such as peacekeeping operations and post-conflict peace-
building has seen it increase its interactions with humanitarian NGOs. While these share 
significant resources, they are also quite successful in providing technical expertise and 
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 In addition to providing humanitarian assistance, NGOs were asked to support 




On two occasions the Security Council has explicitly called on NGOs to provide information 
and resources.
684
 Its Resolution 771 of 13th August 1992 concerning the former Yugoslavia 
“[c]alls upon States and, as appropriate, international humanitarian organizations to collate 
substantiated information in their possession or submitted to them relating to the violations of 
humanitarian law, including grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, being committed in 
the territory of the former Yugoslavia and to make this information available to the 
Council”.
685
 In this resolution, the statements “as appropriate, international humanitarian 
organizations to collate substantiated information” and “to make this information available to 
the Council” explicitly cover NGOs.
686
 No previous resolution regarding the former 




The second example is that of Sierra Leone. In its resolution of 2003, the Council called on 
states, international organizations and non-governmental organisations to continue supporting 
the National Recovery Strategy of the Government of Sierra Leone.
688
 The Council made 
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overt reference to the concept of “non-governmental organisations” rather than implying their 
existence.
689
 This can be seen as demonstrating that it is possible for the Security Council to 
alter its approach in 10 years. The fact that the Council has chosen make such an open 
reference to the concept of NGOs could be a token of a significant increase in NGOs 
influence and in their legitimacy in international law.  
 
These two examples make it clear the UN’s antipathetic attitude to NGOs has undergone 
significant changes. At first, the Security Council became aware that relying solely on states 
was not adequate. Circumstances impelled the Council, including its permanent members, to 
establish relations with NGOs. Their awareness of their incapacity drove them to call for 
support and help from NGOs. Even though the Council, and in particular its permanent 
members, strives to keep its relations with the NGOs informal, the inadequacy of the state-
based system may force the Council to consider formal relationships with NGOs. Secondly, 
the significant increase of NGOs’ reputations in the international legal order encourages the 
Council to refer to them explicitly. It seems that the formal involvement of NGOs on the 
Council is not too distant. 
 





5.4 Concluding Remarks 
 
It can be concluded that it is important for NGOs to establish relations with an institution that 
had hitherto closed its doors to them. Several methods have been used to grant access to the 
Security Council, but such relations as have developed have been confined to informal 
meetings
690
 and have depended on the agreement of Council members, particularly its 
permanent members. While NGOs have been eager to develop such relationships, the Council 
has mostly preferred to use a demand-based approach, restricting it to informal consultations. 
Indeed, relations have sometimes become unilateral rather than remaining bilateral, when the 
Council’s reluctant reactions are taken into consideration. This accords with Willett’s 
prediction that “the last bastions to resist formal relationships with NGOs will be the 
International Monetary Fund and the Security Council”.
691
   
 
Nevertheless, the Council’s resistance could not withstand the challenging presented by 
current circumstances, since NGOs have found a place in Council resolutions as supporting 
actors. The practices of Council members, including its permanent ones, demonstrate that 
they are aware of their inability to deal with issues of international peace and security solely 
from a state-based system, but it is still the elected members who aim to develop relations 
further with NGOs. They persist in attempting to find alternative ways of interacting with 
NGOs, who have likewise taken an avid interest in obtaining access to the Council. Taken 
together, the indispensability of the assistance provided by NGOs paves the way for the 
establishment of concrete formal relations between NGOs and the Security Council.  
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Is Informal Access Enough? 
 
 
Some may argue that informal relations are good enough – indeed, that they are more suitable 
for the purposes of NGOs. They believe that formal access may compromise the nature of 
such organizations, claiming that formal access would in fact limit their capabilities, allowing 
states to control them. On the other hand, some also argues that even the consultative status is 
not an adequate position for NGOs to perform efficiently.
692
 The outcomes NGOs have 
achieved by informal relations will first be examined, while determining any problems in this 
regard. The conclusion will be that formal access has become essential, as NGOs have faced 
difficulties in demonstrating the efficiency of their performance by informal processes. With 
some exceptions, states have tended to use NGOs for their own convenience, calling on them 
as and when they see fit. This state of affairs has already discouraged some NGOs. The 
present chapter highlights the practical need.   
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6.1 Outcomes of informal interactions between the Security Council and 
NGOs  
 
A person’s employability depends to a large degree on their previous experience and 
achievements, which are key indicators of reliability because past deeds strongly suggest 
future ones. The same applies to NGOs in the present context: it is necessary to address their 
experiences and achievements under conditions of informal relations in order to support a 
case for formal access.  
 
NGOs have to some extent been successful in empowering themselves to influence decisions 
taken by decision-making organs. There are many examples of NGOs’ achievements in this 
area. Kofi Annan aptly states that their involvement has increased over the last few years and 
has “moved ‘upstream’ as NGOs participate more and more commonly in the design of 
projects”.
693
   
 
As mentioned earlier, the Security Council has maintained informal relationships with NGOs 
since 1982
694
, relationships that were reinforced by the Arria
695
 formula in 1992. An NGO 
Working Group also advocates off-the record relationships with the Council by arranging 
briefings for delegates. It brings together 30 high-profile NGOs including OXFAM, MSF, 
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Amnesty International, and CARE under the leadership of the Global Policy Forum.
696
 Under 
these informal interactions, NGOs have striven to increase Council member states’ awareness 
of issues related to human rights, humanitarian aid, disarmament, and the environment.
697
 In 
addition to informal relations, some interactions have also been established under a 
subsidiary organ for specific cases at formal meetings under Article 29.
698
 These interactions 
have produced specific outcomes. To this extent, NGOs have been able to introduce issues 




There is no doubting NGOs’ capacity for advocacy and influence. James Paul maintains that 
“this was NGO advocacy at its best and most effective”.
700
 Global Witness is a major NGO. 
It describes itself thus: “we find the facts, we uncover the story and we change the system”.
701
 
One of its most noteworthy ventures provides a very powerful illustration of this definition. 
Global Witness has succeeded in drawing the international community’s attention to the 
problem of conflict diamonds (known also as ”blood diamonds”) by releasing their report “A 
Rough Trade” in 1998.
702
 This report demonstrates how diamonds helped fund the civil war 
in Angola.
703
 The Security Council has consequently adopted Resolution 1295 in April 
2000.
704
 In fact, some resolutions such as 864 (1993), 1127 (1997), 1173 (1998) and 1237 
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(1999) had already been taken on Angola. Yet Global Witness had discovered violations of 
these resolutions.  
 
The Council might not have known the facts, or it might have pretended not to know. 
Nevertheless, an NGO was able to uncover the facts and change the situation. This incident 
therefore actually constitutes evidence for NGOs’ power and the inability or outright failure 
of the Security Council. In this respect, James Paul states that “Global Witness showed how a 
compelling and original analysis could mobilize public support, affect government positions 




However, the first Security Council resolution on Angola was in 1993. The Global Witness 
report was published in 1998, while the Council resolution relating to that report was taken in 
2000. This seven year gap strongly suggests that the Council was too late in the light of the 
resolutions themselves, all of which – from 785 in 1992 to 1173 in 1998 – focused on 
UNITA.
706
 The Council resolution on Angola consisted mainly of reaffirmations of 
condemnations and sanctions against UNITA. Yet the UNSC barely recognised that UNITA 
was not the only problem in Angola. It took an NGO to prove that that other actors were also 
at play in the Angolan conflict, their report revealing the countries that were violating 
sanctions against UNITA for their own interests.  
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If formal access had been granted, Global Witness or another NGO would have discovered 
the facts more efficiently and exerted pressure on the Security Council to act in time, thereby 
forestalling further violations of human rights. This is not to ignore the fact that Global 
Witness had succeeded through informal channels. Yet neither can the unconscionable 
lateness of the report as the result of the lengthy procedures entailed in those informal 
interactions be gainsaid. It cannot be denied that, had the report been issued at least a year 
earlier, it would have been able to prevent many of those violations of human rights and to 
save the lives of many people over that period. 
 
Moreover, NGOs have played a significant role in the strengthening the Angolan sanctions 
regime. After civil actors had increased the awareness of Council members, some resolutions 
were also adopted to prevent the illicit flow of arms into Africa and to protect civilians, 
particularly women.
707
 NGOs have made contributions to the establishment of ad hoc 
international criminal tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda.
708
 Council members were 
apparently not aware of the exact situation in Yugoslavia until a Bosnian priest came to New 
York and asked to see various Council members,
709
 but only Ambassador Arria agreed to 
meet him.
710
 If no one including the Ambassador had done so, the priest would have been 
forced to return to Bosnia having made no impact. It cannot be right to leave issues of 
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international peace and security to such informal arrangements with their uncertain access 
and equally uncertain impact.  
 
Another prominent example is Security Council Resolution 1325, adopted on October 2000.  
This was the first formal acknowledgement from the Council that respect for women’s rights 
and support for women’s participation in peace negotiations and in post-conflict 
reconstruction was required.
711
 This resolution was adopted after lobbying by dozens of 
women’s organizations.
712
 Its date illustrates how hard it is to adjust to the realities of the 
world order without NGOs. The pressing issue of women’s rights is hardly a new one, but the 
Council has remained silent on it until the dawn of the new millennium. If NGOs had not 
influenced the Council, then it would not have adopted any resolution on such a significant 
issue even until the present time. This proves that the Security Council alone is not able to 
consider all issues.
713
 The state-based Council system has deficiency to keep pace with global 
evolution.  
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 As the Syrian conflict continues, the issue of protecting Syrian antiquities appears not to be considered. 
There is, however, an NGO that does. In this regard, the report of the American Association for the 
Advancement of Science (AAAS) has spurred the Council to action. The Council adopted Resolution 2199 on 
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more at https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/144-bibliographies/52741-un-security-council-
banning-all-trade-with-syrian-antiquities.html accessed on 04/04/15 
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Apart from the efforts of NGOs on their own initiative, the Security Council has also 
explicitly asked them for support. For example, Resolution 771 in 1992 regarding Yugoslavia 
“…demands that relevant international humanitarian organizations, and in particular the 
International Committee of the Red Cross, be granted immediate, unimpeded and continued 
access to camps…within territory of the former Yugoslavia and calls upon all parties to do all 
in their power to facilitate such access” while the following paragraph calls “upon states and, 
as appropriate, international humanitarian organizations to collate substantiated 
information…” regarding breaches of human rights.
714
 The Council refers more explicitly to 
NGOs in Resolution 1470 of 2003: it “[c]alls on States, international organizations and non-
governmental organizations to continue to support the National Recovery Strategy of the 




Not the least significant example is the Ottawa Treaty (also known as Anti-Personnel Mine 
Ban Convention, often referred to as the Mine Ban Treaty but officially named the 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-
Personnel Mines and on their Destruction) was signed after lengthy efforts by NGOs in 
December 1997.
716
 Although this treaty does not refer directly to interactions between the 
Security Council and NGOs, yet it provide indirect acknowledgement of their influence. The 
Convention was signed by 162 states but not by 35, including the US, Russia and China. The 
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Treaty thus demonstrates how NGOs could persuade two thirds of UN member states to 
adopt a measure against the opposition of three permanent members of the Security Council.  
 
In addition, given the fact that the Ottawa Treaty was formulated as it were “from below”, 
many international legal scholars, activists, diplomats and organizations believe that the 
Convention represents both a democratization and a new source of legitimacy for 
international law.
717
 The Ottawa Treaty can therefore be seen as a hallmark achievement of 
NGOs. 
 
Nevertheless, the above examples are still not enough to allow informal relations to be 
considered adequate. For example, the Ottawa Treaty has only been ratified by 40 states. 
Three permanent members of the Security Council do not adhere to it. As mentioned, the 
resolution on women’s rights could have been taken much earlier if NGOs had had formal 
access to the Council. The ICC could also have been established earlier, and could even have 
prevented many war crimes. A stronger ICC striving to implement rules of international law 
might have been in evidence.
718
 Such a Court would be able to restrain the Council’s 
questionable actions. Informal access to the Council can thus result in only limited or late 
success, while formal access would make NGOs’ performance more efficient. 
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Their achievements certainly cannot be denied. James Paul
719
 classifies their contribution to 
the Security Council. First, they have improved its accountability and transparency. He states 
that “after more than a decade of NGO action, the public knows much more about the 
Council than before, and citizens are in a stronger position to demand accountability for 
Council action”.
720
 Secondly, NGOs have provided better information and analysis to 
Council members. In fact, its non-permanent members have increasingly benefited from this, 
because NGOs have broken the permanent members’ intelligence monopoly. The Council has 





It is true that NGOs have a significant capacity to provide information. It may be wondered if 
the state, with its intelligent service, is not better placed in this regard. Jaeger considers that 
“if they (UN officials) were unable to obtain the relevant information from independent 
sources (and UN backup facilities are often unable to produce an in-depth analysis), 
committee members would have to take government reports at their face value and would be 
hard pressed to challenge them”.
722
 NGOs allow comparison to be made between information 
that various sources because they can provide independent and comprehensive sources of 
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information. It is therefore easier more accurately to analyse causes without obscuring 
facts
723
 rather than relying on possibly biased inferences. 
 
Thirdly, NGOs have taken the lead regarding some procedural reforms, launching their own 
regular consultation processes with Council members and expanding the Arria Formula. They 
have adopted the aim that there should be more informative mission web sites and have 
significantly broadened the nature and amount of UN information on the Council and its 
work.
724
 They have also pushed the Council to adopt new approaches in its field missions, 




One of the main reasons for the maintenance of informal interactions is that NGOs cannot 
legally participate in the Council, thus concentrating its legislative activity in the informal 
arena.
726
 In this regard, NGOs find informal relations to be an alternative way of establishing 
relations with international law-making. It can be concluded that NGOs would actually prefer 
to establish formal relations, regarding informal ones as their least preferred option. For 
example, if they favoured the latter, they would not strive consultative status in ECOSOC, 
nor would they complain about the deficiencies inherent in informal relations. A second 
reason is that informal relationships are demanded by the Council, which regards informal 
relations as an option for receiving information from NGOs. Yet informal relations are not 
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 Pauwelyn & others (2014), p.742 
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enough, either for the Council’s needs or for international legal circumstances. It would thus 
be advisable for the Council to allow formal access to NGOs. 
 
In conclusion, NGOs have achieved a remarkable amount, both in the Council and outside it. 
It is clear that they have influenced the Council’s decision-making process and have 
accomplished much in the legal and political policy arenas.
727
 It is thus helpful to note their 
capacity to influence states, and consequently to push the latter to take action. At the same 
time, it also demonstrates how limited access has mostly resulted in limited successes that 
have been gained only through the limited access and sources entailed in informal relations. 
In fact, it is not easy to exert pressure on the Security Council, “the ultimate bastion of power 
politics”, by participating NGOs.
728
 Nonetheless, as Therien and Dumontier state, NGOs 
have contrived to loosen “the grip that states have on the institution” despite these 
impediments.
729
 In adverse circumstances they have managed to increase their strength in 
world politics
730
 and have achieved many outcomes through informal interactions. It can thus 
plausibly be maintained that such achievements would be rendered even more satisfactory by 
the establishment of formal relationships. 
 
The cases just discussed relate to issues of security and peace. They demonstrate that NGOs 
have already helped maintain international peace and security, nominally not their legal 
responsibility but that of the Security Council. This provides grounds for asserting that if 
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formal access (which implies legal personality) were granted, they would greatly increase 






6.2 Why Formal Access is Necessary, Rather than Maintaining Informal 
Access 
 
“…The time has arrived to bring NGO and United Nations activities into an increasingly 
productive relationship of consultation and cooperation.”
731
 




Different approaches to the manner in which NGOs participate in the Council’s activities are 
evident, be these formal or informal. Some of those social actors most involved agree with 
member states that they are content with the present informal relationships with the Council, 
believing that such interactions have assisted that body and therefore disagreeing with calls 
for formal consultative status.
733
 Their contemporaries are unhappy with this state of affairs, 
considering that informal consultations are skewed excessively in favour of northern and 
mostly New York-based NGOs while tending to exclude southern ones.
734
 Some also argue 
that there are many reasons to strengthen the legitimacy of NGOs in the Council, as informal 
interactions are insufficient and unproductive.
735
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Some may argue that decisions that cannot be taken in formal meetings can be achieved in 
informal ways. It is held impossible to overstep formal boundaries in formal meetings, yet it 
is possible to ignore formal procedures – or, for that matter, to introduce rules into informal 
ones.
736
 Paul Wapner asserts that NGOs can influence delegates and personnel of UN 
member states from the outside by informal contacts in the halls of convention centres, hotel 
rooms and on the street. Firstly, he suggests that NGOs play an especially useful role in 
educating UN personnel, state representatives and the general public about emerging crises or 
other concerns of wide transnational import.
737
 In this context, they could press states and the 
UN to address such dilemmas by media campaigns, lobbying, social mobilization or 
protest.
738
 NGOs can also hold meetings at large UN conferences in an attempt to influence 




Wapner advocates another way to influence member states: organising side events at UN 
conferences.
740
 In this way NGOs can work with particular governments and international 
organisations to present information about salient facts regarding ongoing negotiations. Such 
meetings have mostly been held in nearby hotels and other venues, and they have often 
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received support from the UN Secretariat in the form of managing organisations and 
providing logistical assistance.
741
 All of these all methods could to some extent influence 
member states, and even result in success on occasion.  
 
Although it might very well be possible for NGOs at least partly to obtain their goals through 
these outside activities, there are two reasons why it would be quite a risky process for 
security and peace: the length of the process, and low probability of positive outcomes. 
Regarding the first, it requires a convoluted process for NGOs informally to press states to 
take decisions regarding their concerns. They would first have to expend significant efforts to 
gain informal access, then be able to provide resources. If formal access were already in 
place, then providing resources would be the only step involved. Urgent of security and peace 
issues will not wait for lengthy procedures. The Panel Report advises interested parties “to 
strengthen the capacities of civil society and communities to carry out early warning and 
response”.
742
 Otherwise, the current problem of inertia in the Security Council would not be 
solved.  
 
Activities intended to influence states are likely to be less effective through informal than 
formal channels. Wapner believes that NGOs could be intimately involved through formal 
mechanisms in persuading member states. He points out the inefficiency of their informal 
counterparts, which reduces the number of direct encounters between NGOs on the one hand 
and state delegates and UN personnel on the other.
743
 Likewise, Woodward rightly indicates 
that when NGOs can formally participate in decision-making processes, their influence on the 









formation of international law is more effective.
744
 When there is no formal pressure, such 
outcomes depend totally on the wishes and the consent of states.  
 
Moreover, discussion of security and peace issues concerns the seriousness of those 
problems, given that the maintenance of international peace and security is both highly 
important and urgent – a resolution should not wait indefinitely. Security and peace issues 
must be dealt at once in order to forestall further crises. Attempts to influence UN member 
states from outside involve open-ended, long procedures with no guarantee of success. This 
does not mean that such attempts should not be made, but they are neither satisfactory nor 
efficient. Willetts makes three points about the benefits of formal access: 
First, NGOs have access to all UN documents, once these have been officially 
circulated…Along with being able to attend the meetings and observe the 
proceedings, this means that the NGOs can gain high levels of information, 
about the political process. …Secondly, NGOs have security passes giving them 
access to all the buildings… They therefore have access to the delegates. 
…Thirdly, being awarded consultative status gives the NGOs a legitimate place 
within the political system. This means that the NGO activist is seen as having a 
right to be involved in the process.745 
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In short, NGOs would be very happy to gain immediate access to officials and documents and 
to talk without impediment to delegates.
746
 Such access would significantly contribute to the 
maintenance of peace and security. On the other hand, these conferences take place at the 
behest of NGOs and states regarding issues that are not urgent. Yet holding meetings to 
discuss the maintenance of peace and security must be their obligation rather than just their 
wish. The ways that Wapner propounds could prove efficacious for circumstances that are not 
serious or urgent, but not for issues that threaten regional or international stability. 
 
Of course, it cannot be denied that it would be very hard to establish relations between NGOs 
and the Security Council by hoping for a positive formal reaction from the permanent 
members. However, the fact that the only chance to influence events is informal cannot 
logically lead to the claim that such interactions are a more efficient way of swaying the 
decision-making powers. If there were a formal place for NGOs on the Council, NGOs would 
be able to influence it both informally and formally. As this it is not the case, informal 
interactions cannot automatically be considered as the best way of persuading Council 
members.  
 
As has been pointed out earlier, NGOs have already interacted with the Security Council, 
thereby developing a practical foundation for the establishment of formal relationships. These 
are, however, mostly subject to the consent of Council member states, and been both vague 
and capricious, delaying outcomes and rendering them potentially unsatisfactory. Byers and 
Lindblom hold that the lack of a legal personality in the international sphere renders an 
individual or an entity largely incapable of participating in an independent capacity in the 





formation of customary law.
747
 For example, formal identity could increase NGOs’ influence 
on the public and on member states, since those that have the reputation endowed by formal 
identity will quite likely be taken more seriously. 
 
A fundamental constituent of all meetings of the type under discussion is their political 
authority,
748
 which might depend heavily on the official positions of the participants. They 
should be attended by heads of state and governments or relevant ministers in order to enable 
concrete and influential outcomes. If they are attended only by junior officials, their 
resolutions would not be strong enough to bind authorities.  The demand for formal access for 
NGOs may thus stem firstly from the inability of informal meetings that low-level 
representatives of Security Council members have mostly preferred to attend. 
 
NGOs have striven to influence the Security Council through numerous proposals, but their 
efforts, including shared information and suggestions, have been largely disregarded or 
blocked, as can be seen from previous cases. Interested NGOs have been dismayed by this 
state of affairs. By way of illustration, governments have tended to send only low-level 
officials to meetings with NGOs; in fact, some have even chosen not to participate.
749
 Formal 
access to the Council might be essential to encourage its members to consider seriously the 
work of NGOs in the decision-making process. For example, when the ICRC was granted UN 
observer status in 1991, it strengthened its access, including regular meetings with Council 
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 Of course, formal access to the Security Council would provide more efficient 
opportunities for access. The further development of current informal mechanisms would 
therefore bring NGOs into close contact with high-ranking governmental representatives such 




It would also encourage more NGOs to share their sources with Council and work with it. 
Formal participation would draw more attention to NGOs and encourage them to cooperate 
more with the Council. In short, taking NGOs seriously would encourage them to work more 
actively. 
The formal participation of NGOs would provide the Security Council with the opportunity 
to regularly receive consultative opinions that are absolutely essential for its operations. 
Archibugi indicates that the Council should seek consultative opinions more often.
752
 
However, informal meetings depend on the will of Council members, particularly permanent 
ones. NGOs are often not able to provide their resources to the Council because of their 
limited access. For example, many proposed briefings by NGOs were stalled because of 
political objections to the subject matter. Kashmir and the Sudan are two noteworthy cases.
753
 
Paul also indicates that: 
[w]hen the P-5 have strong positions, as they often do, NGOs encounter 
immoveable opposition. On sanctions reform, Chechnya, the Middle East, Iraq, 
and many other important issues, even the most vigorous NGO advocacy runs 
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into the brick wall of P-5 opposition (especially from United States), as national 
interests block key NGO concerns.754  
Thus, informal access cannot overcome arbitrary treatment by Council members, even in 
urgent cases. Informal channels are under the control of the Council’s member states, and 
particularly of the permanent members. If NGOs were to be granted formal access, they 
would be able to vitiate such arbitrary treatment.  
 
Some may object that formal access would undermine NGOs’ nature. This implies that NGOs 
would become less mindful of their fundamental goals, and that they could become self-
interested actors, as states are. 
 
Nonetheless, the present proposal is for formal participation rather than membership of the 
Security Council, so that NGOs would not have same status as the Council’s member states. 
In fact, NGOs have already been granted formal participation in ECOSOC. If participation on 
this basis were contrary to their natures, significant numbers of NGOs would not have 
applied for consultative status at that body. Of course, no actor can be guaranteed not to 
become self-interested or to deviate from its fundamental principles. This is something that 
can only be dealt with when it occurs. In any case, predictions can be made from previous 
practice. It is thus held that NGOs are not likely to be worse than states. 
 
The involvement of new actors in the international arena has been regarded as an 
acknowledged fact, and enabling them by allowing them access to channels of participation 
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in the formal system is the concern of many.
755
 The Panel Report emphasises that “direct 
NGOs relationship with UN organs will remain important and that it should be kept 
formal”
756
. The Panel thus indicates that the existing interactions between the Security 
Council and NGOs should be formalized.
757
 As the Council is an international organ, it 
should not remain reluctant to grant formal access to NGOs in a changing international 
environment in which international organizations have been urged to consider the 
participation of new actors. Otherwise, the Council will continue to lack democracy, 
accountability and effectiveness. In similar vein, Thomas Frank states that “fairness of 




At present, the term “global discourse” assumes a conversation between nations. The author’s 
contention is that that limited view is wrong. Not only is it inaccurate, overlooking the many 
actors – multinational corporations, churches, service organizations, gender- and ethno-
culturally specific groups, scientific networks, and a myriad of others – who are already part 
of this discourse.
759
 Crucially, the model’s defect lies in its unfairness.
760
 This approach 
might imply that not representing other voices would produce inequality. Accordingly, 
fairness and openness are the most significant requirements for developing more democratic 
institutions.
761
 When the deficits in the Security Council are considered, NGOs would be 
significant partners with the Council in increasing its democracy, effectiveness and 
                                               
755
 Boutros-Ghali (2000), p.105 
756
 Emanuele Rebasti and Luisa Vierucci, 'A Legal Status for NGOs in Contemporary International Law?' 
(2002), p.10, http://www.esil-sedi.eu/sites/default/files/VierucciRebasti.PDF  accessed on 31/12/14 
757
 A/58/817, proposal 12 
758











 Hence, formal access would enable NGOs to make concrete contributions 
that are not likely to be made via informal meetings. NGOs’ formal access to the SC is 
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making and implementation.” ibid 
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6.3 Concluding Remarks 
 
In conclusion, as is observed above, the outcomes that informal access has produced cannot 
be denied. It is also undeniable that the very fact of having access to the Council is a major 
achievement because gaining admission to an institution that has deliberately tended towards 
exclusiveness is not easy. Paul emphasizes that the presence of NGOs in this state-based 
“club reflects tectonic shifts in the international order”.
763
 It is therefore a remarkable success 
even to have gained informal access to the Council. Yet the international legal order has been 
evolving rapidly, a reality with which the Council has failed to keep pace. 
 
Notwithstanding the outcomes of informal relations, it is necessary to transform these to a 
formal mode. This is mainly because informal relations provide only limited access to NGOs 
and thus does not permit them to operate efficiently. Limited access can only bring limited 
success. Given the fact that the issues with which the Council deals are related to 
international peace and security, it is essential to take appropriate measures in a timely 
manner. Informal access is far from meeting this requirement, since it depends on the good 
will of member states and takes a long time to reach a decision. As discussed in Chapter IV, 
NGOs should therefore be granted at least a partial legal personality that would allow them to 
perform more efficiently. When NGOs’ access is strengthened, their achievements would 
commensurably improve. Formal participation on the Council is thus important in the current 
conditions. 
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Lastly, Bardo Fassbender highlights how the obstacles that face NGOs every time they try to 
access the Council have “given way to a certain ennui or resignation of the interested 
governments and nongovernmental organizations”.
764
 Paul likewise observes that “NGOs are 





In the light of these facts, it cannot be argued that informal relations between NGOs and the 
Security Council have been satisfactory. Translating relationships into a formal mode would 
enhance the Council’s capabilities, as NGOs would be able to provide more resources more 
efficiently, and also because the Council would be able to address the realities of the current 
international legal order. 
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Proposed Framework for Formal Access and Criticisms 
 
7.1 Establishing a Subsidiary Body: the Consultative Committee of the 
Security Council (CCSC) 
 
There is a multitude of processes for granting NGOs access to UN organs,
766
 many of which 
resemble ECOSOC’s procedure. That procedure is the starting point for NGOs to obtain 
access to the UN.
767
 Granting formal Security Council access to NGOs could likewise reflect 
ECOSOC’s procedure. The first way to establish formal relations between NGOs and the 
Security Council is to add a paragraph to one of the appropriate Articles of Chapter V of the 
UN Charter. For example, a paragraph could be added to the Procedure section of this 
Chapter, and a second paragraph could be added to Article 29 as follows:  
The Security Council may make suitable arrangements for consultation with 
non-governmental organizations that are concerned with matters within its 
competence.  
Of course, such a step would require a Charter amendment, which would require the votes of 
the permanent Council members.
768
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It is therefore more logical to consider an alternative way of establishing formal relations 
between NGOs and the Council, one that would not (at least legally) require the affirmative 
votes of the permanent members. The word “legally” is used here as it refers to the UN 
Charter’s explicit requirement for affirmative Council votes in articles such as 27, 108 and 
109. On the other hand, the veto-holding powers can challenge other members’ requests by 
means other than reference to an article of the Charter. They could sometimes do so by 
arbitrary practices such as the “double veto”, which could occur in cases where the Charter 
does not authorize the permanent members to block the process; at this point, those members 
could attempt to make broad interpretations on their own behalf. This amounts to a practical 
rather than a legal obstacle. The issue of the double veto is discussed later in this chapter. 
 
Another way of granting formal access to NGOs could be to grant them consultative status in 
the Council under a subsidiary organ.
769
 This proposal suggests that such NGOs constitute 
subsidiary organs that begin very modestly with largely consultative functions, and that, 
following the model of NGO status in ECOSOC
770
, they would gain powers slowly over 
time. The introduction of formal access to the Security Council for NGOs should thus happen 
through a subsidiary organ with a consultative function, and this access should evolve 
gradually. 
 
At first sight it might appear quite outlandish to speak of the granting of formal participation 
rights to NGOs. However, closer examination reveals that this has already occurred at the 
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 The concept of NGOs’ participation in global governance is as old as 
the United Nations
772
, and this idea has been realized to some extent in the UN system. In this 
context, a proposal for formal access could be partly based on the sample structure of 
previous instances of participation such as that of ECOSOC.  
 
Some scholars suggest granting permanent participation, such as consultative status, to NGOs 
on the Security Council.
773
 However, these suggestions have been cursory in the extreme. 
Specifically, they provide no background information regarding such issues as why and how 
such formal participation should take place and what reasons there are for requesting such 
participation. This dearth of research on the subject means that the present argument has 
nothing to be compared to. 
 
While it is true that no article of the Charter has provided for formal NGO access to the 
Security Council, there is no conceptual reason to preclude it.
774
 The report of the General 
Assembly and Economical and Social Council proposes consultative status for NGOs in the 
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 The report notes that many member delegates have urged that consultative 
arrangements with NGOs should be extended beyond the Economic and Social Council and 





Furthermore, a Panel Report in 2004 makes a four-part proposal.
777
 The first recommendation 
is to improve Arria Formula meetings by “lengthening lead times and covering travel costs to 
increase the participation of actors from the field”.
778
 Secondly, it offers Council field 
missions to arrange regular meetings with “appropriate local civil society leaders, 
international humanitarian NGOs and perhaps others, such as business leaders and United 
Nations Headquarters and field staff should facilitate the meetings”.
779
 Thirdly, the report 
suggests the establishment of an experimental series of Council seminars where emerging 
issues would be discussed with civil society and “other constituencies as well as United 
Nations specialists, such as special rapporteurs”.
780
 The Report aims to develop more formal 
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 Report of the Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations–Civil Society Relations, ‘We the Peoples: Civil 
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relationships between the Council and NGOs.
781
 Lastly, it proposes commissions of inquiry 




In addition, some further proposals await realization in positive law.
783
 These proposals may 
not be made directly to the Security Council, yet they might be worth a short mention. First, 
the Commission on Global Governance recommends “an institutional reform that would 
provide new global machinery through which warnings could be articulated: the creation of a 
Council for Petitions in which a new 'right of petition' could be exercised by non- state 
actors”.
784
 They propose a high-level panel of five to seven people who are independent of 
any states and are selected purely on the grounds of their personal competence. They would 
be appointed by the Secretary-General with approval of the General Assembly, and would be 
able make recommendations for “the security of people” to the Secretary-General, the 
Security Council and the General Assembly. The report believes that this mechanism would 
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Secondly, the proposals of the report of the Our Creative Diversity would pave the way for a 
World People’s Assembly.
786
 This report recommends the establishment of a two-chamber 
General Assembly, one chamber consisting of government representatives as at present, the 
other of representatives from actors from the national civil social sphere. The Commission 
holds that “not only development strategies should become people-centred: so should all 
institutions of global governance”.
787
 In this regard, the Commission suggests that after the 
representatives of NGOs are accredited to the General Assembly, they should be grouped 
together as civil society organizations into a World Forum; they would finally be invited to 
regular meetings to share their views on key global issues such as the environment, 




The CAMDUN (Campaign for a More Democratic United Nations) was established in 1989 
as a project of INFUSA (International Network for a UN Second Assembly), which was 
formed in 1983.
789
 This movement also worked towards the foundation of an organ of the UN 
to represent the world’s citizens as members of civil society (a UN assembly of peoples), 
attached to the UN General Assembly.
790
 This idea has also been at several times in different 
contexts.
791
 The main objective of such as proposals was to establish a second assembly 
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under the General Assembly. This new assembly would involve many representatives 
including NGOs, mostly by granting them consultative status.  
 
Another eminent commission, the Independent Working Group on the Future of the United 
Nations, suggests the establishment of a UN Social Council that would “look to non-state 





As can be observed, these proposals have focused on the foundation of an organ attached to 
the General Assembly. They aim to influence the Security Council indirectly rather than 
directly. The important point is that they all intend to increase the role of NGOs by giving 
them more space. It can therefore be concluded that enabling NGOs to participate in 
decision-making processes is regarded as important to the international legal order. 
 
On the other hand, these proposals do not specifically refer to the Security Council; rather, 
they consider NGO participation in the UN system in general terms. There is occasional 
mention of such participation on the Council in terms of desirability. For example, Brazil’s 
former foreign minister Antonio de Aguiar Patriota addresses the involvement of civil society 
in the Council,
793
 but does not make a clear argument as to whether this should be by formal 
or informal means. Such proposals do not detail the mechanisms of such participation, nor do 
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they offer a rationale for it. On the other hand, they do extensively background the informal 
participation of NGOs.  
 
The first priority has been to offer as realistic and feasible a proposal as possible. Hans 
Köchler points out that when “statutory predicament” is considered, a realistic approach must 
be adopted.
794
 Impractical amendments to the Charter have thus not been suggested in the 
present work. 
 
Archibugi recommends that NGOs recognized by the General Assembly could choose their 
own representatives on the Security Council.
795
 However; as mentioned earlier, the process 
must be shortened; NGOs could then share responsibility directly and efficiently. The formal 
place could thus first be arranged under a subsidiary organ. This proposal therefore suggests a 
permanent subsidiary organ that would provide for consultation with NGOs during or before 
conflicts. This means that NGOs would have a permanent position on the Council, and they 
would thus be able to take effective steps. 
 
NGOs who have been filtered using some criteria
796
 could have access to this subsidiary 
body. The NGOs recognized by the Council might constitute a “Consultative Committee”, 
which would most likely be the Consultative Committee of the Security Council (CCSC). 
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This should be an exclusively consultative body of the Security Council. NGOs would be 
participants rather than Council members.
797
 As mentioned in Chapter 4, NGOs would have 
partial legal personality by obtaining formal participation rights in the Council. Theirs would 
be a limited subsidiary body, as it is to be expected that they would progressively increase 
their influence. The main feature of these subsidiary bodies would be to perform distinct 
functions that the Security Council itself does not exercise.
798
 The proposed CCSC would 
gather and analyse information in order to prepare recommendations on possible action and 
to support such action as the Council may mandate.
799
 The CCSC’s general activities would 
encompass advocacy and policy design and implementation.
800
 In this regard, the CCSC 
would be able to conduct the following activities: 
Providing first-hand information and documentation: there could be three types of 
occasion for which the Security Council would need information. It may not be able to 
discover the truth, it may wish to delay discovering the truth, and it may not wish to discover 
the truth at all. For example, the present author is unsure which of these categories contains 
the example is that the Russian government denied any involvement in the Ukraine crisis; the 
NGO Vice News uncovered the truth.
801
 
Moulding public opinion: the CCSC could sensitively but more actively mould public 
opinion to increase pressure on the Council. 
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Identifying and analysing problems to be discussed by the Council: this would go 
together with moulding public opinion when the Council does not take cognizance of a 
problem or is unwilling to take action. The aforementioned Stanley Foundation and the 
International Peace Institute (IPI) have been actively discussing peace and security issues by 
private conferences and roundtable meetings in order to put them onto the Council’s agenda. 
Developing alternative solutions and suggesting the best: the CCSC could support 
peaceful means or other alternatives to avoid military operations. For example, the Quaker 
United Nations Office (QUNO) has arranged informal meetings with delegates and experts to 
develop peaceful means for dealing with conflicts and disputes. Likewise, the ICRC has 
offered its services to maintain agreement between warring parties.
802
 
Actively monitoring the decision-making process: by this means the CCSC could detect 
obstacles that prevent the Council from taking action, and also from seeing its own position 
more clearly.  It could allow the emergence of proper solutions to overcome gridlocks in the 
Council’s decision-making mechanism. 
Verifying the implementation of decisions: the CCSC would closely monitor this in order 
to reduce the number and impact of wrongful actions that could worsen situations in conflict 
areas. For example the ICRC has assumed a significant role in protecting human rights both 
during and after international conflicts.
803
 It has been more efficient in this regard than any 
other NGOs in that field, as it has been granted special status under the Geneva Conventions 
and Protocol.
804
 This illustrates that how an NGO could contribute more to the Security 
Council by granting formal access. 
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In this case such access could be set up without having to modify the UN Charter.
805
 All that 
would be required would be to apply Article 29, which states that “[t]he Security Council 
may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its 
functions.”
806
 That article therefore provides that such a new organ could be established 
directly by the Council’s non-permanent members. This article is also reflected in Rule 28 of 
the Provisional Rules of Procedure: “The Security Council may appoint a commission or 




Authority for establishing a subsidiary body is bestowed not only by Article 29, and not only 
for the Security Council. Article 7(2) also provides for a general authority: “Such subsidiary 
organs as may be found necessary may be established in accordance with the present 
Charter”. Likewise, Article 22 empowers the General Assembly, which “may establish such 
subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions”. Lastly, Article 
68 confers identical power on ECOSOC: “The Economic and Social Council shall set up 
commissions in economic and social fields and for the promotion of human rights, and such 
other commissions as may be required for the performance of its functions”. The 
Coordination Committee of the San Francisco Conference pondered whether the general 
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provision of Article 7(2) is adequate for all subsidiary organs, eventually concluding that 
modified versions of Articles 22, 29 and 68 should be retained.
808
  
The main purpose of subsidiary organs is to provide assistance to the Security Council on 
those occasions when it is unable to perform its primary responsibilities efficiently. Such 
subsidiary organs could provide support for the Council’s duties of investigation, negotiation, 
administration and service provision.
809
 For example, after the terrorist attacks on the United 
States on 11 September 2001, the Council found it necessary to establish a committee 
concerning counter-terrorism.
810
 Interestingly, the first resolution regarding this issue does 
not make any reference to civil society, neither in Resolution 1373 (2001) nor in Resolution 
1624 (2005); the resolution adopted in 2010, on the contrary, made reference to the 
importance of civil society.
811
 Demand might have played a fundamental role in this sea 
change in the Council’s attitude. 
 
According to Sarooshi the literature on UN subsidiary organs is not extensive because 
scholars have paid little attention to the subject.
812
 There are two main requirements for 
establishing a subsidiary organ. The first is for it to be in fact subsidiary, and the second is 
that its establishment must be deemed necessary for the performance of the Security 
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 In the case of the CCSC, these two requirements already exist: it aims 
to be an organ under the control of the Council, and it is acknowledged that the Council has 
significant problems with its efficiency.
814
 The number of subsidiary organs has indeed 




In fact, the Repertory of United Nations Practice states that there is no categorical definition 
of “subsidiary organ”.
816
 Article 29 has been used to establish three types of subsidiary organ: 
standing committees or commissions that deal with recurring issues, commissions or 
committees that deal with specific subjects in the field, and ad hoc committees that treat 




A permanent CCSC could have similar functions to those provided in Article 71, which 
establishes consultative status for NGOs. However, such a body has not been established 
under Article 29. It is therefore suggested that the maximum effectiveness approach should 
be applied in order to eliminate possible inhibitive reactions that could be based on legal 
provisions. Schweigman states that  
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the open-texture of Article 29 and the innovative use made of it by the Council 




As there is a lack of clarity regarding what it prescribes, prohibits and delineates by way of 
conceptual boundaries, it permits interpretation according to circumstances. 
 
Sarooshi also maintains that the UN Charter must be interpreted in accordance with the 
interpretative principle that a treaty provision should be read in the context of the treaty as a 
whole.
819
 Other provisions could likewise be used to support the establishment of the CCSC. 
Rule 39 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council states that  
The Security Council may invite members of the Secretariat or other persons, 
whom it considers competent for the purpose, to supply it with information or to 
give other assistance in examining matters within its competence..
820
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In accordance with the Appendix of the Council’s Provisional Rules of Procedure, the 
Council can receive written statements from “private individuals and non-governmental 
bodies”.
821
 Each of these provisions could be applied to exert leverage against restrictive 
reactions based on legal assumptions.
822
   
 
As usual, however, there is a risk that the arbitrary
823
 practices of permanent members can 
obstruct the establishment of such a subsidiary body. The veto-holding powers have managed 
to controversialize
824
 the decision of whether an issue is procedural or substantive.
825
 In fact, 
the UN Charter does not authorize permanent Council members to determine the questions 
they will veto.
826
 This has not prevented those powers from expanding their privilege as 
much as possible. 
 
Nevertheless, there are three scenarios that can be expected. The first is that the permanent 
members would regard the issue as a substantive one and reject it using the double veto 
power. In this case, NGOs would need to continue to exert pressure on the permanent 
members until they finally obtain formal status. The second scenario takes place when it 
becomes evident that the reaction of the permanent members is restrictive, in which case the 
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principle of maximum effectiveness would be applied on behalf of the world community to 
eliminate the double veto obstacle.
827
 It would eventually be possible to establish the CCSC 
in which NGOs would enjoy formal status. They would progressively increase their influence 
in the Council to further access the decision-making process. In the last scenario, all Council 
members including the permanent ones would approve formal access for NGOs. The 
plausibility of this scenario is proved by the case of the obstructive role played by Russia in 
particular to the establishment of subsidiary bodies: while Russia insisted on treating the 
issue as substantive, other Council members were perfectly willing to view it as 
procedural.
828
 It might mean that the Council’s members are generally intent to consider the 
fact as procedural. For example, increase in the number of subsidiary bodies has occurred 
after the Cold War period when the Russia obstacle was not insuperable. 
 
In fact, the Security Council has established many subsidiary organs. In some cases the veto 
powers consider the matter as substantive, while others are regarded as procedural by 
consensus or because the elected members or the Council President has persuaded the veto 
powers to do so. The author therefore believes that the veto poses no insuperable obstacle.
829
 
The case would indeed be determined according to circumstances, which depend on the agent 
factor. Likeminded Council members, including the permanent ones
830
, a decisive Secretary-
General and Council President
831
 and of course continuous pressure from NGOs would play a 
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key role in the granting of formal access. Köchler gives an example that illustrates how the 
permanent members’ arbitrary behaviour can be challenged. He states that  
the permanent members’ overbearingness and self-provided increase in power status 
through the “double veto” have been undermined to a certain extent since the 




This refers to the complaint regarding the armed invasion of Taiwan on 29 September 
1950.
833
 The President of the Security Council, Gladwyn Jebb, referred to the Rule 39 of the 
Provisional Rules of the Security Council. The President’s ruling was upheld by a majority of 
nine votes, and confirmed the procedural character of the question of inviting a representative 
for the aim of providing information, even though China had exercised its veto.
834
 The 
Council President justified his decision with following statement: 
I think that if such a situation as this is allowed to stand, a very grave precedent 
will have been created which may well impede the whole functioning of the 
United Nations in the future. I do not believe, therefore, that in the general 
interests of all of us it should be allowed to stand, and I consequently rule as 
President that, notwithstanding the objection of our Chinese colleague, the vote 




According to Köchler,  
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this was the first time that the President employed the presidential ruling 
according to Rule 30 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure to prevent the 





The Formosa case demonstrates the possibility of overcoming the arbitrary behaviour of the 
permanent members. The “double veto” power cannot be considered as provided in Article 
27(3). It is more likely that the veto powers could be persuaded to obey the rules of the 
Charter than that an amendment could be introduced to that Charter that constrains the 
permanent members in particular. The double veto is a debatable issue; it should certainly not 
be considered as an obstacle as much as veto power that raises directly from Article 27(3). 
This is to say that establishing a subsidiary organ using the Charter’s current provisions has 
more chance of success. The controversial nature of this issue also applies to the veto, which 
therefore cannot be regarded as an obstacle pure and simple. Cohen maintains that existing 





Furthermore, Article 29 has not been used to establish a subsidiary organ whose function is 
identical to the proposed CCSC. There are, however, some examples of subsidiary organs 
that refer to the participation of NGOs. One of these is the Security Council Working Group 
on Peacekeeping Operations, established in 2001 to strengthen cooperation with troop-
contributing countries in order to enhance the effectiveness of the United Nations in 
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addressing conflict at all stages, from prevention through settlement to post-conflict peace 
building.
838
 Yet by 2013 cooperation had begun to include NGOs, as a Security Council 
Resolution stated: 
Support peace consolidation and inclusive political processes and through their 
good offices, advice and support, as well as by their ability to deter threats to 
the ongoing peace process, and facilitate consultation process among local 
population and civil society to help them contribute to national processes and 
discussions, and upon request, provide security, technical, logistic and 
administrative support to representative electoral processes, within the 
limitation of its capacities and resources…
839
 
In addition, the Security Council Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict was 
established by Council Resolution in 2005.
840
 The resolution of this subsidiary organ makes 
direct reference to the participation of civil society: 
Underlines further that this mechanism must operate with the participation of 




Lastly, there is Peace-building Commission (PBC) that was established by the UNSC 
Resolution and General Assembly Resolution in 2005.
842
  This subsidiary body was formed 
to develop strategies for post-conflict regions in order to conclude sustainable development. 




 UN Security Council Resolution 2086, S/RES/2086 (2013) 
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The Resolution for this subsidiary body explicitly indicates importance of participation of 
NGOs as it read:  
Recognizing the important contribution of civil society and non-governmental 





These examples show that the Security Council is used to establishing subsidiary bodies that 
allow NGO participation. Examination of their resolutions makes it clear that they have 
mostly agreed to recognise and encourage cooperating with civil society. The CCSC would 
embody two main factors; the provision of effective and direct participation for NGOs and a 
comprehensive set of purposes. What the Council would need to do, therefore, is to establish 
a comprehensive subsidiary organ that would provide direct and effective participation for 
NGOs, rather than making suggestions or making tangential and fleeting references to them.  
 
As can be seen from these examples, subsidiary organs had previously dealt with specific 
circumstances such as the aftermath of conflicts, or with particular issues such as children 
and armed conflicts. The Repertory of Practice of the UN Organs mentions some of these 
special-purpose subsidiary organs. The Council has established “special political missions 
and peace-building offices” to support peace processes, conflict prevention and peace-
building efforts, “working groups” to discuss a range of issues related to the work of the 
Council such as developing general recommendations on how to improve its effectiveness, 
and “commissions and investigative bodies” to investigate violations of international 
humanitarian and human rights law and to investigate all aspects of assassinations of political 







 The Council has in effect established subsidiary organs to assist it in maintaining 
international peace and security as well as with its own working methods and procedures.
845
 
The proposed CCSC would be able to cover these issues comprehensively. 
 
As mentioned, the absence of a definitive legal veto to this proposal means that the veto 
poses no obstacle. The lack of a clear definition of subsidiary organs also gives hope for this 
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7.2 Critical Evaluation of NGOs in their Formal Participation in the Security 
Council 
 
The formal involvement of NGOs in the Council should be examined critically. Paul Wapner 
considers that “NGOs should not be free from harsh scrutiny and critiques simply because 
they inhabit global society, of which many have an overly romantic understanding”.
846
 Thus, 
whilst recent criticisms of NGOs are “insightful and extremely important”,
847
  it is essential 
to critically analyse the formal participation of NGOs in the Security Council by considering 
counter-arguments. 
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7.2.1 Critics of NGOs’ Accountability 
 
The credibility of NGOs is largely great in the areas in which they operate. Surveys 
conducted between 2001 and 2011 show that NGOs performed better than businesses, 
governments and media in providing credible information on human rights, the environment 
and health.
848
 However, there are concerns that NGOs may not be sufficiently accountable. 
 
Some argue that NGOs have an accountability problem, implying that they are not reliable 
enough actors to be granted formal access.
849
 Edwards and Zadek are concerned about this 
issue, claiming that “NGOs have no clear bottom line for results and no single authority to 
whom they must report on their activities”.
850
 Willets maintains that NGOs may be running a 
democratic deficit, as some are small unrepresentative personal fiefdoms and others represent 
a wide body of opinion but have no procedures preventing their supporters from influencing 
their policies.
851
 Gartner points out that “one important dimension of accountability which is 
enhanced by the participation of civil society within international organizations is 
transparency”.
852
 Grigorescu’s study testing some hypotheses across 72 international 
organizations by using some newly developed measures of transparency shows that NGOs 
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are significant predictors of organizational transparency.
853
 Thus, NGOs still would have 
conspicuous role in enhancing democracy.
854
 In fact, as is mentioned in Chapter 8, NGOs 
could make significant contributions to the Council even in terms of accountability. It is true 
that they may have accountability issues, but this is no obstacle to their formal participation. 
 
Nevertheless, when consideration is given to how fairly NGOs elect their executives and 
directors, together with the fact that some establish NGOs merely to make a profit, some to 
raise funds and not distribute for raised purposes and some to serve specific state interests. 
The impact this accountability problem has on the issue of granting NGOs formal access 
cannot therefore be ignored. The Economist points out that these organizations could develop 
bad habits if they are not accountable to anyone.
855
 Likewise, the New York Times notes that 
NGOs  
are now part of the power structure, too. They receive donations from the public and 
advocate policies that each group claims are in the public interest. As they become 
part of the established political landscape worldwide, these groups owe it to the 
public to be accountable and transparent themselves.
856
  
Yet, as mentioned above, while this issue is certainly the subject of debate, it should not be 
considered as an obstacle to their formal participation. Objections could be overcome by 
providing some suitable mechanism. In this regard, the question of the role and accountability 
of NGOs has been received significant attention from both their critics of NGOs and their 
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 The Economist, Sins of the Secular Missionaries (27
th
 January 2000) 
856





 Some commentator’s views on the problem will be mentioned, and their 
proposed solutions addressed. Finally, the current study’s proposed ways of accounting 
NGOs for formal access in the UNSC are presented. 
 
Anderson questions the accountability of NGOs:  
If, as has often been claimed during the last twenty or so years, NGOs act as "stand 
in" representatives of the "peoples" of the world before international organizations, in 
what sense and to whom are they accountable, if they now stand alongside or 
supplant states in this role? And in what sense are these international organizations 




In Anderson’s view, it is harder to hold NGOs accountable at the international level than the 
domestic one.
859
 He suggests that NGOs should find ways to discipline themselves and their 
ideological pretensions in order to remain useful experts and advocates of their causes as a 
civil society. They should also forgo their excessive fondness for public international 
organizations. This does mean that they should not establish relations with them. He 
maintains, however, that these constitute mere faux-legitimacy, as there is no reliable system 
that could hold NGOs to account in such relationships. This is to say that NGOs’ 
accountability should depend solely on agreements between them and international 
organizations. Otherwise, NGOs could eventually be seduced into satisfying one particular 
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international organization’s demands while ignoring its own members. The current study 
therefore also suggests that accountability of NGOs should not only depend on the 
mechanism of the UNSC, but should also balance their relations with the  
funders of these movements, the philanthropists and foundations that set the 
priorities, establish the incentives and disincentives, and which represent a whole 
other set of social and economic pressures upon NGOs and social movements.
860
  
This is indeed a useful way for NGOs to apply self-accounting system as it would improve 
their credibility against both members of the UN Security Council and its members.  
 
Keohane indicates that NGOs are highly vulnerable to reputational threat: they are very weak 
actors whose credibility depends on their accountability.
861
 For example, an NGO might lose 
membership and funding if the public becomes aware that it does not use the funds it raises 
for its stated purposes. In addition, it could be charged for its unlawful action. Wapner 
outlines the difference between NGOs’ and states’ accountability.
862
 This does not mean, 
however, that one is more accountable than other.
863
 If an individual member of an NGO 
disagrees with its policy, they would at least be able to withdraw their membership or 
support. Woodward likewise states that “NGOs are accountable to their members who can 
withdraw their support at any time”.
864
 Wapner also maintains that “members vote with their 
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 Woodward (n595) p.229 
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feet. When the NGO no longer expresses their sentiment, they exit”.
865
 In addition, members 
take their money with them when they withdraw their membership from an NGO.
866
 If any 
problem regarding an NGOs’ accountability were to occur in the Security Council, it would 
at least be possible to hold them to account – by contrast with states.  
 
However, this might not be an efficient way to hold NGOs accountable, nor might it be 
possible for members to monitor their activities. In such cases, states should take 
responsibility for monitoring NGOs and requesting that they state their funding purposes and 
sources, as well as scrutinizing their spending. For example, the Economist provides a report 
on auditing NGOs:  
Competition for funds and publicity among the larger NGOs results in a divided 
movement that is not making the best use of its assets. It also results in the diversion 




Wapner highlights other ways of making NGOs accountable, including boards of directors or 
advisory councils, collaboration with other NGOs and accountability to states when they wish 
to obtain accreditation to international institutions.
868
 Likewise, NGOs could likewise be held 
accountable by a UNSC mechanism that would be established to accredit NGOs to the 
Council. This mechanism could require that NGOs report their activities and monitor their 
operations. It would thus be useful for the Council to institute a mechanism that would hold 
NGOs accountable both before and after formal access was granted. 
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Some criticise NGOs for their executives’ voting processes. Charnovitz, however, dismisses 
the notion that representativeness has any bearing on NGOs’ accountability,
869
 believing 
rather that it is more important to determine the usefulness of the organization’s ideas than 
“whether the ideas faithfully represent the views of the NGO’s membership”. Spiro likewise 
maintains that NGOs cannot be monitored as ‘the democratic state is idealized on the 
accountability metric, especially by virtue of periodic elections”.
870
 He believes that voting is 
“a crude tool for keeping governmental authorities in line” as governments could “get away 
with an awful lot before having to answer to their membership…”
871
 He suggests that “the 
formal inclusion of non-state actors in international decision-making might act more as a 
restraint on NGO and hold them accountable”.
872
 Formal access would certainly also increase 
the possibility of holding NGOs to account. On the other hand, it could be difficult to monitor 
an NGO that acts informally, and is thus not subject to any clearly defined rules. The granting 
of formal access would place certain obligations and responsibilities on NGOs as well as 
conferring rights. Maragia states that  
recognizing NGOs as legal persons not only enables them to become better 
actors but also enables the international community to hold them accountable 
for what they do.
873
  
Granting NGOs formal access to the Council would thus increase their accountability, as it 
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The questions of who such organizations should be accountable to in the UNSC and how they 
should be held accountable under a formal access regime remain. Some potential answers 
present themselves.  
 
The present study suggests that the Council could also establish a committee on NGOs 
similar to the one in ECOSOC, whose standing Committee on NGOs was established by the 
Council in 1946. One of the main tasks of that Committee is the consideration of applications 
for consultative status and requests for reclassification submitted by NGOs.
875
 ECOSOC has 
also established principles that require NGOs to fulfil requirements of representativeness and 
accountability.
876
 The Council could likewise establish a committee and outline principles on 
NGOs in order to evaluate the operations of NGOs seeking to be considered for formal 
access. This committee could also require NGOs to be more transparent about their 
personnel, funding and activities.  
 
This argument is strengthened by the consideration that it might be risky to leave the question 
of NGOs’ accountability solely in hands of states, whose activities they are likely to criticize. 
It would thus be unreasonable to expect a state-based mechanism such as the UNSC to be 
objective.
877
 State-based gatekeeping could also cause NGOs to satisfy the Council at the 
expense of their members. The present study therefore adds the suggestion that it would be 
necessary to develop alternative means in addition to the Council mechanism that would hold 
NGOs fairly to account. NGOs themselves should therefore take steps to be more transparent 
in their funding, personnel and operations. They could monitor each other’s activities when 
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 Ultimately, the question of NGO accountability is thus an issue for debate; 
it should certainly not be regarded as an obstacle. 
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7.2.2 Fairness and Objectivity  
 
Some regimes often consider the efforts of NGOs as inimical to their interests, believing that 
their work is in the interests of some other countries. These governments would therefore 
resist the involvement of NGOs on a formal basis. For example, permanent members such as 
Russia and China are very reluctant to recognise the work of NGOs and to cooperate with 
them. Jeremy states that  
the USA, UK and France are more open to Non-Governmental Organizations 
(NGOs). On the other hand, Russia and China, also permanent members of the 
Security Council are suspicious of NGOs. Thus, Russia and China make life for 
NGOs in their territories much harder.
879
 
They are therefore likely to be the most significant opponents of granting formal status to 
NGOs. The fact that the leading NGOs are mostly European or American may increase the 
Council’s inequality if they were to be granted formal access. This presents a possible 
objection to this proposal. Roger Porter observes that  
it is clear that many developing countries view NGOs, which are largely based 
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There would, however, be some criteria that could be applied when granting formal status to 
NGOs in the Security Council. ECOSOC uses this procedure: “a[n] NGO cannot be profit-
making; it cannot advocate the use of violence; it cannot be a school, a university, or a 
political party…”
881
 The Council can likewise apply its own criteria that accord with its 
purposes, using a process that would ensure the selection of suitable NGOs to the CCSC. 
 
For example, national NGOs could be excluded from formal participation on the grounds that 
it is easier for national governments to influence them. Indeed, a government could 
theoretically shut down a national NGO, “confiscate its assets, and prevent its officers from 
travelling abroad”, even though the significant political costs involved may make this 
difficult in practice. (It may also not be entirely effective in preventing the NGO from 
communicating with the outside world.
882
) A national NGO would therefore be susceptible to 
governmental pressure, and may indeed be significantly dependent on its government’s 
policies.  
 
By contrast to such national NGOs, it is certain that “each international NGO is a distinct 
entity”.
883
 International NGOs could locate their headquarters in different countries, meaning 
that if a state were to prevent an NGO from performing its activities, that NGO would close 
down its headquarters in that country and reopen them in another. International NGOs are 
thus difficult to coerce, and are not likely to be dependent on a single state’s policies. It 
would therefore be possible to prevent NGOs with state or group interests from accessing the 
Security Council, when they are already subject to pressure from the permanent members. 
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The imbalance objection might be valid to some degree, as it first occurred in 1921 in the 
dispute concerning the Dutch worker delegate to the ILO.
884
 Be that as it may, this problem is 
not an insoluble one as regards formal participation of NGOs on the Council. Firstly, 
Charnovitz points out that “the growing number of NGOs in developing countries may help 
redress geographic imbalance”.
885
 Secondly, NGOs should not be considered as states. Their 
membership is mostly international. Besides, even if an NGO betrays its purposes and uses 
the opportunities presented to it to serve the interests of a particular country, such a state of 
affairs would be obvious because the actions of NGOs under a formal status regime would be 
open to public scrutiny. NGOs would ultimately be held accountable for their actions, which 
would present a disincentive to them to behave in such a way. 
 
Moreover, because the nature of NGOs is different from that of states, they should not be 
judged on the basis of equal regional division. Antonio Gramsci draws  
the distinction between political society (the police, the army, legal system, etc.) 
which dominates directly and coercively, and civil society where leadership is 
constituted through ideology or by means of consent’
886
  
In other words, the activities of civil society are mostly based on individual consent, in 
contrast to the coercive methods employed by states. NGOs as a civil agent should not be 
equated with states, which are members of political society. 
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Willets agrees that NGOs and states are different. He considers the latter as negotiators and 
NGOs as participants. Their functions are distinct, so their contributions to global governance 
differ.
887
 Even though NGOs may have certain rights and might perform significant roles in 
international law and international relations, yet they cannot be treated as equal to states or 
intergovernmental organisations.
888





An NGO founded in Germany might be very effective in Africa. Global Witness, for 
example, is an IGO with offices in the UK and America, yet its effective discovery of 
“natural resource exploitation, conflict, poverty, corruption, and human rights abuses 
worldwide” is well known. One of its reports, “A Rough Trade”, uncovered the blood 
diamond trade in Angola.
890
 Angola is a southern African country, but it would be incorrect 
to consider Global Witness as an NGO from a single region (in this case, Europe). 
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What is more, NGOs’ memberships can span the globe, as indeed can their branch offices. 
The latter are quite different from states embassies founded to maintain their national affairs. 
This implies that a western-based NGO could indeed be more supportive of the rights of 
southern people than southern governments. 
 
NGOs play significant roles such as “adding more diversity to the policymaking process and 
monitoring the gap between governmental rhetoric and governmental practice in policy 
making implementation”.
891
 It is thus logical to expect that the participation of NGOs, even 
Western- or American-based ones, would be much more active than developed nations on 
behalf of developing countries. If this were not so, then most developing countries would not 
oppose NGOs’ activities.  
 
The Indian representative of the G-77 made a proposal to a substantive session in Geneva in 
1995
892
 according to which  
the whole United Nations system, including United Nations bodies and 
conferences dealing not only with economic, social and sustained economic 
growth and sustainable development issues, but also with disarmament, finance, 




                                               
891
 Sorensen (n444), p.355 
892
 “Report of the Open-ended Working Group on the Review of Arrangements for Consultation with Non-
Governmental Organizations on its Second Session” Economic and Social Council, UN Doc. E/1995/83, 6 June 





In fact, it is by far the developed countries who oppose the participation of NGOs, perhaps 
because it has mostly been NGOs who have challenged their ultra vires acts.  
 
Some scholars disagree that NGOs can be considered as advocates of states’ interests. 
Philosopher John Dewey stated that “the voluntary associations just spoken of do not 
coincide with political boundaries”.
894
 He cited “associations of mathematicians, chemists, 
astronomers; business corporations, labour organizations, churches, [who] are transnational 
because the interests they represent are worldwide”.
895
 It would indeed be hard therefore for a 
single state to encompass global concepts or aspirations. A matter concerning the world 
community should not be confined within borders of a state. Samsung Galaxy smartphones 
obviously do not suit only South Koreans. When a scientist discovers a remedy for an illness, 
everyone around the world who suffers from that illness would benefit.   
 
Charnovitz agrees that NGOs should not be curbed by the national interests of states.
896
 He 
says that it would be illogical to compel an NGO like the International Chamber of 
Commerce (ICC) or the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
897
 “to channel its 
concerns through its own government”.
898
 By his account, the majority of NGOs are more 
likely to foster socially beneficial policies. He also believes that NGOs have not organized 
internationally and promote collective goals such as peace and the protection of the global 
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commons by mere chance.
899
 While national NGOs may well advocate militarism or 
protectionism, such aims are unlikely to inspire true international coalitions.
900
 National 
NGOs could thus be excluded from the Council, as mentioned earlier (see also the definition 
of NGO in Chapter IV).  
The Security Council would moreover actually benefit, as NGOs would share all their 
potential facilities. The aim of involving NGOs in the Security Council is to develop its 
capabilities and to challenge its anti-democratic structure. They would thus not gain any 
advantage from the Council. Thus, because NGOs would deliver rather than receive benefit 
from such a relationship, the question of equal distribution of benefit does not arise. The 
participation of NGOs to the Council cannot be considered pragmatically. A country that 
obtains permanent or non-permanent Council membership could well use such an opportunity 
to further its own national interests, but the activities of NGOs to a large extent benefit most 
of humanity. The granting of formal status on the Security Council for either western or 
southern NGOs should be satisfactory to people from all the world’s regions. 
  







7.2.3 Whether NGOs are a Threat to International Legal Order 
 
Chandler has criticized the role of civil society in the international realm, emphasizing the 
negative role of NGOs in international relations:  
[T]he attraction of the global sphere has little to do with changes at the 
international level; the focus on morality and values in international relations is 
not the product of an actually existing global civil society, of the campaigns and 




He thereby denies the contribution of NGOs to democracy or other values in international 
relations, instead considering them as self-interested agents. He thinks NGOs should not be 
expected to deal with pressing international issues, concluding that “we should perhaps ask 




That limited description of NGOs, however, is wrong. It would be unfair to ignore the 
contributions of NGOs have made thus far, as Wapner points out.
109
 Their activities have 
proved crucial in increasing representation. The Secretary-General’s report highlights the 
importance of NGO’s participation. The report emphasizes significant aspects of NGOs such 
as their patience in seeking out peaceful measures, their first-hand, speedy collection of 
information about conflicts and their ability to rebuild war-torn countries. When the 
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Council’s deficiencies are considered, these features are likely to be essential to the Council’s 
work in maintaining international peace and security. 
 
Charnovitz also observes that it would be unfair to accuse NGOs of undermining positive 
international law while significant numbers of them have helped develop it.
903
 NGOs’ aims 
would at least be no worse than those of states or terrorist groups. They would in any 
circumstances contribute more than states. The UN has also been convinced that, in spite of 




Anderson also considers NGOs as a threat to the supremacy of international law.
905
 He goes 
further, characterizing the influence of NGOs as “international legal imperialism” and 
maintaining that international NGOs do not represent local individual voices, but rather 
reflecting the interests of global transnational elites in the international legal order. Falk and 
Allott, by contrast, believe that the development of international civil society is a positive 
phenomenon.
906
 Falk’s concept is that  
international movements founded on common interests that cross state borders 
are active in the international system, but that they are partial, representing 
particular issues and interests.
907
  
Falk thus refutes Anderson’s approach to NGOs’ activities, arguing that they are inconsistent 
with his view of them as “international legal imperialists”.
908
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The author also maintains that the development of NGOs should not be considered as a 
threat. As Falk rightly indicates, NGOs are the products of individual demands. They might 
certainly be inimical to self-interested groups who have no compunction about violating 
individual rights. NGOs cannot be regarded as representing the interests only of small 
numbers of people. On the contrary, their constituency is large. Kelsen’s quote must be 
pointed in this context: he states that it is necessary to “focus on the fact that the real subjects 
of international law are individuals’.
909
 The activities of NGOs should not therefore be 
regarded as a menace, or as international legal imperialism: in fact, they represent individual 
interests. 
 
It must be admitted that some NGOs do advocate causes that are deeply controversial and, in 
some cases, are incompatible with universally accepted norms and principles.
910
 This may 
well be true, but it does not present an obstacle to the participation of NGOs. This concern 
can be dealt with through ECOSOC’s mechanism of applying criteria for NGO membership. 
The Security Council could do the same in order to exclude undesirable NGOs. 
 
The increase in the numbers of NGOs derives from popular demands, of which they are the 
agents and executors. They should therefore not be considered as threats to international law. 
If they were, so could any actor in the international arena. If Chandler’s and Anderson’s 
views were carried to their logical conclusion, all states could be considered as threats to 
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international law and as deleterious to the international legal order. In fact, the present author 
does indeed consider NGOs as threats – not, however, to the international legal order by to 




7.2.4 NGOs Potential Undermining of the Security Council’s Effectiveness  
 
In addition to all these factors, some believe that granting formal access to NGOs would 
make the Security Council less effective because of the potential participation of large 
numbers of NGOs, which might prove impractical. This problem could, however, be 




In fact, the Council has already been suffering from an inefficiency problem. Just the most 
recent cases of Syria and the Ukraine demonstrate that the Council has much to gain in terms 
of effectiveness. In truth, it is an organ that does not work well; any negative side-effects of a 
reform proposal should certainly be taken into consideration, but they should not be regarded 
as impediments to reform.  
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Estimating Outcomes of Formal Access for NGOs to the Security 
Council 
8.1 Balancing Veto Power 
 
First and foremost, formal participation by NGOs in the Council’s state-based system could 
provide the necessary checks and balances against the excesses of state collusion in decision-
making.
912
 Daniele Archibugi similarly maintains that pressure is more influential when 
exerted by nongovernmental actors,
913
 while Hans Köchler emphasizes that an international 
organization can properly function only in an order that provides a balance to the holders of 
power.
914
 It is therefore only to be expected that formal access by NGOs might be a 
counterweight to the intrinsically undemocratic, unaccountable and ineffective institution of 
the Security Council.  
 
The question of providing such a balance is not an easy one. Other members have thus far 
failed to exert adequate pressure on the holders of the veto power, mainly because other 
members’ policies have depended largely on those states, and in particular the US and Russia. 
It would be naïve to think that the elected Council members will in the near future adopt 
measures to balance the Permanent Five. On the other hand, NGOs are only actors that have 
managed to influence the permanent members, thanks to the latter’s limited sources of 
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informal access. Formal access would give NGOs more latitude to exert their power of 





8.2 Sources of Information 
 
As mentioned in Chapter IV, NGOs could provide technical expertise on special topics 
required by governments.
915
 As many sources of information and data are independent, 
NGOs could supply personnel and resources that governments have been reluctant to provide 
to international organizations in the interests of compliance.
916
 In fact, it is essential for the 
Council to have adequate sources of technical support in order to increase its capabilities on 
the ground. The Panel Report of 2015 states that  
[i]n the field, mission leadership should proactively seek objective feedback on 
progress and trends from independent experts and civil society and track perceptions 
of the mission.
917
   
Likewise, the eminent report of the UN’s Independent Working Group sees the Council as 
potentially “benefiting from early warning and analysis that will permit the more effective 
exercise of preventive diplomacy”.
918
  This would deprive the Council of the excuse of not 
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having adequate resources to be effective.
919
 It might also prevent it from spuriously 




It is the author’s view that the Security Council, and in particular its permanent members, 
cannot be unaware of events in conflict areas. Their easy access to significant sources of 
intelligence must mean that they are fully informed. If this is accepted, it is not possible to 
maintain that they do not take action, or that they take the wrong actions, because they do not 
have the necessary information. Such inaction or wrongful action must therefore be 
deliberate.
921
 NGOs can change this mindset by publicly presenting the Council with the facts 
regarding a particular situation, making it impossible for the Council to withstand pressure 
from the international community.
922
  
                                               
919
 In the case of use of chemical weapons in the ongoing Syrian crisis, it would have taken an unconscionably 
long time to discover the facts if NGOs had not provided the necessary documentation  by social media 
920
 As in the Iraqi invasion of 2003 and the Libyan intervention of 2011 
921
 An example of wrongful action is the Security Council’s decision to embark on a military operation in Libya 
in 2011. During that operation, coalition states bombed civilians and the country’s facilities. Ernesto Londoño, 
‘NATO Confirms It Hit Wrong Target, Killing Libyan Civilians’ (19 June 2011) The Washington Post 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle-east/nato-says-strike-may-have-killed-libyan-
civilians/2011/06/19/AGL7VdbH_story.html accessed 12/07/2015. 
922
 The Bush administration asserted that there were weapons of mass destruction (WMD) regarding the 
invasion of Iraq in 2003, but it was later revealed that the administration presented misleading information in 
order to justify its military operation. See the latest news about this issue at https://news.vice.com/article/the-cia-
just-declassified-the-document-that-supposedly-justified-the-iraq-invasion accessed on 30/03/15.  
257 
 
8.3 Enhancing Efficiency 
 
Kofi Annan states that “the United Nations relies on to be as effective and responsive as it 
can be, in the service of the people it exists to represent”.
923
 As argued in Chapter III, the lack 
of effectiveness is one of the main prompters of calls for reform. NGOs’ formal participation 
in the Council’s decision-making processes would make it highly possible for them to press 
the Council to take more effective action. Annan holds that  
the overriding purpose of cooperation between the United Nations and non-state 




He maintains that “cooperation should be viewed as a means of achieving United Nations 
goals and enhancing performance”.
925
 It has been acknowledged that NGOs could enhance 
the efficiency of the Council’s activities
926
 by supplying “field experience and expertise 
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NGOs have influenced international law by persuading states to take action without 
consent.
928
 Jessica Mathews observes that NGOs are increasingly able to sway even the 
largest governments,
929
 and that they have therefore become significant actors in maintaining 
the supremacy of law. 
Moreover, NGOs could establish close, regular relations with top officials of member states, 
which would allow them to achieve their goals more quickly. In this regard, they could help 
state officials to examine controversial proposals by providing rapid feedback.
930
 The Panel 
Report of 2015 states that  
[i]n the field, mission leadership should proactively seek objective feedback on 
progress and trends from independent experts and civil society and track perceptions 
of the mission.
931
   
Formal participation by NGOs could also provide a mechanism for determining reaction to 
the Council’s measures. Testing the value of such decisions in advance would ameliorate the 
negative responses that might be provoked while increasing the Council’s credibility. NGOs 
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Under the WWO, states did not bear much responsibility in international law for their actions. 
This meant that there was no authority by which states could be held to account for their 
behaviour, and no possible leverage that could be exerted on them to prevent them from 
taking any particular action.
933
 NGOs’ increasing activities in the post-Westphalian era have, 
on the other hand, led to states becoming accountable for their actions.
934
 Duncan Hollis 
notes that “there is no doubt that international law recognizes fewer topics today as within the 
reserved domain of states’ respective domestic jurisdictions”.
935
 NGOs could thus cause the 
Security Council to take action even when its member states were not willing to do so. 
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8.4 Eliminate Lack of Representativeness 
  
Another consideration that renders the participation of NGOs necessary is the lack of 
representativeness in the Security Council.
936
 Tallberg and Uhlin also point out that  
the opening up of international institutions to CSOs expands participation, 
establishes a complementary channel of representation of citizen concerns and 
ultimately improves the prospects of those being affected by global decisions to 
also have a stake in their formulation and implementation.
937
  
NGOs by nature tend to allow for more direct participation by citizens.
938
 Scholte likewise 
maintains that increasing NGOs’ participation could enhance public participation in global 
governance and put the interests of vulnerable and often excluded groups onto decision-
makers’ agendas.
939
 National minorities, ethnic groups and those governed by monarchies 
cannot properly be represented in the international arena. Only some one-third of the world’s 
states are democratic, and even their governments do not represent their entire populations.
940
 
Individuals elect their governments, but these pay little heed to their electors’ concerns in 
their foreign policies. Nothing can be said concerning those who did not vote for their current 
governments. 
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In fact, a lack of representation in the sphere of foreign policy did not pose a problem for 
individuals decades ago because globalization was not an issue, so a problem in one region 
had little impact on other regions. The current world order, however, compels individuals to 
concern themselves with conflicts in remote areas.
941
 For example, the Ukrainian and Syrian 
crises may have been causes of apprehension to many, not just because of the potential effect 
of such far-off events on their lives, but also because the proliferation of news and its easy 
availability through a variety of media including smartphones means that affecting images of 




States thus no longer find it easy to hide their foreign policy faults.
943
 NGOs have enormous 
resources with which to mould public opinion. There has been a significant increase in access 
                                               
941
 “It has been too often confirmed that practices of indignity and strife which begin as internal in physical 
manifestation in a single community quickly and easily spread to other communities and become international.” 
Myres S. McDougal & W. Michael Reisman, 'Rhodesia and the United Nations: The Lawfulness of 
International Concern' (1968) 1 Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, p.13. 
942
 A tragic news item that supports this argument has commanded popular attention around the world. The 
picture of the lifeless body of Aylan Kurdi, a three-year-old Syrian boy from Kobane, was published by a 
Turkish news agency. The picture has sparked a massive wave of comment internationally on social media, to 
the extent that it has apparently been responsible for a shift in attitudes to migration. As a political result, the 
picture has caused some countries such as Germany to relax their restrictions. Governments whose migration 
policies are very restrictive have also been put under pressure by petitions with hundreds of thousands of 




 When the Iraq war took place, there were significant protests took place around the world, particularly in 
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to communications media, particularly radio
944
, television and film.
945
 These media have 
served to raise awareness of both problems and opportunities. Boutros-Ghali states that it is 
possible to persuade people everywhere to request more accountability, more representation 
and “more participation in governance, [and] eventually, more control over their future and 
more say in the decisions that affect their lives”.
946
 NGOs have therefore been of prime 
importance for international organisations since the latter are not able to represent popular 
demands, let alone to meet them.
947
 NGOs communicate superbly with people at both 
national and international levels,
948
 so they would be perfect vehicles to give voice to those 
who are not represented in the international realm.  
 
While states can be seen as a source of the world’s problems, it is often asserted that NGOs 
are the “voice of the people”.
949
 The Report of Panel maintains that  
Looking to the future, the rise of civil society and the growing voice of the 
people are creating [a] strong momentum for the spread of democracy and 
human rights across the globe.
950
  
A concrete example of this is that of  
the Royal Dutch Shell Company, [which,] after obtaining approval from the 
relevant national and international authorities, decided to sink the Brent Spar 
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rig to the ocean floor. Greenpeace launched a campaign to boycott Shell 
gasoline. Within weeks, Shell’s sales in Germany were down by 30 percent, at 
which point Shell chose a course which avoided the sinking of the rig. Since the 
incident, shell consults Greenpeace regarding the decommissioning of its rigs.
951
  
Formal participation of NGOs may ensure that the Security Council is responsive to citizens 
across the world. An NGO-enriched Council would gain legitimacy by considering a diverse 
range of viewpoints and reaching decisions in a democratic fashion.
952
 Charnovitz supports 





As discussed earlier, the current world has seen many innovations such as the 
communications revolution that have engendered an evolution in international affairs. 
Internet-based tools have hugely facilitated communication, making it easy for people to keep 
in touch with each other around the world. People have consequently discovered that it has 
increasingly become possible to share ideas, beliefs and aims with others from different 
countries or regions.
954
 As a consequence of these developments, the importance of national 
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governmental policies has dwindled.
955
 It has been observed that individual or group global 
interests have supplanted national interests and policies. People have begun to become 
members of NGOs in order to have their views represented. Put simply, the participation of 
NGOs on the Security Council would make the Council more representative. Lack of such 
representation, on the contrary, would constitute a significant drawback for a main body of 
the UN whose decisions have such direct and serious impacts on people’s lives, and may 
cause it to totally lose its relevance and legitimacy. 
 
To illustrate this point further, one might consider the consequences for a complete lack of 
individual influence over their governments’ foreign policies. NGOs could in this instance act 
as an alternative, perhaps even a preferable one on specific issues. NGOs constitute a 
fundamental form of popular representation in the current world order,
956
 Boutros-Ghali 
points to the inevitable consequence: “it is not surprising that in a short space of time we have 
witnessed the emergence of many new non-governmental organizations”.
957
 It is also highly 
possible for people to adopt multiple identities that transcend the conditions of the 
geographical political jurisdictions in which they live.
958
 An NGO could therefore represent a 








 That has link with Internet as it allows people to make communication beyond their borders. Jurgen Kurtz, 
‘NGOs, the Internet and International Economic Policy Making: The Failure of the OECD Multilateral 




more accurate reflection of an individual’s personal opinions than the organs of authority in 
their states – authority for which they may never have voted.
959
   
 
For example, an American citizen who cares deeply about not using force in territorial 
disputes may determine that their views are better represented by a specific international 
NGO than by their own government. This case is brought more sharply into focus in non-
democratic countries governed by non-elected administrations. Willet observes that the 
presence of military dictatorships, autocratic feudal regimes or corrupt oligarchies makes it 
hard to hear these region’s voices. He sees NGOs as potential “surrogate representatives of 




Boutros-Ghali also defines roles of NGOs as follows: 
…non-governmental organizations have become increasingly involved with the 
establishment of democratic institutions, carrying the voices and the needs of the 




He also underlines that  
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non-governmental organizations fulfil an essential representational role in the 
contemporary world, thus, their participation in international organizations is, 
in a way, a guarantee of the political legitimacy of those organizations.
962
  
That is to say that NGOs would also be the voice of those who are not represented, or do not 
feel represented, by their governments. NGOs’ remarkable capacity to access knowledge and 
resources might help bridge the gap between the Security Council and those who are affected 
by its decision.
963
 Of course, it is clear that NGOs’ formal participation would increase the 
Council’s representativeness and legitimacy. 
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8.5 Improving Peaceful Settlement 
 
Granting formal participation rights to NGOs in the Security Council would promote 
democracy, thereby increasing the Council’s ability to solve international conflicts 
peacefully. This is why NGOs have often become targets of terrorist groups.
964
 NGOs still 
take many risks to provide humanitarian aids whenever and wherever possible; formal 
identification with the Council would increase their security in this regard. It is also one of 
the main purposes of this study to employ the tenets of CD.
965
 These both present the 
opportunity to overcome conflicts by dialogue rather than by force of arms.
966
 In fact, this 
point was clarified a decade ago by the World Summit as a “culture of prevention” under the 
Responsibility to Protect (R2P).
967
  Yet member states could not successfully meet this 
demand. NGOs are the best means of improving the Council’s preventive diplomacy and 
minimizing the use of military operations.  
 
Barack Obama responds to criticisms of his policy regarding the threat of Iran’s nuclear 
programme by saying that “the absolute best option is a diplomatic resolution”.
968
 There is no 
                                               
964
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doubt that “traditional methods of action are not necessarily effective” in the area of UN 
peace-keeping.
969
 These traditional methods were stipulated in Articles 41 and 42 of the UN 
Charter. The Charter’s draughters were, however, motivated by the clear-cut aggression 
typical of the 1930s.
970
 Many current conflicts, however, are not of the types to which the 
authority of those articles applies.
971
 Today’s conflicts must be resolved by an expanded 




In this regard, as discussed earlier, preventive diplomacy would be made possible through the 
participation of NGOs. For example, a Tunisian National Dialogue Quartet
973
 was awarded 
the Nobel Peace Prize in 2015 because of its success in helping prevent the Jasmine 
revolution from descending into chaos.
974
 Another example illustrating how NGOs can play 
important roles in peace-building missions is Geneva Call, a neutral and impartial NGO that 
aims to encourage armed non-state actors (ANSAs) to respect international humanitarian 
norms in armed conflict and other situations of violence.
975
 Its unique approach, based on the 
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 The Tunisian national dialogue quartet is a coalition of groups from civil society 
974
 ‘Tunisian National Dialogue Quartet Wins 2015 Nobel Peace Prize’ The Guardian (9 October 2015) 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/09/tunisian-national-dialogue-quartet-wins-2015-nobel-peace-prize  
975





Barack Obama responded to a question about the problem posed by ISIL by saying that  
we cannot keep on thinking about counter-terrorism and security as entirely 
separate from diplomacy, development, education. All these things that are 
considered soft, but in fact, are vital to our national security.
977
  
He believes that traditional methods are not adequate to bring about solutions, and 
emphasizes the importance of other instruments in bringing about permanent solutions for 
international peace and security. He also expects that increased investment in these 
instruments would make it possible to prevent conflicts in advance,
978
 and thereby to build 
durable solutions. 
 
Obama accepts that such alternative methods are not adequately funded:
979
 enough resources 
are not devoted to diplomacy, development and education. In this context, the importance of 
NGOs cannot be denied, as they are indeed rich in such resources. Barker also rightly 
indicates that diplomats must work alongside humanitarian agencies in the maintenance of 
peace in conflict regions.
980
 The world’s biggest military power, the US, itself considers the 
use of alternative ways of dealing with international peace and security, admitting its 
inadequacy in these respects. The inconsistency in entrusting international peace and security 
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to the state-based Security Council ought to be obvious. This is a conundrum to which realists 
have no answer.
981
 If a superpower admits its inadequacy to dealing with international peace 
and security issues, then realists must be forced to reconsider the idea that states are only 
actors in the international legal order. 
 
A recent Report of the Panel in 2015 stresses, with regard to conflict prevention and 
mediation, that  
[a]t the global level, the United Nations must mobilize a new international 
commitment to preventing conflict and mobilizing partnerships to support 
political solutions. It must find ways to draw upon the knowledge and resources 
of others beyond the United Nations system through civil society…
982
  
The report explicitly underlines the necessity of alternative civil resources that could be used 
to prevent conflicts more efficiently and to mediation.  
 
Once the Security Council embarks on democratic reform, it would enhance its ability to 
maintain international peace and security. Indeed, a measure of any well-ordered society is its 
ability to resolve conflicts through peaceful dialogue.
983
 Boutros-Ghali asserts that “without 
true democracy in international relations, peace will not endure, and a satisfactory pace of 
development cannot be assured”.
984
 There is thus a strong relationship between democracy 
and peace. The process of democratization in the Security Council, which involves granting 
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formal access to NGOs, can therefore help promote more peaceful settlements in conflict 
cases. As a first step towards democracy, formal participation by NGOs might transform the 
Council’s customary reflex as regards the maintenance of international peace and security, 
enabling it to develop new skills such as the more efficient use of diplomatic power. 
 
What is more, it has become clear enough that responding to international threats by military 
intervention is mostly not the best solution. The Security Council has indeed had a bad 
reputation regarding its military interventions. An example is the Libyan operation of 2011, 
where there was the possibility of managing an agreement through diplomatic means rather 
than using force.
985
  A Libyan expert at the International Crisis Group, Hugh Roberts, said  
One hopes it will encourage NATO and Western governments to reconsider the 
case for a cease-fire, which they appear to have ignored until now; the great 
danger is that out of laziness, politicians will continue to succumb to the false 
argument that there is no alternative to military intervention.’
986
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In some cases such as in Somalia and Rwanda the Security Council simply abandoned the 




In fact, military intervention is mostly the default response to threats to international peace 
and security, as this form of reaction is believed to be the most appropriate. Nevertheless, the 
cosmopolitan perspective urges the international community to take other actions.
988
 Failure 
to do so renders a faulty application of force unlikely to resolve a conflict – in fact, it risks 
making the situation worse. Camilleri asserts that “reliance on force by states has become 
increasingly problematic, and its consequences, intended and unintended, increasingly 
damaging”.
989
 He also emphasises that the issues of peace and security have moved beyond a 
state-centric view of world.
990
 The traditional approaches adopted by the state-centric 
Security Council have thus been doomed to failure. 
 
Moreover, disagreements among the veto powers and the real costs involved always render 
military intervention an expensive option. Maintaining international peace and security 
should not only mean bombing targets and destroying threats (with the attendant threat of 
“collateral damage”, including many innocent people and the most important resources of the 
country). There is a variety of tools with which to maintain peace and security that avoid 
causing new and serious problems. For example, diplomatic means could be essential for this 
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purpose, as could arms embargos.
991
 Diplomacy would be much easier to implement than 
military intervention because a consensus is easier to reach and safer, and its real cost is 
much less. NGOs are the best actors to manage conflicts through these diplomatic 
instruments, and to bring about the conditions for sustainable peace in the countries within 
their spheres of influence. 
 






…the political negotiations proceed in the strictest secrecy…peace-keeping 
operations involve interlinked components-military and civilian-operating in a 
highly volatile political context. Human rights are too often subordinated to 
political or military imperatives.
994
  
Whilst NGOs are keen to sort out problems on a voluntary basis, states are equally intent on 
deal with them in their own interests.
995
 NGOs and states mostly operate according to 
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different values: NGOs are concerned about values such as human dignity and morality, 




States have mostly failed – or have preferred not – to solve problems peacefully, since their 
self-interest leads them to abuse their position and involve themselves in conspiracies. To 
make such entities responsible for maintaining international peace and security would be a 
contradiction in terms. For example, preventing the sale of weapons to dangerous countries 
would be an alternative, yet no state intends to take this measure. Peaceful methods are thus 
more likely to be activated by NGOs than by the state-based system.  
 
Other factors reinforce how military intervention can sometimes be the wrong strategy. For 
example, defining targets as terrorists and then attempting to eliminate them could be risky, 
because today’s terrorist may become tomorrow’s hero. Murithi observes that  
history is replete with erstwhile so-called ‘terrorists’ who are now feted by the 
international community as statesman, including Nelson Mandela of South 
Africa, Gerry Adams of Northern Ireland and the late Yasser Arafat of 
Palestine.
997
   
The same argument could also be made another way: steps taken by the Security Council 
should be as peaceful as possible in order not to provoke significant long-term negative 
outcomes. The Libyan military intervention in 2011 resulted in an ongoing civil war between 
several groups when central authority collapsed, which has in turn led to the exodus of 
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thousands of Libyan migrants
998
 and the country being used as a base by many terrorist 
groups.
999
   
 
Iraq was also subject to a traditional state-based action in 2003 that was widely considered to 
be unlawful. This invasion has led to several ongoing problems in the country and the wider 
region. According to former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan,  
The folly of that fateful decision [to invade Iraq] was compounded by post-
invasion decisions. The wholesale disbandment of the security forces, among 
other measures, poured hundreds of thousands of trained and disgruntled 
soldiers and policemen on to the streets. The ensuing chaos has proved an ideal 
breeding ground for the Sunni radical groups that have now coalesced around 
the Islamic State (IS) label.
1000
   
For reactions to international peace and security issues to be appropriate it is essential to grant 
NGOs a formal place on the Security Council, as they are best means of promoting peaceful 
action. 
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The UN must work with NGOs in order to increase its legitimacy and efficiency.
1001
 NGOs 
activities could be very profitable in this respect. An NGO-enriched Security Council would 
contribute more to international peace and security through its significantly different impact 
on individual views. It would generate increasingly positive feedback because NGOs mostly 
do not use intermediaries. They go to conflict regions with their equipment and their own 
voluntary personnel, who could be from different countries. The Panel Report in 2015 states 
that  
Several local community actors and civil society representatives expressed the 
view to the Panel that they found it difficult to interact with United Nations 
personnel, who appeared remote and aloof. They noted that peacekeepers often 
lacked training on how to deal with traumatized people and that communication 
challenges were often compounded by language barriers. Some expressed 
concern that peace operations did not spend enough time understanding existing 
capacities for peace and protection or conflict mitigation mechanisms and 
simply replaced local structures with exogenous ones.1002 
 
The report further underlines that the UN needs to establish strong communications with 




NGOs could make a significant contribution to the Council in maintaining world peace and 
security. Paul rightly maintains that it is only to be expected that the cooperation between 
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NGOs and the Security Council may eventually contribute to a stronger system of 
international law and “a global order that will eventually ensure the values of peace, 




This proposal does not totally do away with military operations. Rather, this study proposes 
that the Council should ensure that the military option is the last one. The use of military 
force can sometimes be necessary, but reasons of necessity cited by the Council’s state-
centric system cannot be relied upon. Under its current structure the Council does not have 
the actors appropriate to ensure that military force is the last option. NGOs could improve the 
Council’s preventive diplomacy to solve problems without using that option. In fact, military 
operations as a necessary deterrent, when their authoritative use could play a convincing role, 
are the main distinctive feature of the Council. This work thus argues that the Security 
Council should minimize the use of military force by the more active employment of peaceful 
measures, rather than doing away with the military option outright. This might be made 
possible by the formal participation of NGOs. 
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8.6 Preventing Radical Reactions  
 
One of CD’s main purposes is to provide a decision-making process in which individuals 
affected by decision can take part. This would help decrease the number of marginal groups 
that have damaged peace and security through their terrorist activities. According to Boutros-
Ghali,  
democratic institutions and processes channel competing interests into arenas of 
discourse and provide means of compromise which can be respected by all 
participants in debates, thereby minimizing the risk that differences or disputes 
will erupt into armed conflict or confrontation.
1005
  
Such eruption happens mostly because individuals may become involved in violent activities 
when they cannot see any alternative ways of representing themselves. 
 
CD also believes that world democracy could first be achieved by maintaining international 
democracy. Boutros-Ghali and Alger observe that it is not possible to develop local 
democracy without maintaining international democracy.
1006
 The former states that  
sustaining democracy and development within States is closely linked to 
expanding democracy in relations among States and at all levels of the 
                                               
1005
 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, ‘An Agenda for Democratization’ (1996) United Nations, para.17 
1006
 See ‘Local democracy is not feasible without global democracy’ Chadwick F. Alger, ‘Searching for 
Democratic Potential in Emerging Global Governance’ in Bruce Morrison (ed.) Transnational Democracy in 
Critical and Comparative Perspective: Democracy’s Range Reconsidered (Ashgate, 2003) p.103. Also see 
‘Democratization within States may fail to take root unless democratization extends to the international arena’ 
Boutros-Ghali (1996), p.27 
279 
 
international system, therefore, democracy in international relations provides 
the only basis for building mutual support and respect among nations.
1007
  
As the Security Council has tried to promote democracy around the world, it must first be a 
more democratic entity in order to contribute to peace and security.  
 
What is more, the principal causes of war have changed since the collapse of the fascist and 
communist regimes: they are now unfairness and anomie.
1008
 Thomas Franck states that  
how the means of a good life are distributed among peoples and persons and 
whether people and persons are adequately consulted in the decisions that 




That is to say that terrorism is not the main problem: the key issue is the absence of a 
democratic international system that could effectively enable individuals to articulate their 




In this regard, the Security Council must be more democratic in order to represent the 
interests of individuals if it would prevent the emergence of marginal terrorist groups and 
contribute to peace and security. There is also a common belief that “democracy bolsters 
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peace and prosperity, and even quells terrorism”.
1011
 Democracy in the international 
community is the way to foster the involvement of all actors. To do this, the Council must 
employ NGOs by granting them formal participation. Boutros-Ghali emphasises that “non-
governmental organizations are a basic form of popular representation in the present day 
world”.
1012
 Charnovitz also maintains that “NGOs can vocalize the interests of persons not 
well represented in policymaking”.
1013
 By the same token, Philip Caryl Jessup affirms that  
facilities offered for direct action by private international organizations serve to 




Finally, the Panel Report of 2015 also emphasizes that “the need to counter violent 
extremism necessitates that the United Nations reinforce its collaboration with many 
international civil society organizations”.
1015
  NGOs undoubtedly constitute an excellent 
channel for citizens to participate in global affairs, thus increasing the impact of people 
affected by the Council’s decisions.
1016
 Thus, formal participation by NGOs assumes 
particular importance, as they are a key element of a more democratic Council. 
 
Nonetheless, democracy may not provide absolute protection from civil war or international 
conflict. Its main benefit is to provide a process by which a genuine social discourse could 
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take place among individuals legitimately representing the spectrum of opinions and interests 
in a community.
1017
 It is essential for the Council to be able to facilitate a discourse regarding 
international problems before taking a decision that might affect millions of people. Of 
course, decisions can be taken undemocratically, and even then negotiation and discourse 
could occur. Yet “there can never be a genuine social convergence”.
1018
 As argued in Chapter 
II, according to CD international decision-making entities must consider the participation of 
non-state actors in order to reduce the level of social divergence. It is thus truly necessary for 
the prevention of international conflicts to provide for formal participation of NGOs in the 
Security Council. 
 
Since the escalation of international terrorism has posed a challenge to the Council, the 
formal participation of NGOs is a major opportunity to strengthen the interaction between 
that body and the world’s people. According to Boutros-Ghali, when the Council becomes a 
democratic institution it would be more likely to  
promote and respect the rule of law, respect individual and minority rights, cope 
effectively with social conflict, absorb migrant populations and respond to the 
needs of marginalized groups.
1019
  
Whilst it is possible for democracy to foster the evolution of the social contract upon which 
lasting peace can be built, it is plain that “a culture of democracy is fundamentally a culture 











 A more democratic Council that would make a greater contribution to world 
security and peace is possible through the participation of NGOs. 
 
  





8.7 Decreasing Lack of Accountability  
 
The Security Council has become more secretive and unaccountable than ever, meeting 
behind closed doors “in private consultations of the whole” after 1990.
1021
 Critics and some 
prominent states have argued that there is a lack of legitimacy in the Council’s work because 




Liberals believe that  
the “black box” of sovereignty becomes transparent, allowing examination of 
how and to what extent national governments represent individuals and groups 
operating in domestic and transnational society.
1023
  
Scholte believes that participation by NGOs could enhance transparency and accountability 
in global governance by exerting leverage on decision-makers.
1024
 Peter Willet also 
emphasizes that “NGOs make the political process transparent”.
1025
 Formal participation by 
NGOs would thus confer their accountability and transparency on the Council, as they would 
inform public about what transpires in that body.
1026
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Formal participation would allow for progress towards a more participatory Council system. 
It would firstly help inspire and mobilize citizens to hold their governments accountable for 
their actions.
1027
 Council members would therefore be exposed to civic pressure. Secondly, 
NGOs would directly make the Council more accountable. Charnovitz states that “NGO 
involvement may enhance the accountability of IGOs”.
1028
 Boutros-Ghali similarly holds that 
NGO participation “in international relations is, in a way, a guarantee of political legitimacy 
of those international organizations”.
1029
 For example, some international organisations such 




Moreover, some delegates consider the improved relationships between the Council and 
NGOs as a significant stage in the development of a more “legitimate and effective 
international political and legal order”.
1031
 It was believed that NGOs could leverage the 
Security Council and balance it to make it more legitimate.
1032
 When the difficulties with 
informal access are considered, granting formal access to NGOs would be a significant step 
to opening the Security Council and its agenda to public examination and participation. This 
means that the Council would potentially be open to public scrutiny that would make it more 
accountable.  
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8.8 Increase Capability 
 
Since the UNSC’s establishment in 1945 it has always been the ideal forum for discussing 
international conflicts and finding proper solutions. Yet, it is obvious that many threats to 
international peace and security have emerged simultaneously. Ban Ki-moon, UN Secretary 
General, states that “[t]here is widespread feeling and opinion among member states that 
considering such dramatic changes in political and security field in the world, the Security 
Council should change also, in a more democratic way, transparent and accountable way”.
1033
 
Likewise, the former foreign minister of Brazil, Antonio de Aguiar Patriota, has said that “in 
addition to interstate conflict and the proliferation of weapons – particularly weapons of mass 
destruction – new challenges have emerged, such as terrorism and the involvement of non-
state actors in internal conflicts”.
1034
 In that respect, the international legal order has been 
beset by a bewildering multitude of problems, many of which have derived from features of 
international politics that subsequent developments have rendered obsolete.
1035
 Boutros-Ghali 
highlightins the influence that “globalisation has had on the ability of the states to manage 
global problems and dynamics”.
1036
  Nevertheless the Council does not have the capacity to 
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The Security Council’s exclusively state-based system renders it inadequate to deal with all 
these problems in a timely manner. In order to keep pace with the sweeping changes of the 
1990s, the Council must consider the formal participation of these new actors. New, non-state 
actors have increased their influence in world affairs, and it has become indispensable to 
integrate these into existing international structures and mechanisms.
1038
 Granting formal 
access to NGOs would increase its capacity to address international peace and security issues. 
Adam Smith’s classic theory of the division of labour provides a useful model in this 
respect.
1039
 Of all the functions necessary for the Security Council’s operations, it can fulfil 
some only very inefficiently. NGOs are far better placed to play these roles, thereby 
improving the Council’s overall ability to provide more services for the maintenance of peace 
and security. The operational role of NGOs is acknowledged – Wapner among others notes 
that the UN already regards NGOs as significant actors in its operational activities.
1040
 They 
are indeed suitable agents to help the UN implement its mandates and support its 




Greater NGO participation would strengthen the Council as a whole, since globalization has 
produced new challenges to international peace and security. The report of Panel of Eminent 
Persons in 2004 states that “today’s conflicts appear to be more complex than ever”.
1042
 This 
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being the case, states have been unable to cope with these new challenges by themselves.
1043
 
These challenges include, but are not limited to, “global environmental issues, refugee flows 
and mass migration across borders, the rapid spread of infectious diseases, unsustainable 
development models, civil war that threatens international peace and security, drug 





These new challenges have forced States to cooperate with other actors.
1045
 Baehr maintains 
that “the treaty-based monitoring committees and the Charter-based special procedures could 
hardly have functioned, if not fed by the information that is supplied by NGOs”.
1046
 The 
Security Council, as a Charter-based organ, is thus intimately bound up with NGOs’ 
participation. Some authors rightly consider that  
problem solving in an increasingly diverse and complex network/knowledge 
society requires action beyond what states can shoulder, [so] it needs pragmatic 





The Security Council capacity to deal with these new emerging problems is not, however 
adequate because of its exclusive composition of state actors. The Council acts very slowly 
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and sometimes causes deadlock because of its state-centric system and decision-making 
processes. NGOs, on the other hand, have distinct advantages over states and international 
organizations.
1048
 They are generally independent of any sovereign state, enabling them to 
execute international policy more quickly and directly.
1049
 They have a marked ability to cope 
with the new challenges of the international legal order because their possession of 
considerable “on-the-ground knowledge, new tools, new skills in social and cultural analysis, 
the active involvement of communities and their leaders, links to vulnerable groups and 





NGOs are bolder than states. There is no limit to the situations in which they can involve 
themselves; likewise, they can exceed any limits imposed by powerful authorities in calling 
them to account for their wrongful policies.
1051
 Their independence and non-profit nature 
allows NGOs to raise objections to veto powers that the non-permanent Council members 
dare not raise. States’ reasoning is based on their interests, NGOs on their values. Besides, 
NGOs are intrinsically much more altruistic.
1052
 Given the Council’s state-centric structure, it 
would be naïve to hope that it would in the interests of international peace and security.
1053
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NGOs could be a remedy for this lack of altruism in the Council, which they could strengthen 
by monitoring governmental compliance. Otherwise, as the report indicates, “without well-
organized, well equipped social organizations, legislators would find it impossible to apply 




Their unique capabilities in all of these fields increase NGOs’ indispensability as partners for 
the Security Council.
1055
 Kofi Annan declares it to be an absolute necessity to provide “full 
opportunities to non-governmental organizations and other non-state actors to make their 
indispensable contribution to the Organization’s work”.
1056
 The Cardoso Panel
1057
 issued “a 
strong plea for a greater role of civil society organizations in the United Nations system”.
1058
 
The Panel believes that “constructively engaging with civil society is a necessity for the 
United Nations, not an option”.
1059
 It considers such engagement as essential to enable the 
UN to better identify and understand global priorities and to mobilize all resources to deal 
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more effectively with the task at hand.
1060
 In short, it can be concluded that formal 
participation by NGOs is important if the Security Council is to increase its capability to deal 
with problems emerging from the new world order. 
  






Feasibility of the Proposal: Possible but Difficult  
When ideas fail, words come in very handy. 
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe 
 
9.1 Viability of an NGO-Enriched Security Council 
 
Of course, there would be some procedural or political battles around granting formal access 
for NGOs to the Security Council. Significant obstacles must be considered in order to assess 
the real prospects for this proposal. It would be as well to begin with the fact that  
when the UN Charter was drafted in 1945, nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs) attended the San Francisco conference and lobbied successfully to 
obtain Article 71, providing for "consultative arrangements" with the Economic 
and Social Council (ECOSOC).
1061
  
This quote constitutes a reminder not to underestimate NGOs’ lobbying capabilities; it should 
also serve to eliminate doubts about the possibility of them obtaining formal status on the 
Security Council. 
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9.1.1 The Balance of Power Obstacle 
 
An argument that would apply to any reform proposal including the present one is that the 
current balance of power renders the implementation of any such proposition impossible. 
Therien and Belanger-Dumontier state that  
UN discourse and policies related to the promotion of global democracy are 




Any moves toward a more democratic Security Council would thus founder on the purported 
rock of the UN Charter.  
 
However, Chapter VII of the present work demonstrates that there is no conceptual reason to 
preclude the formal participation of NGOs: Article 29 and Rule 39 of the Provisional Rules 
of Procedure of the Security Council are enough for this purpose. Yet Chapters III and VII 
argue that the lack of efficient actors rather than the Charter presents the real obstacle to 
reform.
1063
 The UN Charter is in fact quite flexible in this regard, but states as the so-called 
main actors have been unable to apply efficiently these provisions. 
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The taboo against amending the Charter has also been weakening,
1064
 and demands for UN 
reform, particularly of the Security Council, have correspondingly become significantly more 
insistent. If this were not so, studies, reform projects and restructuring of the Council would 




Claims of the impossibility of Security Council reform serves the interests of those 
permanent members who do not want any new actors to appear in their domain, and who may 
exert pressure on other Council members to comply with this wish. Of course, this does not 
mean that any other party must voice such obstacles, which would only reinforce a sense of 
the hopelessness of reform and encourages concession to the Council’s current structure by 
default. Such a reaction simply serves to perpetuate the current situation, as Maragia 
observes: “such attitudes serve to perpetuate the status quo while ignoring important events 




CD also disputes this deferral to the status quo: it prefers to find an alternative way by which 
to effectively oppose the hegemonic bloc rather than meekly accepting the impossibility of 
doing so.
1067
 Archibugi states that  
the strengthening of international institutions, especially if inspired by the 
values of democracy, would most probably produce the desired effect of obliging 
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the United States and its allies to engage in a foreign policy much more in line 
with their own constitutions.
1068
  
A first step in the discussion might therefore be simply to refuse automatically to defer to this 
pessimistic view of Council reform. 
 
This research offers a way to open the Security Council to NGOs, but that would entail public 
scrutiny; in the long term it would mean that the power of the permanent members would be 
balanced. Such an obvious potential outcome would probably stiffen the Council’s 
disapproval of such measures, the veto powers in particular.  
 
Such resistance is of course not surprising, nor should it cause the proponents of reform to 
despair. Any status quo or privileged power, not only those of the P5, is by nature 
conservative, and would resist any attempt at reform. Murithi observes that members of a 
body will always use their positions to exert a gatekeeper role regarding the degree and 
extend of change to be allowed.
1069
 Archibugi and Held likewise assert that “of course, each 
actor is likely to persuade its own agenda and may be interested only [in] a few of the 
components”
1070
 of the development of a more democratic Security Council.  
 
In this context, “while each agent may act on narrow terms”
1071
, receiving resistance from the 
permanent members or other states is possible – a struggle, perhaps, but not an impossible 




 Murithi (2012), p.137 
1070





one. The resistance of member states, rather than constituting an insuperable objection, is 
thus an obstacle that must be confronted. In this regard, NGOs have mostly been granted 
access over the objections of states. Peter Willets rightly points out that the rights of NGOs 
have become established in customary law in the way which NGOs are often able to access 
intergovernmental proceedings even when the political climate turns against them and when 
there is remarkable opposition or hostility to their presence.
1072
 Such obstacles are thus hardly 
new to NGOs; indeed, their very experience in this respect would help them overcome any 
opposition. 
 
9.1.2 The Difficulty of Establishing Democracy at the International Level  
 
Achieving democracy in the international realm is thus more difficult than it is within 
national boundaries. Accordingly, democratic values and norms have remained very weak in 
many of the world’s regions,
1073
 and it would consequently be hard to expect such states to 
approve the participation of NGOs, a development that would pave the way for democracy. A 
significant number of the UN’s member states are not democratic countries, and many of the 
others are only partly so. Under these circumstances, it is argued that such actors are unlikely 
to support any democratic project.  
 
Therien and Belanger-Dumontier maintain that “it is doubtful that governments unreceptive 
to public debate and participation at home would adopt such values at the global level”.
1074
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The anti-democratic constitution of the Security Council is a natural result of its member 
states’ behaviour. They maintain their own anti-democratic structures while complaining of 
the Council’s. When anti-democratic behaviour is unfavourable to them, they become 
defenders of democracy. This is of course typical of the hypocrisy discussed in Chapter III. It 
could therefore be seen as ironic that they be served by the Security Council. 
 
Nonetheless, the match between the two types of system could be be overwhelmed by such 
states’ desire for democracy: the fact the world has suffered under the Council’s regime for 
decades could be productive of a significant longing among nations for an improved Council. 
Many attempts have indeed been made to change its structure. The efficient maintenance of 
international peace and security is essential also for their benefit. These are significant 
reasons for them to support a more democratic Council. 
 
The approval of other member states, Archibugi argues, is possible because of two significant 
virtues of democratic states. Of course, Realist theorists would not predict a democratic 
stamp of regime to necessarily implement a more virtuous foreign policy.
1075
 Cosmopolitan 
democracy also acknowledges this lesson from the Realists regarding the lack of necessary 
coherency between domestic and foreign policies.
1076
 Yet, cosmopolitan democracy 
underlines two covered virtues of democratic regimes that might make it possible for states to 
‘bridge the ‘real’ and the ‘ideal’ elements of their foreign policies’.
1077
 Archibugi argues that 
the approval of other member states is possible because of two significant virtues of 
democratic states: 
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The first of these two virtues is the interest of states in generating and 
participating in international organizations (Russett and Oneal, 2001) and in 
favouring trans-national associations. The second virtue is the tendency of states 
to nourish a greater respect for rules when these are shared among communities 




In that respect, developing a more democratic Security Council would be for benefit of most 
members of the UN, such a Council would encompass these two virtues. It is thus not 
inevitable that states will oppose this proposal. Archibugi states that  
even from a Realist perspective it would be wrong to think that the interests of 
all actors involved in international politics are opposed to democratic 
management of the decision-making process.
1079
  
Of course, it is not to be expected that undemocratic states such as China and Russia would 
approve such a democratic project. This opposition is likely to last as long as their 
undemocratic systems – which is to say, it is likely to be long term.
1080
 Their permanent 
status on the Security Council also disposes them to a conservative bias. However, were other 
member states to agree on such a project, they would exert significant pressure on the 
Permanent Five.  




 Ibid p.453. 
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9.1.3 The Demands of Appropriate Circumstances 
 
Since the Council system is controlled by states, it is difficult to envision them formally 
agreeing to end their monopoly and “accept sources of international law that are completely 
outside their sphere of influence”.
1081
 Hans Köchler points out the practical difficulty of this 
task.
1082
 In a similar vein, this proposal is unlikely to be considered by politicians or 
diplomats who are wedded to the principles of realpolitik, their own national or political 
benefit and the influence of lobby groups.  
 
Nevertheless, this should not mean that such a project will never be implemented. As has 
been mentioned throughout this thesis, the circumstances necessary to enable this proposal to 
be implemented must be established. James Paul and Céline Nahory emphasise that “the 
Council reform is a process for the long haul, not a quick fix”.
1083
 Consequently, it is 
plausible to say that NGOs can have formal status on the Security Council when states or 
NGOs ensure that the appropriate conditions exist. For example, even regular informal 
meetings were regarded as an unexpected development. James Paul indicates that  
 
The NGO Working Group on the Security Council is an influential forum at the 
United Nations. When it was founded in 1995, no one imagined that an NGO 
body could have regular interaction with Council members at the highest level. 
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But the Working Group proved that the unexpected can happen, even in the 




On the other hand, it would indeed be unfair to disregard the necessity for a progressive 
process.
1085
 “A few years ago, no one spoke of the democratization of the United Nations 
system, [while] today, it can be seriously contemplated.”
1086
 This question has in fact been 
placed on many relevant agenda today.
1087
 The UN was therefore reflecting the nascent 
debate on the democratic deficit in the early 1990s. It has become imbued with the idea
1088
 
that “the model of human political organization means that everywhere the exercise of power 
requires the consent of those that are governed”.
1089
 The formal consultative relations 
between ECOSOC and NGOs have likewise been refined at least three times in regard to the 
developments of world affairs since then, respectively by ECOSOC resolutions 1296 (XLIV) 
in 1968, 1996/31 in 1996 and the 2004 Cardoso Resolution entitled “We the Peoples: Civil 
Society, the United Nations and Global Governance”.
1090
 It is acknowledged that these 
enhancements in NGOs’ roles originate in the realities of the world order, and can be 
considered as a lengthy process of expansion of NGOs’ roles in ECOSOC. 
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The previous chapter has referred to the fact that Article 71 of the UN Charter only mentions 
ECOSOC, empowering that organization alone to make arrangements for NGOs to act as 
consultants on facts regarding which these groups have competence.
1091
 However, these 
relationships have evolved, and so the Secretary-General has accrued the power to invite 
NGOs to General Assembly meetings. Even the Security Council has shared in this 
development as it has been in informal relationships with NGOs since 1982.
1092
 Given these 
facts, it is plain that the development of relationships between the UN and NGOs has been a 
long-term process. The Charter might be important, but circumstances could override any 
objections. For example, even though NGOs have the right to participate in ECOSOC only in 
a consultative capacity, in fact, “NGOs have obtained some participation rights that go 
beyond consultation”.
1093
   
 
All reform proposals agree that building an effective Council is both an important and a 
lengthy process. A mechanism must therefore be devised that would result in a more 
democratic Council. Such reform must be slow in order to overcome resistance to change on 
the part of the permanent members. 
 
Any direct attempt to restructure the Security Council would be faced by the implacable 
opposition of the veto powers. Previous reform proposals that have required Charter 






 Willetts (2000) p.191 
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amendments have fared similarly poorly.
1094
 It would therefore be judicious to ensure that 
any reform proposal was a slow, progressive process in order to overcome the veto obstacle. 
 
Boutros-Ghali maintains that  
dominance by one country or group of countries must over time evolve into a 
democratic international system in which all countries can participate, along 
with new non-States actors involved in international affairs.
1095
  
Establishing a democratic Security Council would be possible in the long term, because even 
though there is no direct veto obstacle, one or all of the veto powers might resist the granting 
of formal access to NGOs. Chuchai Kasemsarn, Thailand’s representative, holds that the veto 
power should first be curtailed and then gradually abolished.
1096
 NGOs could be the agents of 
the Council’s evolution into a democratic system, using conditions in the international sphere 
as leverage.
1097
 After the proper circumstances have been established, the realities of the new 
world order will demand that the holders of power reach an accommodation with NGOs. For 
example, Chapter VIII mentions the case of Yugoslavia in 1993, in which the UNSC 
Resolution mentioned NGOs only by implication.
1098
 Yet ten years later in the case of Sierra 
Leone the UNSC Resolution referred explicitly to them.
1099
 They could bring pressure to bear 
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on states regarding their behaviour, and could gradually transform attitudes and practices in 
order to permit the formal participation of NGOs in the Council.  
 
9.1.4 No Need to Amend the Charter  
 
There might be no direct, comprehensive solution to designing a perfect Security Council 
when the current balance of international relations is taken into consideration. It is easier to 
persuade states to take single steps towards a democratic Council than to commit them to 
endorsing a general programme promoting such an institution.
1100
 Granting formal access to 
NGOs would be a first step towards a more democratic Council. Conferring formal access 
rights is not a general proposition, since it is possible to establish such a relationship by the 
affirmative vote of nine members.
1101
 It is thus perfectly feasible, because it involves no 
amendment to the Council’s structure. This can be seen as an advantage. 
 
What is more, the outcomes of a more democratic Security Council are likely to evoke major 
support from UN members. Boutros-Ghali believes that democracy will ensure that the 
weaker voices in the international system are heard. This would make the present proposal 
highly attractive to most members of the UN, who have been kept isolated from the outset by 
the organization’s mechanism. Such an outcome would of course also provoke the opposition 
of the powerful states that have mostly dominated the Council. The majority support of the 
weaker actors would, however, overwhelm this obstruction, in part because the weak states 
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form more than two-thirds of the UN, a majority that would make a more democratic Council 
quite likely. 
 
9.1.5 Requirements of a Progressive Approach 
 
One might think that the achievement of democracy within the Security Council requires a 
radical and direct transformation.
1102
 The Council’s state-centric structure would not, 
however, realistically embrace any such immediately thoroughgoing change, since that would 
depend on extraordinary events. Even when it is possible for a system to adopt changes, it 
would require a long period of time to do so. This does not surprise Archibugi and Held,
1103
 
according to whom the number of UN actors that must be consulted in the decision-making 
process has already increased significantly, implying that pluralism in international relations 
has steadily expanded. It is therefore highly possible for some long-term trends toward a 




The application of direct, radical changes may have negative effects such as the withdrawal 
of member states. The demise of the League of Nations
1105
 was due partly to the unreadiness 
of the international system and its constituent states to come together under the aegis of an 
organization to discuss their problems. The aftermath of World War II, and especially the 
spectre of nuclear holocaust, made states graphically aware that they should find ways to 
avoid war. Informal meetings between the Security Council and NGOs were at first rejected, 
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 For example, it has been acknowledged that the US’s absence was a reason for the League’s expiry. 
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but when states realized that they had to accept the existence of NGOs, they agreed to meet 
with them, at least informally. Some process is therefore imperative to prepare the ground for 
the establishment of a new system.    
 
9.1.6 The Status Quo Obstacle 
 
It is also possible to believe that  
the status quo is intact and the likely scenario is that the appearance of [the] 
process towards SC reform will continue to plod along for another few decades 




Yet this would be to ignore developments in the UN system. James Paul believes that NGOs 
could take encouragement from their evident efficiency, speed of reaction, success and “the 
breadth of their support by international public opinion”.
1107
 They have thus achieved a 




The UN has been much more attentive than before to the “claims of transnational movements 
that promote a more inclusive and democratic vision of global governance”.
1109
 Therien and 
Belanger-Dumontier point out that “the UN has indisputably helped the idea of global 
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democracy to more firmly take root in modern political life”.
1110
 Member states are indeed 
already aware that the current structure is out of date, but they might endeavour to maintain 
their positions as long as they can. Thus, it would be more accurate to say that Council 
reform may take a long time, until member states are no longer able to sustain the status quo. 
When the situation does finally arise, the five permanent members will have to fix the 
Council’s system by allowing formal access to NGOs. 
 
NGOs could occupy a more exalted place than states allocate to them.
1111
 One example that 
illustrates how NGOs could progressively have access to the decision-making process of an 
international treaty is Article 8(3) of the Convention Concerning the Protection of the World 
Cultural and Natural Heritage of 1972,
1112
 which reads  
…at the request of States Parties to the Convention meeting in general assembly 
during the ordinary sessions of the General Conference of the UNESCO, 
representatives of other intergovernmental or non-governmental organizations, 




Another is that, after NGOs were afforded a place, the Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) also provided access to NGOs. 
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 ibid p.372 
1111
 “Things did not, however, quite happen the way governments had initially planned, and NGOs quickly 
started to occupy more space than had been made for them.” Hachez  (2008), p.68 
1112
 The General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO) meeting in Paris from 17 October to 21 November 1972 
1113
 These NGOs are specified in the same articles as in the International Centre for the Study of the 
Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property (ICCROM), a representative of the International Council of 
Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS) and a representative of the International Union for Conservation of Nature and 
Natural Resources (IUCN) 
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According to Article 11(7) of the CITES convention, NGOs could be “represented at 
meetings of the Conference by observers, shall be admitted unless at least one-third of the 
Parties present object”.
1114
 In these cases, NGOs accomplishments eventually persuaded 




The veto power might seem to render the participation of NGOs on the Security Council 
difficult. This is true in that some permanent, and even non-permanent, members would 
demonstrate hostility to granting NGOs formal participation rights. In fact, this would only 
result in challenges and delays: it would indeed make such access more difficult, but not 
impossible. Peter Willets disagrees that NGOs are rejected for political reasons. He believes 
that “hostility from particular governments often leads to challenges and perhaps delay, but 
not rejection”.
1116
 He also asserts that rejection or underrepresentation of NGOs arises from 
their own negligence of the UN.
1117
 Besides, as mentioned in Chapter VIII, formal 
participation of NGOs in the Council is important for the sake of the elected members and 
those states that have complained about the permanent members. Apart from the Permanent 
Five, such a proposal could therefore receive considerable support from UN members.  While 
not underestimating the role that states’ approval would play, the greater part by far is 
actually played by the performance of NGOs themselves. 
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 CITES Convention Article 11(7) http://www.cites.org/eng/disc/text.php#XI 
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 NGOs first targets were friendly governments, from which a synergism emerged that allowed NGOs to 
influence decision-makers. NGOs’ lobbying power enabled them to frame the issues under discussion and 
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Thomas G. Weiss, Ahead of Curve?: UN Ideas and Global Challenges (Indiana University Press, 2001), p.117 
1116





As discussed in Chapter IV, there is no definitive legislation providing for participation by 
NGOs. Circumstances therefore play the determining role in this regard. It follows that one 
cannot predict the inevitability of the rejection by Russia, China or any other permanent 
members of participation by NGOs on the Council, because circumstances might confound 
such an expectation. Besides, the informal access already enjoyed by NGOs under suitable 
conditions makes it highly likely that formal participation also will be granted. 
 
9.1.7 Supporting Developments 
 
Another consideration supports the feasibility of this reform proposal: the power of the 
Council’s permanent members has already been eroded by significant changes in the 
international legal order. NGOs have persuaded the Council to adopt certain resolutions even 
though they are not non-permanent members, meaning that their unofficial status on the 
Council does not preclude their successfulness. The new demands posed by the international 
legal order have also encouraged the Security Council to accept that the UN Charter is not 
immutable.  
 
The UN Charter clearly requires the vote of all permanent Council members in order take 
action under Chapter VI and Article 52(3).
1118
 Yet the Council can still claim authority even 
                                               
1118
 Article 27 of the UN charter states that “Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made 
by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided 




when one of its permanent members does not cast a vote by abstaining or by absence.
1119
 This 
is one example that shows how the Charter could be reinterpreted by considering 
circumstances. 
 
When the international legal order before the 1990s is compared to the subsequent period, it 
can be observed that the Security Council has already decreased its authority and shared its 
responsibilities. The founders of the Charter aimed to confine its system largely to the 
maintenance of international peace and security by the five permanent members of the 
Security Council.
1120
 Article 39 explicitly confirms this authority, Article 12 precludes the 
General Assembly
1121
 from debating security issues on its own authority, and Articles 52-53 
limit regional organizations to acting only with Security Council approval; even the 
Secretary-General’s
1122
 powers are ineffective and weak in this respect.
1123
 The major 
powers, the five permanent members of the Security Council, have enjoyed their Charter-
mandated position as the only rulers with the authority to discuss security subjects and 
address solutions pursuant to the UN Charter. 
                                               
1119
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Nevertheless an evolution of customary international law has resulted from new demands; the 
limitations described above have already been exceeded. The UN Charter has therefore been 
reinterpreted in order to make it conform to the facts of the international legal order. For 
example, the clear statement of the Charter, the “Uniting For Peace” resolution, was taken by 
the General Assembly to claim authority in the field of security and peace because of the 
Council’s ineffectiveness. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold also “expanded his own 




More interpretations and developments followed after the collapse of the Cold War. Since 
1968, the provisions of ECOSOC Resolution 1296 (XLIV) has governed the rules and 
procedures concerning NGO consultative status with ECOSOC and its subsidiary bodies. 
Changes in the relationship between the UN and NGOs, and in the level of participation by 
NGOs in the work of the UN, have been manifested in the series of UN conferences held 
during the 1990s, in ECOSOC subsidiary bodies such as the Commissions on Sustainable 
Development, Human Rights, and the Status of Women, and elsewhere across the UN 
system. “NGOs have become more present, active and influential at the international level, 
and more directly engaged in intergovernmental policy setting processes”.
1125
 Some 









 ECOSOC Concludes NGO Review (November 1996) < http://www.globalpolicy.org/home/177-un/31786-





The Security Council even has started to arrange regular informal meetings with NGOs under 
the Arria Formula in order to benefit from the latters’ experience
69
 – a marked improvement 
on their formerly rare ad hoc interactions with NGOs. It was clear that when circumstances 
do change, it impels the relevant parties to take action in order to deal with the new situation. 
In fact, this began to occur even in the Charter’s first decade. 
 
These examples provide evidence that the UN Charter is not immutable, and that its 
interpretation can be adapted to changing circumstances. The formal participation of NGOs 
does not even contravene the Charter, obviating the need for reinterpretation. Although the 
resistance of traditional states may make approval of such measures difficult, the Security 
Council’s previous granting of some concessions certainly imply that it is amenable to 
change when necessary or when circumstances make such developments indispensable. It is, 
in short, becoming increasingly possible for NGOs eventually to obtain formal access to the 
Security Council. 
 
9.1.8 Implications for the Veto Power 
 
Apart from all these considerations, some think that removing the Permanent Five’s veto 
power is essential. They may therefore criticize any proposal that does not advocate this on 
the grounds that it would not address the Council’s problem. As mentioned in Chapter III, a 
significant problem regarding the Council is the lack of effective actors. Tools such as the 
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“Uniting for Peace” resolution and Article 27 are available.
1127
 In any case, this does not 
mean that the veto power is not an obstacle, so it might in fact be true that that power poses a 
significant problem regarding the Council, and consequently that it should be removed. 
 
However, if the system does not permit such a step, it is more plausible to consider 
alternative ways.  Any proposed solution would otherwise be stymied. The main aim of this 
proposal is to offer a solution that would be both curative and feasible. The Security Council 
is as it were diagnosed by the present work as suffering from a severe problem that by its 
nature requires a long course of treatment. Such treatment necessitates patience because an 
immediate solution is simply not applicable. “Overdosing” may cause crises for no positive 
return, and may actually lead to termination. Practical limitations must be considered. 
Demanding the removal of the veto would have the same “overdosing” effect on the 
permanent members while still not addressing the problem of the Council’s state-centrism 
and its inefficiency in dealing with international problems. 
 
History has witnessed momentous changes in social organization worldwide.
1128
 
Contemporaries considered such changes as impossible, even unimaginable. The “elitist 
                                               
1127
 As mentioned in Chapter III, the “Uniting for Peace” resolution could be used to take action when the 
Council fails to do so; Article 27 states that nine Council votes are required to authorize elected members to 
prevent the Council from taking undesirable steps. 
1128
 For example, women did not even have the right to vote until the late 19th century. The US constitution has 
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312 
 
approach” emphasized that the highest social strata such as kings should be in authority 
because they considered them to be an inevitable and unalterable fact of social life.
1129
 
However, there are only a few examples of such systems in the current world order. Their 
existence could simply have been as products of their times, in which the idea of an 
administration without kings or an elite class was seen as being as unrealistic as Security 
Council reform appear to some today. Whenever a proposal mentions measures to reform the 
Council such as removing the veto from permanent members, it is immediately regarded as 
unrealistic. It might indeed be unrealistic at present to change the Council’s structure, but this 
situation should certainly not be regarded as permanent. 
 
In that respect, there are in fact some examples of the UN’s actions not strictly conforming to 
the letter of its Charter. NGOs have been granted rights, even though these are not mentioned 
in any provision of the Charter. They have taken part in some specialist UN conferences from 
the UN’s very inception.
1130
 While their rights at such conferences have been notably fewer 
than in ECOSOC, their political status and chances of participation have been significantly 
higher since the mid-1980s.
1131
 In addition, the rule in Article 27 states that “affirmative 
votes” of Security Council members are required, but the Council’s practice has been that a 
resolution can be adopted by the Council even if a permanent member abstains. In short, it is 
possible for NGOs to exert further leverage on Council members to persuade them not to use 
their veto power, although there is no provision for this in the Charter.  
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 Fredrick Engelstad, ‘Democratic Elitism: Conflicts and Consensus’ in Heinrich Best, John Higle eds. 
Democratic Elitism: New Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives (Brill Academic Publishers 2010) p.61 
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 Willetts (2000), p.193 
1131
 The UN’s practice has established global norms for diplomatic behaviour, even enabling NGOs to influence 





There are significant problems with the Security Council, both in the UN Charter and in 
practice. The Charter provides the permanent Council members with a veto power. In 
practice, the first difficulty arises from the use of that power. More problems have been 
raised by the Council’s members themselves. Its non-permanent members have not yet 
blocked any decision taken by the five permanent members, and the Uniting for Peace 
Resolution authorises the General Assembly to be final decision-making body on peace and 
security issues. Yet this authority has mostly been ignored; most UN members have instead 
criticised the permanent Council members for the Council’s failures. Any attempts at reform 
that rely on the UN’s members are therefore unlikely to change the situation.  
 
Secondly, the international legal order has entered the post-Westphalian era. It is thus also 
important to consider the new facts of the international legal order in order to develop a 
Security Council that is more representative, accountable and efficient. These facts are the 
emergence of non-state actors in the international legal order and new problems that states 
find it hard to deal with but whose resolution is possible by non-state agents. This study 
proposes that the Security Council should grant formal access to NGOs as new actors capable 
of dealing with new problems. In that respect, the arguments of CD theory have proved to 
support the purposes of this study. 
 
As has been discussed, it is preferable for the Security Council to shift its position from “an 
anchor set in granite” to “an anchor set in sand”. For Thomas Franck the UN Charter should 
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be considered as a “living tree”.
1132
 Realists may reject such a proposal as idealistic and 
impracticable. Yet the international legal order has changed significantly, and is still 
evolving. It is thus the claim that the Security Council’s structure should retain its current for 
that is in fact neither practicable nor realistic, flying as it does in the face of remarkable 
international developments.
1133
 The present author would certainly reject such an approach to 
the problem as quite unrealistic. Past attempts at reinforcing international democracy have 
often met with stiff resistance from a minority of powerful states.
1134
 However, such 
opposition to democracy has proved to undermine the efficiency of the Security Council; the 




Of course, this proposal might at first be considered as too contentious.
1136
 States have so far 




 New UN 
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon could if he wanted to revive the panel’s suggestions, but he 




Nonetheless, the preceding discussion makes it clear that this is not a new situation: not many 
reform proposals have received support from states. It would not therefore be a 
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 Menno T. Kamminga, ‘What Makes an NGO Legitimate in the Eyes of States?’ in Anton Vedder (ed.) NGO 
Involvement in International Governance and Policy: Sources of Legitimacy (Brill, 2007), pp.175-195, p.188. 
1137
 Cardoso report, as aforementioned, recommends to improve and formalize relations with NGOs. See: 
A/59/817.  
1138





straightforward step or an easy one for the Security Council to grant formal access to NGOs. 
However, this obstacle would be progressively overcome with the patient influence of NGOs. 
These would need to cooperate closely in order to overcome those obstacles.
1140
 Wiessner 
and Willard state that “an actor with actual or potential influence is a candidate for 
participation in the decision process”.
1141
 NGOs would also be granted further access 
commensurate with their increasing influence.  
 
Wapner argues that while innumerable problems plague interactions with civil society, “we 
can look at those relations as a dynamic interplay in which efforts toward good governance 
are slowly but significantly being worked out”.
1142
 Gillian observes that “it is absolutely clear 
that, one way or another, relationships with NGOs are going to continue and grow”,
1143
 and 
foresees that their relationships with the UN will deepen and strengthen. As the world 





The time has come for the Security Council to conform to present conditions and prepare for 
the future rather than preserve the past.
1145
 If the Council continues to attempt to confine 
NGOs to a purely informal position, thereby ignoring the important developments that have 
been taking place outside the UN, it runs the risk of losing its central position, and even its 
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relevance, in facing the challenges of global governance.
1146
 On the other hand, it is highly 
likely that NGOs will progressively, even without consent of states, obtain formal places in 
the Security Council.
1147
 Donini states that  
new issues and actors are knocking at the UN's door. It is no longer possible to 
keep them out; if the door is locked they will come in through the window or the 
cracks in the floor.
1148
  
Archibugi asserts that  
it is no vain hope, therefore, to believe that in time the citizens of the world will 




When such measures have been enacted de jure, its effect will depend on the practice of 
states in the short term and civil society in the long term. Thus, “only time will tell if this 









 Teubner asserts that the dynamics of current world order make it possible for civil society to free itself from 
the restrictions that nation-state politics had imposed on them.  Gunther Teubner, 'Global Private Regimes: Neo-
Spontaneeous Law and Dual Constitution of Autonomous Sector in World Society?' http://www.jura.uni-
frankfurt.de/42852650/global_private_regimes.pdf 
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9.3 Limitations of the Study 
 
Providing for formal participation for NGOs is obviously not a comprehensive solution. Be 
that as it may, such a measure would be a step towards a more democratic Security Council. 
CD considers the participation of individuals who are affected by the decision-making 
process. Although many non-state actors could be considered as representatives of 
individuals, this study limits itself to participation by NGOs. Even in this regard, general 
evaluation and sources regarding NGOs have been avoided, as the emphasis has remained on 
relations between the Security Council and NGOs. 
 
 
9.4 Future Research  
 
This paper has mostly addressed the outcomes of formal NGO participation. There might of 
course be other outcomes not mentioned, each of which could each be analysed in depth.  
This thesis also addressees the participation of NGOs as non-state actors, without dealing 
with other types of non-state actor such as businesses, individual experts and Secretariat 
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